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Résumé 
Deux décennies après l’adoption de la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés en 1951, 
l’affluence du nombre de réfugiés réclamant l’asile aux frontières occidentales a mené les États 
européens à instaurer des règles restrictives pour dissuader les demandeurs d’asile à se réclamer 
de cette protection internationale au sein de leurs territoires respectifs. Une des mesures 
préventives récentes est la directive sur « Pays d’origine sûrs » (POS) dont l’objectif est 
d’identifier les requérants non éligibles à recevoir la protection internationale, car issus de pays 
considérés sécuritaires. Ce travail de recherche propose une étude comparative entre les 
directives de l’Union européenne adoptées en 2005, puis réformées en 2013 et la Loi sur 
l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés en vigueur au Canada. 
D’une part, nous analysons l’impact néfaste de cette directive dissuasive sur les droits 
fondamentaux des demandeurs d’asile en provenance de pays d’origine désignés, notamment en 
ce qui a trait à leur droit à une entrevue individuelle ainsi que leur droit d’en appeler de la 
décision qui a été prise et leur refusant l’asile. D’autre part, nous démontrerons comment 
l’étendue des limites substantielles à l’égard des droits fondamentaux des demandeurs d’asile en 
provenance des POS est contradictoire avec les obligations constitutionnelles de l’UE et du 
Canada, notamment celles formulées dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union 
européenne, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et la Charte canadienne des droits 
et libertés. Bien que l’élaboration et l’application des règles adoptées par les systèmes juridiques 
mentionnés souffrent de plusieurs défauts violant les droits fondamentaux des demandeurs 
d’asile en provenance de pays d’origine désignés, nous démontrerons que l’approche du Canada 
a des conséquences plus draconiennes sur des demandeurs d’asile en provenance de POS que 
celles découlant de la loi commune applicable dans l’UE. Finalement, nous conclurons que les 
États occidentaux ne devraient pas se limiter à une solution à court terme telle celle du POS. Ces 
États devraient avoir plus de responsabilités et offrir une protection internationale accrue en 
soutenant les pays près de zones de conflits tout en établissant un programme réaliste permettant 
d’accueillir un nombre précis de réfugiés tous les ans. 
Mots Clés : Pays d’origine sûrs – Pays d’origine désignés – Droits humains – Droits 
procéduraux – Droit à l’entrevue individuelle – Droit d’appel – l’Union européenne – Canada – 
Réfugiés requérants – Demandeurs d’asile 
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Abstract 
Two decades following the adoption of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
the growing number of asylum seekers arriving at the Western countries’ borders convinced 
European States to put in place new asylum rules to prevent asylum seekers from reaching their 
borders and dissuade the potential refugee applicants from seeking international protection in 
their respective territories. One of the most recent preventive measures has been the “Safe 
Countries of Origin” rule (hereafter SCO) whose main purpose is to identify and reject refugee 
applicants who are not in real need of international protection since they originate from countries 
which are deemed generally safe. In this research, we conduct a comparative study between the 
European Union’s Directives adopted in 2005 and recasted in 2013, and the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act enacted by the Canada.  
At the first step, we intend to verify the adverse impact of this deterrent rule, during the 
expeditious determination procedure, on the SCO asylum seekers’ fundamental human rights 
including the right to personal interview and the right to appeal. At the second step, our objective 
is to demonstrate to which extent the fundamental human rights limitations imposed on SCO 
asylum seekers are in contradiction with the EU’s and Canada’s constitutional obligations 
undertaken respectively in EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Based on this comparative 
research we illustrate that, while the elaboration and the application of the SCO rule in both the 
above-mentioned legal systems suffer from inherent flaws which infringe the basic human rights 
of SCO refugee applicants, Canada’s approach has had more drastic consequences on the SCO 
refugee applicants than those resulting from the EU’s common asylum law. Finally, we conclude 
that, instead of a short-term solution such as the SCO rule, the Western States must accept more 
responsibilities in providing international protection by supporting the countries that border the 
crisis zones, and establishing a workable program to accept a specific number of asylum seekers 
every year. 
Keywords: Safe Countries of Origin - Designated Countries of Origin - Human Rights -
Procedural Rights - Right to Personal Interview - Right to Appeal - the European Union - Canada 
- Refugee Applicants - Asylum Seekers 
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Introduction 
Questions involving international asylum seekers have persisted throughout human history. 
Since the twentieth century, these questions have become an international legal issue that 
requires specific legislation, regional cooperation, and international agreements. To date, the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees1 (hereafter the 1951 Geneva Convention) 
remains the most notable international attempt to define refugee statuses, along with the major 
principles that provide adequate protection for refugees.   
Two decades after ratifying the convention, however, the humanitarian objectives surrounding 
refugee protection changed as Western States began to view it as a legal instrument that was ill-
equipped to handle problems regarding the arrival, acceptance, and resettlement of refugee 
applicants at their borders or within their territory.2 The reasons why this internationally 
established refugee regime went from a responsive system to one that is widely considered 
inadequate include, among others, a sudden and unexpected mass influx of refugees from non-
European countries in particular, along with those originating in countries not normally 
associated with refugees, such as Asia, Africa, and Central or South America, the appearance of 
persons with a stateless status, the globalization and dissemination of information and low-cost 
transportation, which altered the scale of displacement and facilitated access to Western Europe 
and North America, along with time-consuming and costly refugee admission processes, which 
exposed the inherent deficiencies surrounding national asylum legislation in Western countries.3 
                                                            
 
1 The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (28 July 1951) online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>. 
2 Gretchen BORCHELT, “The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union: A Misguided Approach to Asylum 
Law and a Violation of International Human Rights Standards”, (2001) 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.473, p. 491. 
3 Daniele JOLY, Clive NETTLETON and Hugh POULTON, Refugees: asylum in Europe?, Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, p. 
5-6; Tomas HAMMAR, European immigration policy: a comparative study, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, p.249-250; Ninette KELLEY and Michael J. TREBILCKOK, The making of the mosaic: a history of Canadian 
immigration policy, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2010, p.352-353 and p.381; Rebecca HAMLIN, Let me be a 
refugee: administrative justice and the politics of asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p.47. 
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Since the early 1980s, a dramatic rise in asylum applications filed in Western States has created 
an extensive backlog surrounding the refugee determination process. In Western European 
countries, for example, the number of refugee claims went from 64,000 applications in 1983 to 
192,000 in 1986. Similarly, the number of overseas refugees selected in Canada rose from 7,300 
in 1977 to 52,000 in 1991, and the number of inland refugee claimants increased from a few 
hundred in 1977 to several thousand in 1980.4 Consequently, Western governments have begun 
implementing a new asylum system primarily intended to prevent refugee applicants from 
reaching their territory,5 discourage potential refugees from approaching their borders,6 and 
reduce the likelihood that asylum seekers will gain access to their refugee determination 
process.7 
With a growing number of asylum seekers since the late 1980s,8 the inability of Western States 
to reduce the refugee application backlog in their national asylum system has exposed the 
inefficiency and short-lived impact of deterrents and dissuasion measures like visa 
requirements,9 carrier sanctions on transportation companies,10 detention,11 and the rejection of 
                                                            
 
4 W.R. BOHNING, “Integration and immigration pressures in western Europe”, (1991) 130(4) International Labour 
Review 445, p.447; Ninette KELLEY and Michael J. TREBILCKOK, prec., note 3, p.381. 
5 Agnès HURWITZ, The collective responsibility of States to protect refugees, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 
p.22(part1) and p.5(prat 3); Matthew J. GIBNEY and Randall HANSEN, “Asylum Policy in the West: past trends, future 
possibilities”, (2003) WIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER), No. 
2003/68, p.5, online: <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/52741>. 
6  Matthew J. GIBNEY and Randall HANSEN, prec., note 5, p.7-9; Kay HAILBRONNER, “The concept of ‘Safe Country’ and 
expeditious asylum procedures: a Western European perspective”, (1993) 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 
31, p.36. 
7W.R. BOHNING, prec., note 4, p.449; Maryellen FULLERTON, “Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights”, (1988) 29(1) Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 33, p.35-39; Maryellen FULLERTON, “Failing the Test: Germany Leads Europe in Dismantling 
Refugee Protection”, (2001) 36(2), Texas International Law Journal 231; James C. HATHAWAY, “Harmonizing for 
Whom: The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in the Era of European Economic Integration”, (1993) 26(3) Cornell 
International Law Journal 719, p.720-721; Kay HAILBRONNER, prec., note 6, p.31-37; D. JOLY, C. NETTLETON and H. 
POULTON, prec., note 3, p. vii-2 and p. 19-20; Eva KJAERGAARD, “The Concept of ‘Safe Third Country’ in Contemporary 
European Refugee Law”, (1994) 6 (4) International Journal of Refugee Law 649; Andrew SHECKNOVE, “From Asylum 
to Containment”, (1993) 5(4) International journal of refugee law 516. 
8 W.R. BOHNING, prec., note 4; Kay HAILBRONNER, prec., note 6, p.36. 
9 Agnès HURWITZ, prec., note 5, p.5(part 3); Ninette KELLEY and Michael J. TREBILCOCK, prec, note 3, p.404. 
10  James C. HATHAWAY, prec., note 7, p.720-721; Agnès HURWITZ, prec., note 5, p.5(part 3) ; Matthew J. GIBNEY and 
Randall HANSEN, prec., note 5, p.6.  
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basic socio-economic rights for asylum seekers.12 As the primary European destination for 
asylum seekers at the time,13 Germany, Austria and Switzerland were faced with new backlogs in 
their asylum systems when 438,191, 20,000 and 41,629 requests were filed in 1991 and 1992, 
respectively.14 In Canada, the number of inland refugee applicants reached its peak at 37,000 in 
1992.15 As a result, these countries concluded that the main objective should not be to prevent 
access to the host country’s borders, but to limit the stay of asylum seekers while accelerating the 
asylum process to hasten their removal. A rationale built on social, political and moral 
considerations stated that the longer asylum applicants resided in the host country, the harder it 
became to reject and remove them.16 Consequently, policymakers implemented new and 
restrictive rules that would provide a judicial and administrative boost to the integrity and 
efficiency of their asylum determination process by identifying and separating the legitimate 
refugee claims from the unfounded ones.17 
The main focus of our research involves the concept of safe countries of origin (hereafter 
“SCO”) or designated countries of origin (hereafter “DCO”), introduced as a new measure in 
Canadian refugee law.18 The SCO concept refers to a country of origin based on its legal and 
political situation, the general presumption of safety is conceivable and justifiable in the sense 
that its nationals do not qualify for international protection.19 These rules are intended to be 
applied during the preliminary examination or at the start of the determination process20 to 
recognize and remove asylum seekers who do not warrant international protection, along with 
those who are not eligible for refugee status because they originated from a safe country that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
11 Matthew J. GIBNEY and Randall HANSEN, prec., note 5, p.8. 
12Id.; Kay HAILBRONNER, prec., note 6. 
13 Kay HAILBRONNER, prec., note 6. 
14 Id. 
15 Ninette KELLEY and Michael J. TREBILCKOK, prec., note 3, p.381. 
16 Matthew J. GIBNEY and Randall HANSEN, prec., note 5, p.9. 
17Id., p.7-9; Gerry Van KESSEL, “Global Migration and Asylum”, (2001) 10(10) Forced Migration Review 10, p.11. 
18 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27, s.109.1; Kay HAILBRONNER, prec., note 6. 
19 Hemme BATTJES, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p.344. 
20 Kay HAILBRONNER, note 6, p.32. 
4 
 
 
provides adequate protection21 and poses no serious risk of persecution,22 inhuman treatment, or 
degrading punishment.  
In effect, this initiative represents a new avenue for the general practice known as safe country 
practice, which includes different rules such as safe third country, first country of asylum, and 
safe country of origin. The first two rules were implemented in the early 1980s in Europe by the 
Scandinavian countries,23 while the third was brought forward at the beginning of the 1990s.24 In 
general terms, the safe country practice was implemented to prevent asylum seekers who are not 
in any real (safe country of origin) or urgent (safe third country or first country of asylum) need 
of protection from gaining access to a complete examination during the first instance of the 
determination process.25 Thus, the safe country concept theoretically refers to two distinct but 
interconnecting situations. The safe third country or first country of asylum rule applies when 
asylum seekers come from a third State in which they have already found protection, or when 
they acquire a reasonable opportunity to seek protection at the border of, or within, the third 
country’s territory before continuing to their destination State.26 There may be cases, however, 
where the nationality or formal residence of the asylum seekers’ involves a State that is generally 
considered safe due to its low refugee rate and where the asylum seekers, or the group to which 
they belong, are not at risk of persecution. This situation led to the creation of new measures 
regarding safe countries of origin.27 While questioning the basis of refugee claims, asylum 
seekers from safe third countries, first  countries of asylum, or safe countries of origin are now 
                                                            
 
21 Sabine WEIDLICH, “First Instance Asylum Proceedings in Europe: Do Bona Fide Refugees Find Protection”, (2000) 
14(3)Geo. Immigr. LJ 643, p.650-651. 
22 European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution ("London 
Resolution"), 30 November 1992, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f86c6ee4.html>. 
23Agnès HURWITZ, prec., note 5, p.1 (part3). 
24 Cathryn COSTELLO, “Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, 
Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection?”, (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law 35, 
p.50. 
25 Matthew J. GIBNEY and Randall HANSEN, prec., note 5, p.9-12. 
26European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning 
Host Third Countries ("London Resolution"), 30 November 1992, para.2(c), online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f86c3094.html>. 
27European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution ("London 
Resolution"), prec., note 22, para.1. 
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denied the standard (case-by-case) asylum procedure by the receiving State, resulting in an 
expeditious application process with very restricted procedural and appeal rights. 
With regard to national legislation in Western States, some authors claim that Switzerland was 
the first country to adopt this new and restrictive measure in its national asylum laws.28 The 
concept, however, was quickly implemented in Western European States, owing to the “policy-
sharing interactions characteristic”29 of asylum legislation. In other words, the sudden 
appearance of the SCO rule in Western European countries stems from an implicit intention to 
promote the “procedural race to the bottom”30 by exercising more restrictive measures in an 
effort to appear equally, if not less, unfavourable than neighbouring States.31 By the mid-1990s, 
the SCO rule had been incorporated into the national asylum policy of many Western European 
countries, including Switzerland (1990), Austria, Finland, Luxembourg (1991), Germany (1992), 
Portugal (1993), Denmark (1994), The Netherlands (1995), and the United Kingdom (1996).32 It 
is not clear which of these preventive or restrictive measures proved most efficient in reducing 
the refugee application backlog in the EU, but by the end of the 1990s the number of asylum 
seekers had seen a significant decline in the EU Member States, dropping from nearly 700,000 
requests in 1991 to fewer than 300,000 in 1997.33 
The safe country practice was implemented by EU Member States through the creation of the 
Common European Asylum System when it adopted the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 
December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
                                                            
 
28 Cathryn COSTELLO, prec., note 24. 
29Id. 
30Id.; Matthew HUNT, “The Safe Country of Origin Concept in European Asylum Law: Past, Present, Future”, (2014) 
26(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 500, p.504. 
31Matthew HUNT, prec., note 30, p.503-505. 
32  Cathryn COSTELLO, prec., note 24, p.51; Henry MARTERSON and John MCCARTHY, “’In General, No Serious Risk of 
Persecution’: Safe Country of Origin Practices in Nine European States”, (1998) 11(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 
304, p.306; European Parliament, “Asylum in the European Union: The “Safe Country of Origin Principle””, 
November 1996, p.4-5, online: <http://aei.pitt.edu/4906/1/4906.pdf>. 
33 Sabine WEIDLICH, prec., note 21, p.646; Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees, 
“Asylum Procedures Report on Policies and Practices in IGC Participating States”, 2009,p.14 ,online: 
<http://www.igc-publications.ch/pdf/IGC_AsylumProcedures_2009_Bluebook.pdf>. 
6 
 
 
withdrawing refugee status,34 and the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection.35 These two supranational instruments have been enacted with the purpose of 
ensuring a harmonized asylum procedure among the EU Member States while avoiding the 
unsatisfactory outcomes that result from a lack of asylum policy coordination across the EU. The 
SCO concept is more controversial in Canada due to its recent, 2012 inclusion in Canadian 
refugee legislation.36 
Since the early years of the SCO rule, there have been widespread objections from refugee and 
human rights experts.37 Concerns were raised regarding the measure’s precarious effects on 
asylum seekers. The objections pointed to violations of the fundamental principles and 
requirements surrounding international refugee protection enshrined in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention,38 such as the examination of each specific refugee application,39 the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion or nationality when implementing the convention40 
and, more importantly, the infringement of a cornerstone principle known as “non-refoulement” 
incorporated in major international refugee and human rights laws, including the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,41 according to which “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return 
                                                            
 
34 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32005L0085&from=EN>. 
35 European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013L0032&from=EN>. 
36Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27, s.109. 
37 James C. HATHAWAY, The rights of refugees under international law, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 
p.333-335; Henry MARTERSON and John MCCARTHY, prec., note 32; Rosemary BYRNE and Andrew SHACKNOVE, “The safe 
country notion in European asylum law”, (1996) 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 185; Nazare ALBUQUERQUE ABELL, 
“The Compatibility of Readmission Agreements with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”, 
(1999) 11(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 60. 
38The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, prec., note 1, art.33. 
39Id., art.1(A)(2) and art.32. 
40Id., art.3. 
41 The United Nations General Assembly, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, (10 December 1984), art.3, 
online:<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx>. 
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(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened”42 or “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture”43 due to his race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.44 
The crucial effects of this restrictive rule are more understood regarding the current refugee and 
human rights crisis the global society in general, and the Europe in particular, face these days 
giving grounds for more rigorous and comprehensive inquiry.  In fact, the civil wars exploded in 
the Northern Africa and the Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen, Lybia, Afganistan, and 
Iraq have devastated these countries socially, politically and economically which eventually have 
forced millions of their nationals to be displaced internally or escape to the neighboring countries 
and the EU Member States seeking international protection. What makes this situation worst is 
the six years of civil war and consequently the human rights disaster in Syrie which has entailed 
millions of asylum seekers in other countries. The unprecedented movement of asylum seekers 
and sudden rise of refugee applications in the EU Member States, in particular the Eastern and 
the Southern European countries, have paralysed the Western States to put forward effective 
responses and durable solutions to this catastrophic human rights situation in providing 
international protection and accepting Syrian refugees, along with other asylum seekers from the 
Middle East and the Northen African countries. In essence, the Western States’s reaction to this 
refugee crisis has not been acceptable comparing to the neighboring countries to the conflict 
zones such as Turkey (more than 3 Million Syrian refugees)45, and Lebanon (1.1 Million Syrian 
                                                            
 
42The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, prec., note 1, are.33(1). 
43 The United Nations General Assembly, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, prec., note 41, art.3(1). 
44 The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, prec., note 1, art.33(1); James C. 
HATHAWAY, prec., note 37, p. 279-370; Elihu LAUTHERPACHT, Daniel BETHLEHEM, “The scope and Content of the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion”, in Erika FELLER, Volker TURK and Frances NICHOLSON (dir.) Refugee Protection 
In International Law, UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press,  2008, p. 87; Walter KALIN, Martina CARONI, and Lukas HEIM, “Article 33, para.1 (Prohibition of Expulsion or 
Return (‘Refoulement’)/ Défense d’Expulsion et de Refoulement) “, in Andrea ZIMMERMANN (dir.), The 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Oxford,  Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 
1327. 
45 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Turkey: Key Facts and Figures”, September 2016, 
online: <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/51498>. 
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refugees), and Jordan (635,324 Syria Refugees)46, regarding to fundamental economic, political, 
social and human rights shortcomings these countries undergo, while reaching their capacity in 
accepting and settling these asylum seekers. 
This situation, bringing about the worst human rights and refugee crisis since the World War II, 
have placed the questions relating to the Western States asylum policies as one of the most 
discussed and concerning topics among the press and the Western policy makers. Unfortunately, 
the refugee crisis is dealt by the Western governments with referring to those already 
experienced restrictive and preventive refugee policies and legislation inefficiency of which in 
resolving the mass movement of asylum seekers and reducing the security concerns of Western 
societies have been proved during the past three decades. One of the irresponsible and 
instantaneous responses is the closure of external borders of EU or quick and massive expulsion 
of asylum seekers without considering their human rights conditions in the transit States, safe 
third country, or their country of origin launched by certain Balkan countries including Hungary, 
Croatia, and Slovenia blocking the main refugee route to Northern European countries, in 
particular, Germany. On the other hand, the inability of the neighboring countries and reluctance 
of EU States in acceptance and receiving the augmenting refugee requests, have left no other 
way for asylum seekers to turn to people smugglers while risking their lives in passing the sea by 
unseaworthy boats or other dangerous paths to reach the internal borders of EU. According to 
UNHCR’s monthly data update in October 2016, respectively in 2015 and between January to 
October 2016, over 1 million and more than 300,000 asylum seekers have fled wars, violence 
and persecution in their countries in search of safety to Europe by passing Meditteraen Sea, 
while tragically in this period of time, about 7,000 asylum seekers have been missed or drowned 
in this dangerous journey especially children.47  
                                                            
 
46 Amnesty International, “Syria’s refugee crisis in numbers”, 6 February 2016, online:  
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/>.  
47 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refugee/Migrants Emergency Response- Mediterranean”, 
8 October 2016, online: <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>, The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees Canada, “Over one million sea arrivals reach EU in 2015”, 30 December 2015, online:  
<http://www.unhcr.ca/news/over-one-million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-in-2015/>. 
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In another effort to resolve the refugee crisis in EU, the European Council has made a deal with 
Turkey on 18 March 2016, known as EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. As the most worrying aspects48, 
according to the deal, Turkey, already housing more than three millions asylum seekers, has 
committed to accept the irregular migrants rejected from EU, in exchange for abolition of visa 
restriction imposed on Turkish citizens, facilitating the negotiation of Turkey accession to EU, 
and EU funding of €3bn for resettlement of 72,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey.49 
Meanwhile, the restrictive measure such as SCO rule has yet kept its dominant role in pushing 
back unwanted asylum seekers which prove its importance among the other preventive asylum 
rules. For instance, Germany has proceeded to reform its refugee law by adding new countries to 
its national list of SCO including Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, with the main purpose of 
reducing the social and political pressure of acceptance and presence of the third country national 
in its territory.  
Hence, while a great deal of academic research has been conducted to reassess the SCO rule in 
relation to other preventive or restrictive measures, more research is needed due to the rapid 
expansion of the rule in the Western States and its violation of the fundamental principles 
surrounding international refugee and human rights laws. In terms of our study, however, the 
most important reason that would justify a rigorous and comprehensive study of this rule 
involves its decisive role in fast-tracking unfounded asylum claims and the expulsion of rejected 
refugee applicants. The main concerns involve the denial of the principle of procedural fairness 
by imposing very short time frames to prepare SCO applicants for the determination process and 
to allow decision-making authorities to rule on SCO refugee applications, the rejection of basic 
procedural rights for SCO asylum seekers, including the omission of the right to a personal 
                                                            
 
48 For more critiques about this agreement, refer to: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report of the 
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, “The situation of refugees and migrants under the EU-
Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016”, 19 April 2016, D0c.14028.  
49 The European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, online:  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/3/40802210113_en.pdf>, European Commission, 
Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement- Questions and Answers, 15 June 2016, online:  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm>. 
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interview and limited appeal rights, along with the obvious influence of intergovernmental or 
economic relations between States when establishing the SCO list.  
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the extent to which the procedural consequences 
and basic human rights limitations imposed on the SCO asylum seekers during the accelerated 
procedure, which includes the restriction on the right to a personal interview and the right to 
appeal, comply with the constitutional obligations agreed upon by the European Union and 
Canada under their fundamental human rights charters. For this purpose: 
1. Chapter one will define the notion of the SCO rule by referring to the intergovernmental 
instruments that initially led to its implementation in the Western European States. This 
chapter will also take a detailed look at the European Union’s shared asylum legislation 
regarding the SCO rule, including the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 
on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status50 and the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection,51 with particular attention given to the provisions of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights52 and the European Convention on Human Rights.53 
2. Chapter two will reassess the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,54 which includes 
the concept of designated country of origin and its obvious violation of the Canadian 
government’s constitutional obligations under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.55  
                                                            
 
50 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34. 
51 European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, prec., note 35. 
52 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN>. 
53 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights), (4 November 1950), online:  
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Convention_ENG.pdf>. 
54Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27. 
55 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act of 1982, [enacted as Schedule B to the 
Canadian Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)]. 
11 
 
 
3.  In Conclusion, as the last part, we will examine the key implications that were drawn 
from a comparative study of EU and Canadian asylum legislation and provide 
recommendations for future improvements. 
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Chapter 1: Development and harmonization of the SCO rule 
in the EU  
The concept of SCOs was established by the Western European countries in the early 1990s,56 
implemented extremely fast in all EU Member States’ asylum systems,57 and after two decades, 
was incorporated into Canadian asylum legislation.58 It seems reasonable to begin with both the 
legally mandatory or non-mandatory documents adopted at the EU level, in order to understand 
the definition of and modifications imposed on this restrictive rule for nearly two decades, as 
well as its consequences for the regional and national refugee protection systems of the Western 
States. This restrictive measure was developed during the process of establishing a common 
asylum policy and legislation at the EU level and can be divided into three distinct stages.  
The first stage involved primary steps toward harmonizing asylum law, which led to the passage 
of instruments such as the Schengen Agreement of 198559 and the Schengen and Dublin 
Conventions of 199060 by the EU Member States at the intergovernmental level, outside the 
realm of EU competence and free from the supervision of the EU’s parliamentary and judicial 
body. Even after the Maastricht Treaty61 entered into force and asylum matters were incorporated 
into the newly created Justice and Home Affairs Pillar (Third Pillar), the EU was not granted the 
                                                            
 
56 Cathryn COSTELLO, prec., note 24. 
57 Id., p.51; Henry MARTERSON and John MCCARTHY, prec., note 32; European Parliament, “Asylum in the European 
Union: The “Safe Country of Origin Principle””, prec., note 32. 
58 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27, s.109. 
59 The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 
(14 June 1985), online: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922%2801%29&from=EN%3E>. 
60 European Union, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the  
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders ("Schengen Implementation Agreement"), 19 June 1990,  
online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(02):en:HTML> ; Convention 
determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the 
European Communities - Dublin Convention, (15 June 1990), online: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01)&from=EN>. 
61 The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, online:  
<http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf>. 
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necessary competence to enact legally binding asylum law or create a coordinated asylum policy 
for all the Member States. This was, for the most part, because the Member States did not want 
to give up their prerogatives to the European Community in a domain that interfered directly 
with their sovereignty rights on their territory. The asylum legal documents adopted by the EU in 
at that time also had an intergovernmental nature and suffered from weakness such as 
undetermined timelines, ambiguous objectives, the absence of a concrete law-making structure 
and the unclear legal nature of the adopted instruments.62 
The essential documents adopted under the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar were the resolutions 
the EU Council of Ministers Responsible for Immigration (hereafter ECMRI) ratified in 1992 
and 1995 as guidelines for the Member States to harmonize their national asylum procedures. 
Given their non-binding legal effect, the Member States were under no obligation, but merely 
“agreed to seek to ensure that their national laws are adapted, if need be, and to incorporate the 
principles of this resolution as soon as possible.”63 Nevertheless, since these resolutions–the 
1992 Conclusion on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution,64 the 
1992 Council Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum65 and the 1995 
Council Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures66 in particular–were the first 
documents, at the EU level, to provide the primary definition of the SCO rule, the basic 
conditions constituting a safe country of origin and the procedure under which SCO applications 
were to be decided, they will be briefly explained in Part 1 to demonstrate the EU’s first 
perceptions of the SCO concept, as a starting point for more detailed discussions of the SCO rule 
implemented in EU common asylum legislation in 2005 and 2013. 
                                                            
 
62 Sylvie Da LOMBA, The Right to seek Refugee Status in the European Union, Antwerp; New York, Intersentia, 2004, 
p.13. 
63 European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, 
para.4, online: < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f86bbcc4.html>. 
64 European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution ("London 
Resolution"), prec., note 22. 
65 European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, 
prec., note 63. 
66 European Union, Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31996Y0919(05)&from=EN>. 
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While the first stage was characterized by disparate legislative cooperation with undetermined 
objectives and ineffective results, the next stage was the first phase toward establishing the 
Common European Asylum System (hereafter CEAS), which commenced when the Treaty of 
Amsterdam entered into force in 199767 and provided the necessary legal basis for adoption of 
the first instrument under the new competence granted to the European Union, the Council 
Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status,68 which will be reassessed in Part 2. 
In its last attempt to repair the flaws inherent in the first phase of establishing the CEAS, 
including the legislation framework, the major inconsistencies between the legislated provisions 
and the EU’s human rights obligations and the Member States’ failure to transpose and 
implement the common EU asylum measures,69 the European Community began revising the 
instruments passed in the first phase and enlarging the European asylum system.70 This 
ambitious objective was inspired while reconsidering the Asylum Procedures Directive of 2005 
in order to ensure increased harmonization in the implementation of procedures among the 
Member States,71 decrease the difficulties caused by the lack of coordinated application of the 
EU’s common asylum rules on secondary movements of asylum seekers within the Union and 
                                                            
 
67 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, and certain related acts (Consolidated Version), (97/C 340/01),  10 November 1997, online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL&from=EN>. 
68 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34. 
69 Doede ACKERS, “The Negotiations on the Asylum Procedures Directive”, (2005) 7(1) European Journal of 
Migration and Law 1, p.33. 
70 Matthew HUNT, prec, note 30, p.522-524; Francesca IPPOLITO and Samantha VELLUTI,  “The Recast Process of the 
EU Asylum System: A Balancing Act Between Efficiency and Fairness”, (2011) 30(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 24, 
p.28-32; Steve PEERS, “The second phase of the Common European Asylum System: A brave new world- or lipstick 
on a pig?”, 8 April 2013, Statewatch, p.1-2, online:  
< http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-220-ceas-second-phase.pdf>; Commission of the European 
Communities, “Policy Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection across the EU”, 17 Jun 2008, Com 
(2008) 360 final, online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0360:FIN:EN:PDF>; Council of the European 
Union, The Stockholm Programme- An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 4 May 2010, 
(2010/C 115/01), online: 
 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52010XG0504(01)&from=EN>. 
71 Francesca IPPOLITO and Samantha VELLUTI, prec., note 70, p. 32. 
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“increase mutual trust between Member States.”72 The 2013 Recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive’s provisions, compared to those of the Asylum Procedures Directive of 2005, will be 
discussed in Part 3. 
 
Part 1: Preliminary instance of common European asylum 
legislation 
The European Economic Community was created in 195773 with the primary objective of 
economic integration. Real cooperation regarding asylum and immigration policy within the 
European Community began in the early 1980s with a sudden increase in the number of refugee 
claims, leading to the adoption of intergovernmental provisions outside the framework of the 
EU.74 What convinced the EU Member States to legislate shared asylum provisions was the fact 
that the unilateral mainstreaming of immigration and asylum policies could at some points 
temporarily reduce the pressure of refugee claim backlogs. However, this system ended up 
generating more difficulties, such as the phenomena of asylum in orbit,75 asylum in limbo76 and 
                                                            
 
72 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme- An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens, (2010/C 115/01), prec., note 70. 
73 European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version), Rome Treaty, 25 March 
1957, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39c0.html>. 
74 European Union, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the  
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders ("Schengen Implementation Agreement"), prec., note 60; 
Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member 
States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention, prec., note 60; A.G. HURWITZ, prec., note 5, p.14 (Part1). 
75 This is a situation where the asylum seeker is not granted refugee status in any country where he/she applied for 
international protection. As a result, the countries in which the asylum application is lodged send constantly the 
asylum seeker to another country without considering themselves responsible to examine merit of the asylum 
claim. 
76 The problematic living condition of ‘asylum in limbo’ is an unknown status where asylum seekers are awaiting 
the result of their initial refugee claim or their appeals of the refugee status determination decision for an 
undetermined time. The situation of asylum in limbo can also be reproduced where the receiving country leave 
asylum seekers in detention centers or in refugee camp without any durable solution. 
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asylum shopping,77 and in practice failed to provide the expected result of permanently pushing 
the constant influx of asylum seekers back from EU borders. 
When the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 199278 and cooperation in the field of asylum 
and immigration was incorporated into the triple shared framework of the EU under the Third 
Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, another objective was defined regarding cooperation in the 
field of asylum legislation, although still with an intergovernmental character:79 reducing the 
security concerns of EU Member States. In fact, EU Member States’ major concern involved 
deterring asylum seekers from accessing EU borders because of security and terrorist threats. In 
other words, it was assumed that the economic integration, gradual abolition of internal frontiers 
and freedom of movement within the EU would endanger EU Member States’ territorial integrity 
and public safety.80 European policymakers tried to tackle the security gap caused by the 
abolition of internal frontiers between the Member States by adopting compensatory rules in the 
fields of terrorism, criminal actions and asylum seekers. Along with the intergovernmental 
activities of the Member States outside the Community’s framework, the ECMRI decided to 
issue recommendations for harmonizing policy on regular and expeditious asylum procedures, 
the application of safe third country and safe country of origin principles and manifestly 
unfounded asylum requests among the EU Member States. These recommendations resulted in 
the adoption of four non-binding instruments during meetings in 1992 and 1995:  
• Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning 
Host Third Countries with the objective of resolving the problems caused by the complex 
and ambiguous application of the safe country concept among the Member States81  
                                                            
 
77 This expression refers to the context within which, because of different asylum systems among certain countries 
in a region like European Union, the asylum seekers try to find a refugee country with more favorable asylum 
legislation or better social conditions by requesting refuge in several countries or they pass some countries, while 
being able to apply for asylum in transit countries, and head to an specific State to lodge their refugee application. 
78  The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty on European Union, prec., note 61. 
79 Id., Title VI. 
80 A.G. HURWITZ, prec., note 5, p.15-.16 (part 1); J.C. HATHAWAY, prec., note 7,p.719. 
81 European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning 
Host Third Countries ("London Resolution"), 30 November 1992, point 2(c), online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f86c3094.html>. 
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• Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for 
Asylum82   
• Conclusion on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution83 
• Council Resolution on Minimum guarantees for asylum procedures84 
Of these documents, the last three directly refer to the SCO concept, propose the criteria for 
identifying safe countries of origin, introduce the expeditious procedure for decisions on SCO 
refugee applications and determine the procedural principles to be observed by the Member 
States. These documents will be explained briefly in the next two sections. 
1.1: Conclusion on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of 
Persecution85 
This instrument, containing only six paragraphs, mainly concerned the questions surrounding 
safe countries of origin, with the purpose of reducing the heavy burden of refugee application 
backlogs on the Member States’ determination process, providing international protection for 
asylum seekers who merit it and deterring bogus refugee applicants from abusing the Member 
States’ asylum procedures.86 
For the first time, apart from the Member States’ national legislation, a definition of SCO for the 
entire EU was given in paragraph 1 of the Conclusion as:  
[A] country which can be clearly shown, in an objective and verifiable way, normally not 
to generate refugees or where it can be clearly shown, in an objective and verifiable way, 
                                                            
 
82 European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, 
prec., note 63. 
83 European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution ("London 
Resolution"), prec., note 22. 
84 European Union, Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, prec., note 
66. 
85 European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution ("London 
Resolution"), prec., note 22. 
86 Id., para.2. 
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that circumstances that might in the past have justified recourse to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention have ceased to exist.87  
As a positive interpretation, according to this definition, it is only permissible to designate a 
whole country as an SCO, without any geographical or population exceptions. It is therefore not 
acceptable to designate part of a country as safe or identify it as safe for a particular group. 
However, the negative point that can be drawn from this definition is that the safety of a State is 
conceivable only if the life or freedom of its nationals is not threatened under the provisions of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention. Infringement of the provisions of other major international human 
rights legal instruments, such as the 1984 Convention against Torture and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in the country in question are not relevant to the rejection of its 
general safety.  
The Conclusion set out four criteria for evaluating the security of a country for its nationals. It is 
not clear which of these four criteria had a more decisive role in determining the general safety 
of the third country. It seems that the Member States were to consider all these factors. The 
requirements consisted of:  
1. Previous numbers of refugees and recognition rates. Under paragraph 4(a) of the 
Conclusion, the Member States were required to “look at the recognition rates for asylum 
applicants from the country in question who have come to Member States in recent 
years.”88  
Although the ECMRI admitted that the stable conditions of a safe country of origin could 
change in subsequent years, it did not specify the circumstances under which the Member 
States should ignore previous low rates of refugee acceptance of the SCO’s nationals and 
remove the designated country from the SCO list. It simply mentioned that “in the 
absence of any significant change in the country it is reasonable to assume that low 
                                                            
 
87 Id., para.1. 
88 Id., para.4(a). 
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recognition rates will continue and that the country tends not to produce refugees.”89 
However, it is illogical to consider a low rate of acceptance one of the main indications of 
a country’s safety over the number of refugee applications. In addition to the difficulties 
in gathering accurate information from a third country, a growing number of refugee 
applications is the most significant indication of a changing human rights situation and 
calls into question the general and objective assumption of the safety of a country under 
inquiry. 
The precarious effect of this provision on future SCO refugee applicants is that in 
addition to the presumption of safety, which makes it harder for them to prove their 
persecution claims and denies them a fair determination procedure, it is irrational to 
expect the Western States to be able to react properly to a sudden human rights crisis in a 
third country where most of the human rights violations remain undocumented and 
unknown to the international community, especially persecution caused by State actors 
against minority ethnic, sexual or religious groups. In this context, refugee applications 
would be recognized as unfounded because their national country had been previously 
designated as an SCO, and the low acceptance rate would reaffirm the presumption of 
safety, preventing the Western States from monitoring the actual human rights conditions 
in the third country and encouraging them to reject more refugee applications from 
countries assumed to be safe. This ambiguous provision was in line with the prevalent 
belief among the Western States’ policymakers, who concluded that the reduced 
admission of a third country’s nationals resulted from the implementation of safe country 
rules, demonstrating that most refugee applicants from safe countries are economic 
migrants and do not deserve international protection from the Western States.90 
2. Observance of human rights. According to paragraph 4(b) of the Conclusion, the third 
country’s respect for human rights may be demonstrated by two factors, including 
“the formal obligations undertook by a country in adhering to international human rights 
instruments and under its domestic law” and “how in practice it meets those 
                                                            
 
89 Id. 
90 For a detailed discussion in this regard, see: Kay HAILBRONNER, “The concept of ‘Safe Country’ and expeditious 
asylum procedures: a Western European perspective”, prec., note 6. 
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obligations.”91 This paragraph is the most notable provision of the Conclusion because of 
its stress on the real practices of the third country rather than complete reliance on the 
international obligations agreed to by the third country. It reiterates that  
[A]dherence or non-adherence to a particular instrument cannot in itself result in a 
country being considered as one in which there is generally no serious risk of 
persecution. It should be recognized that a pattern of breaches of human rights may 
be exclusively linked to a particular group within a country's population or to a 
particular area of the country.92 
Also, the Conclusion correctly stipulated the third country’s openness to monitoring by 
human rights NGOs as one of the most reliable indications of its commitment to observe 
its international human rights obligations. Thus the Member States, during the process of 
determining safe countries of origin, are warned about paying attention solely to 
international refugee and human rights legal instruments the third country has ratified. 
The central focus must be not only on the formal and general reports issued by officials 
of the third country in question, but also on the actual human rights situation for minority 
groups, especially those living far from large cities. In order to gather up-to-date and 
reliable information about these groups, the Member States are strongly urged to take the 
reports of expert human rights NGOs into consideration.  
3. Democratic institutions. Paragraph 4(c) can be interpreted as complementary to the 
second criterium, which stated that “consideration should be given to democratic 
processes, elections, political pluralism and freedom of expression and thought,”93 along 
with the availability and effectiveness of judicial redress provided by the executive and 
judicial body of the third country, as one of the most important manifestations of the 
presence and accessibility of adequate protection in the third country.94 
4. Stability. While the ECMRI recognized the possibility that a stable, safe situation could 
change in the country of origin as previously mentioned, no guidelines were given to the 
                                                            
 
91 European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution, prec., note 
22, para. 4(b). 
92 Id. 
93 Id., para.4(c). 
94 Id. 
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Member States on how they should verify changing human rights situations in third 
countries or when a third country should be excluded from the SCO list. The ECMRI left 
this worrisome matter to the Member States’ discretion, which proved to be influenced by 
other factors than human rights considerations, such as economic, political or military 
intergovernmental relations.  
In short, the ECMRI ignored the fact that the SCO rule contradicts the rationale behind the 
establishment of a refugee protection regime. Asylum seekers appear and international protection 
is required when minority groups of different ethnicities, religious beliefs or political opinions 
are threatened in their country. It is challenging and complicated for the Western States to 
understand the real human rights practices in third countries, as well as the degree of suppression 
and the persecution that the people endure under conservative or radical governments with 
entirely different cultures, administrative law and judicial systems. Is any evidence more 
convincing than an increasing number of asylum seekers from a particular country arriving in a 
Western country to justify a potential lack of safety and human rights violations in that third 
country?95 Although there will always be a certain number of fraudulent refugee applications, 
without adequate guarantees in the first instance decision and appeal procedures, it is totally 
unacceptable to determine safe countries of origin under such ambiguous and general 
requirements. 
All these factors are theorically relevant and crucial in assessing the safety of a third country, but 
it is unrealistic to believe that the Member States will properly take into account these criteria as 
well as the real practices of the third country, especially since under the provisions of the 
Conclusion, they are completely entitled to designate a safe country of origin according to their 
national legislation only. When the Conclusion was being drafted, the EU faced strong resistance 
from the Member States regarding interference in their national legislation on the movement of 
asylum seekers and acceptance of refugees. In the end, the Conclusion did not improve on the 
SCO concept, and the only outcome was an official affirmation of the Member States’ neglectful 
                                                            
 
95 Rosemary BYRNE and Andrew SHACKNOVE, prec., note 37, p.186. 
22 
 
 
practices in reducing the number of asylum seekers and ignoring human rights violations 
currently occurring around the world. 
1.2: The Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum96 and 
the Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures97 
In general terms, a refugee status determination process to identify asylum seekers eligible for 
international protection normally consists of a full and detailed examination of the merits of 
every refugee application and provides rejected refugee applicants with the right to appeal. The 
general principles and the fundamental rights provided for asylum seekers during regular 
determination procedures were set out in the Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum 
procedures. However, with the growing influx of asylum seekers and the emergence of 
restrictive and preventive measures in the Western States’ asylum systems, a specific 
determination process with the central objective of recognizing manifestly unfounded or clearly 
fraudulent refugee claims at the first stages of the determination process has been created in the 
form of an “accelerated procedure” or “expeditious examination.” During this process, the 
decision-making authorities are permitted to focus on objective factors rather than the claim’s 
detailed and substantive considerations during their examination.98 The especial procedural rules 
and the possibility of ruling on SCO applications using accelerated procedures were legislated 
under the Council Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum. 
While the expeditious procedure developed in all Member States’ asylum systems,99 it was not 
defined comprehensively in any document ratified under the Third Pillar. The Resolution on 
Manifestly Unfounded Application for Asylum simply referred to the accelerated procedure as a 
process that does not encompass comprehensive assessment of the application at every level of 
the determination and introduced the most common applications that may be ruled on during an 
accelerated procedure, including clearly unsubstantiated claims, fraudulent asylum requests and 
                                                            
 
96 European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum 
("London Resolution"), prec., note 63. 
97 European Union, Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, prec., note 
66. 
98 Sabine WEIDLICH, prec., note 21, p.659. 
99  Id.; Kay HAILBRONNER, prec., note 6. 
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SCO refugee applications100 that “shall be regarded as manifestly unfounded.”101 The Resolution 
on minimum guarantees for asylum procedure enumerated certain principles that the Member 
States should respect or may disregard during accelerated procedures. In this part, these two 
resolutions will be explained together to give a more comprehensive perspective on the SCO rule 
and its consequences during accelerated procedures. It is important to note that according to the 
Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, the Resolution on minimum 
guarantees on asylum procedure and the Conclusion on Countries in Which There is Generally 
No Serious Risk of Persecution, it is completely up to the EU Member States to designate safe 
countries of origin and decide whether to examine refugee requests from these countries in an 
accelerated procedure.102  
The ECMRI requirements that the Member States must observe during an expeditious procedure 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. Under paragraph 3 of the Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, 
the ECMRI suggested a time frame of one month for deciding on SCO applications using 
an accelerated procedure,103 but the details were left to the national legislation of the 
Member States. The Resolution did not clarify how the Member States should identify 
asylum seekers in urgent and real need of protection or how to give refugee applicants 
enough time to present their well-founded fear of persecution under the fast track 
procedure. How can asylum seekers, who have been traumatized in their own country and 
during the journey to the destination country, be expected to trust the determining 
authority in a short period of time and express their story without forgetting the key 
points that are essential to the interviewer’s decision? Is it realistic to expect decision-
making officials who process many asylum applications at the borders or in airports on a 
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daily basis to be able to recognize real asylum seekers through a limited admissibility 
procedure, especially applicants from safe countries of origin, knowing that many 
genuine refugees correspond to examples of manifestly unfounded applications at the 
first stages of the asylum process?104  
2.  The ECMRI required guarantees that the personal interview be conducted by fully 
qualified officials to make decisions on applications within an accelerated procedure.105 It 
is a positive sign that the Resolution considered that the crucial role of the personal 
interview is to make the first instance determination process fairer, in particular for SCO 
refugee applicants. The requirement that refugee applications be examined by “an 
authority fully qualified in the field of asylum and refugee matter” and the right to a 
personal interview were unconditionally affirmed later in the Resolution on minimum 
guarantees for asylum procedures.106 
3. Although according to the above paragraph, the appeal procedure for decisions rendered 
in an accelerated process would be more simplified compared to regular rejected refugee 
requests, the ECMRI urged the Member States to provide appeal or judicial review rights 
for refugee applicants whose requests were refused during an expeditious determination 
process.107  
In this regard, there are some contradictions between the resolution adopted in 1992 and 
the resolution passed in 1995. Under the provisions of the 1995 Resolution on minimum 
guarantees for asylum procedures, the ECMRI expressly permitted the Member States to 
deny unfounded refugee applicants (including SCO applicants) the right to appeal if “an 
independent body which is distinct from the examining authority has already confirmed 
the decision.”108 
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Though rejected asylum applicants were permitted to stay in the Member State’s territory 
while appealing a negative decision, except for refugee applicants recognized as 
unfounded based on “deliberate deception or an abuse of asylum procedures,”109 in cases 
where an asylum application was determined to be manifestly unfounded during a special 
procedure at the border prior to the admission procedure and the application was 
consequently refused, the Member States were permitted to disregard the principle of 
suspensive effect of appeal.110  
These provisions cannot be justified in any way whatsoever in relation to the principles of 
fairness and efficiency of asylum procedures reiterated in the Resolution on minimum 
guarantees for asylum procedures,111 in particular with regard to the vital role of the right 
to appeal and the suspensive effect of appeal in preventing refoulement of SCO refugee 
applicants, who experience a higher burden of proof and shortened time frame for the 
first instance decision process. 
4. Fortunately, under paragraph 8 of the Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications, 
the Member States were encouraged not to channel SCO applications to an accelerated 
procedure automatically before individually considering every SCO application and 
assessing any specific claim presented by the asylum seeker that may contradict the 
general presumption of safety in the country of origin.112 In other words, the ECMRI 
intended to require the Member States to implement the SCO rule as an absolute bar, 
denying SCO asylum seekers a fair chance to substantiate their claims and removing 
them without fully considering the merit of their applications during a detailed and fair 
determination procedure.  
This short review reveals a missing element in the Western States’ asylum system. Categorizing 
asylum claims and transferring them to a simplified and accelerated examination procedure is the 
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first step toward further violations of refugee rights and rejection of fundamental procedural 
principles. That is why without the necessary safeguards, such as the right to a personal 
interview, the right to appeal and the right to stay in the receiving country’s territory while 
awaiting the appeal decision, these accelerated procedures are suspect.113 Although it was 
contended that the objective of the ECMRI resolutions was to resolve the problems of genuine 
refugees facing restrictive asylum rules and persuade the Member States to establish a fair and 
efficient asylum procedure, these non-binding instruments were not able to make a significant 
difference or motivate serious reforms in the EU Member States’ safe country practices because 
of the lack of necessary legislative competence, executive body and judicial institutions to force 
the Member States to obey the adopted provisions and modify their diverse asylum practices.114 
On the other hand, the development of asylum law from unilateral national initiatives to a 
multilateral process demonstrates the considerable change that refugee protection theory and 
practices experienced at the EU level. The main reason for establishing international refugee law 
was to create a global consensus on protecting the fundamental human rights of asylum seekers 
deprived of their own government’s protection. However, this objective has been replaced by 
increasingly restrictive measures and preventive practices among the EU Member States, with 
the objective of reducing their security concerns and meeting their economic goals. The key 
problem with the European Community’s asylum regulations, as Hathaway has underlined, is 
ignorance of the fact that the international refugee protection rules incorporated in the 1951 
Geneva Convention do not contradict the interests or sovereignty of the Member States; on the 
contrary, they are “an attempt to reconcile the dominant intention of States to control entry into 
their territories with the human rights reality of forced migration.”115 
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Part 2: The first phase of establishing a Common European Asylum 
System  
The most meaningful step toward the creation of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) commenced with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty.116 As explained in the previous 
section, primary collaborations in the field of asylum law in the EU started and expanded in the 
1980s at intergovernmental fora to satisfy the Member States’ concerns about losing their 
discretion in asylum matters.117 Although the major provisions adopted at this time represented 
an essential contribution to the creation of shared asylum policy and rules among EU Member 
States, the efforts of Western European governments, given the abolition of internal borders, 
were intended to develop and implement more sophisticated measures to prevent asylum seekers 
from reaching the EU’s external borders and increase the discretionary power of EU States in 
asylum law.118 Nevertheless, the Member States’ reluctance to create shared legislation of 
asylum provisions with the EU and the lack of an explicit intention to harmonize regulations in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of international refugee and human rights law 
created a complicated situation with an even more severe refugee application backlog.119  
In the mid-1990s EU Member States, conscious of the shortcomings of intergovernmental 
cooperation at the Third Pillar level, came to the conclusion that issues involving asylum seekers, 
as an integral part of the internal market and free movement of persons, had to be part of a joint 
system with a harmonized and sustainable approach.120 This was the major role of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which introduced a new area in the shared EU legislation structure, clarified the 
goals to be achieved in the development of common EU asylum and immigration law and 
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policy121 and broadened the European Union’s objectives from intergovernmental cooperation in 
the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar to maintaining and enlarging the Union as “an area of 
freedom, security and justice”122 that allowed the free movement of people while ensuring 
external border controls, managing the movement of immigrants and asylum seekers, and 
preventing criminal activities.123  
As a result of this communalization process,124 issues involving asylum law and policy were 
placed explicitly under the discretion of the Community Pillar.125 Upon addition of a new title, 
“Title IV on Visa, Immigration, Asylum and other Policies to the Free Movement of Persons,” to 
Articles 63(1) and 63(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Community gained the 
competence to adopt common minimum asylum law standards, including the criteria for 
determining the Member State responsible for considering an asylum application, the minimum 
standards for receiving an asylum seeker, the minimum standards for qualifying a third country 
national as a refugee and the minimum procedural standards for granting or withdrawing refugee 
status (Article 73k of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Amsterdam).126 
Despite this  major achievement in communalizing asylum legislation at the supranational level, 
the EU legislative body was not granted full discretion to enact shared provisions, but was 
confined to adopting only “minimum standards” within the Community as set out in Article 63 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In fact, the Member States maintained their prerogatives on the 
sensitive matter of asylum law. They were obliged to agree only on the lowest common rules 
while using their discretionary power to continue implementing restrictive asylum rules in their 
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domestic legislations. Moreover, the vast discretionary powers accorded to the Member States to 
implement the asylum rules of their national legislations resulted in various asylum procedures 
among them, eventually reducing the effectiveness of the legislated common measures and 
leading to the same problems as before, such as the inability to manage the irregular movement 
of asylum seekers effectively within the EU. In the end, the minimum asylum policy 
demonstrated that the Western European States’ objectives were the same as before: to restrict 
access to their asylum determination procedures, perceive asylum seekers as economic 
immigrants, prevent unfounded refugee applicants from abusing their asylum systems by 
implementing safe country rules and implement stricter external border controls.127 
The Council Directive of 2005 defined the SCO concept and set out the requirements for 
identifying safe countries of origin at the EU and national levels (section 2.1), the process for 
ruling on SCO applications (section 2.2) and the legal and procedural limitations imposed on 
SCO refugee claimants, including the right to a personal interview and the right to appeal 
(section 2.3). All these issues will be defined in this section in order to clarify compliance with 
the fundamental human rights principles of EU law enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union128 and the European Convention on Human Rights129 by referring 
to the rulings of the European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ), which, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, was tasked with interpreting the EU common asylum 
measures adopted under Title IV of the Treaty of Amsterdam.130 
2.1: The Asylum Procedures Directive of 2005 and its Recast in 2013 
The CEAS, created in the first five years after the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force and 
reaffirmed at the European Council summit in Tampere,131 resulted in one regulation and four 
directives, the last of which, the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
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standard on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Asylum 
Procedures Directive of 2005, hereafter the APD), directly considered major issues surrounding 
the SCO rule. The Commission presented the first version of the APD to the Council in 
September 2000, but due to the debates and the modifications the Council imposed on it, the 
Commission had to prepare another proposal in accordance with the Council’s amendments in 
June 2002. Eventually, after protracted negotiations among the Member States in the Council, 
the Directive was adopted by the Council of the European Union at the meeting of the Justice 
and Home Affairs on December 1, 2005,132 with a one-year delay from the time limit appointed 
by the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Presidency Conclusions.133 
It is worth noting that the APD had an even more destructive effect on the development of 
common asylum rules at the EU level and protection of refugee rights at the international level 
than previous provisions adopted by the EU, such as the London Resolutions, which had briefly 
explained the current restrictive practices of the Member States without officially enforcing a 
deterrent or a limiting measure on them. In fact, it was only after the APD was adopted that the 
safe country practices were introduced and officially passed at a supranational level in a legally 
binding instrument. This legislative practice gave rise to deep concerns and severe criticism from 
the vast majority of refugee and human rights organizations and experts. The most significant 
criticism was based on the fact that incorporating these rules into a legally binding instrument 
adopted by the Council with a direct effect on the Member States’ asylum systems transformed 
them from exceptional to normal principles in refugee determination procedures, further 
decreasing the protection standards provided by the international refugee rights regime.134 In 
other words, the passage of the APD spread the initiatives and restrictive practices of Western 
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European countries around the world and consequently weakened the global consensus regarding 
the fragile situation and urgent protection needs of asylum seekers. 
 
The more troubling feature of the Directive was the incorporation of various practices for 
applying the SCO rule and the enactment of inconsistent provisions in the final version compared 
to the Commission’s 2002 proposal.135 It seems that the radical alterations imposed on the initial 
proposal were mostly due to pressure from influential Member States in the Council to 
incorporate all their various rules and procedures in determining safe countries of origin and 
keep their national lists in force, against the general principles of the Directive.136 These two 
negative aspects of the APD related, for the most part, to the essential flaws in regional and 
international asylum legislation. 
At the EU level, according to Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
[D]uring a transitional period of five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission or on the 
initiative of a Member State and after consulting the European Parliament.137  
In other words, during this five-year time frame, no co-decision procedure or a simultaneous 
active role was recognized for either the Council or Parliament. The unanimous voting 
requirement resulted in many amendments to the Commission’s proposal because the Member 
States delegated to the Council were afraid of losing their authority in their territory and of 
sharing the Community’s asylum legislation. This legislation took so long to pass that the 
deadline established by the Treaty of Amsterdam was extended. Given this troublesome law-
making procedure and the expressed necessity that the Council’s legislation be restricted to 
minimum standards, the Commission’s proposals were mostly modified to recognize the lowest 
standard of protection for asylum seekers and refugees and provide less harmonization than was 
originally proclaimed.138 These are exactly the difficulties the Commission faced in introducing 
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and amending the APD proposal. The more alarming result was the European Parliament’s 
strictly consultation role, which prevented it from exercising its supervisory capacity to 
effectively oppose the Council’s legislative actions and force the Council to abide by the 
fundamental principles of EU law while adopting common asylum provisions. Ultimately, the 
final version of the Directive resulted in contradictory provisions and a wide range of 
discretionary powers for the EU Member States. The APD was arguably a clear portrait of the 
Council’s flawed decision-making process and the Member States’ unwillingness to create a real 
Common European Asylum System.139  
 
The difficulty of agreeing on a harmonized asylum procedure is rooted in the absence of a 
formally accepted legal framework and fundamental principles at the international level for 
decisions on refugee requests. Although some essential procedural principles, such as non-
refoulement or the prohibition of discrimination based on race, nationality or religion can be 
drawn from the 1951 Geneva Convention (the leading international source on refugee rights) and 
other major international human rights legal instruments, including the 1984 Convention against 
Torture, the European Convention on Human Rights or the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child140 (referred to in the Preamble of the APD as international refugee and human rights 
instruments by which the Member States, who are signatories, must abide141), none of them 
determines a specific procedure under which applications for international protection should be 
managed or refugee status should be granted or withdrawn.  
 
This fundamental gap comes from substantial discrepancies between the administrative laws of 
every country, even at EU level, with a close legal system. Every Member State has its own 
administrative rules for decisions on refugee applications that have developed out of their 
different constitutional laws and legal traditions.142 Creating a common asylum system and 
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constraining accepted procedural rules for examining asylum requests has a direct impact on 
administrative arrangements and constitutional law in the Member States.143  
 
There were and still are many complexities regarding the number of asylum applications lodged 
in each Member State and the financial difficulties Member States experience, which bring about 
differences in asylum legislation and the political or social reactions of each country in dealing 
with them. For instance, Germany has a long history of accepting asylum seekers and as a result, 
was one of the first countries to enact preventive measures in its asylum system, such as 
provisions relating to SCOs or STCs, compared to other Member States such as Italy, which in 
the 1990s had one of the lowest rates of approved asylum applications.144  
Despite all these shortcomings, it should not be forgotten that adopting the APD was 
undoubtedly the most vital and difficult step the Council has taken to create an area of freedom, 
security and justice in which all asylum seekers are guaranteed the same rights and valid status 
throughout the EU. This brief explanation of the obstacles in reaching generally accepted 
procedural rules on the problematic subjects of asylum law and the refugee determination 
process can facilitate an understanding of the APD’s inconsistent provisions, and SCO rules in 
particular, which will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
If we take the 2005 version of the APD as a starting point, and more importantly as the EU 
legislative body’s first attempt to harmonize asylum procedures among EU Member States, the 
next and most recent legislation in this regard, the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive 
(hereafter RAPD), adopted in 2013 during the second phase of CEAS establishment, is the best 
portrait of the EU Community’s improved point of view and policy toward asylum seekers and 
their fundamental rights throughout the EU. The inherent flaws of the primary phase of CEAS 
establishment, which were recognized and reaffirmed in the Commission’s reports145 (some of 
which will be described in the next section), convinced the Community to revise the instruments 
enacted during this period and develop CEAS in accordance with the principles of EU law and 
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international refugee and human rights law,146 while also taking into account ECJ and European 
Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) jurisprudence.  
The first and the most significant difference between the first and second phases of EU common 
asylum legislation is the law-making procedure under which the Commission’s proposal was 
adopted by the Council and European Parliament. According to Articles 63(1), 67(1), and 251 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty, reaffirmed in the Treaty of Nice (new Article 67(5)), after the five-year 
transitional period following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, common measures 
in asylum law would be legislated in a co-decision procedure shared between the Council and 
European Parliament.147 In other words, contrary to the legislative procedure set out in the first 
phase based on unanimous votes from the Council and mere consultation from European 
Parliament, during the recast process, the Community’s contributions were compelled in 
accordance with Article 251 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the qualified majority votes in the 
Council (QMV) and the co-decision procedure between the Council and Parliament.  
This method for enacting shared asylum law measures is more advantageous than the former, 
since it recognizes and affords European Parliament a more active role, ensuring that common 
EU asylum provisions comply with the objectives of the Community and the principles of 
Community law and international human rights standards. Given that the members of European 
Parliament are directly elected by the voters in all Member States as representativess of the 
people’s interests, contrary to the Council, which is composed of ministers who defend the 
Member States’ policy, a more effective Parliamentary presence in the law-making process 
ensures the democratic quality of EU common legislation and increases the fairness and 
efficiency of adopted measures by limiting the Council’s power to give Member States more 
discretion. Consequently, as will be demonstrated in the following section, the RAPD has 
directly addressed most of the criticism and concerns of the first Directive and contains more 
favourable provisions, in particular for more disadvantaged groups of asylum seekers such as 
SCO applicants.  
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The second stage was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, requiring the 
Commission to prepare proposals for reviewing and reforming EU legislations from the first 
phase. This goal was reaffirmed in Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2010) programs.148 During the 
recast process, the Commission focused on modifying the inherent weakness in the instruments 
in force, eliminating ambiguous and complicated provisions and limiting the discretion granted 
to the Member States.149 The Council and European Parliament were mandated to adopt the 
legislative proposals with the aim of establishing a single asylum procedure and a uniform 
international protection status by no later than 2012.150 This objective has been more influential 
while revising the APD, as stipulated in the Stockholm Programme, to ensure “greater 
harmonization and streamlining of the implementation of the procedures,”151 “prevent or reduce 
secondary movements within the Union” and “increase mutual trust between Member States.”152  
On October 21, 2009, the Commission put forward a proposal for recasting the APD, which was 
adopted on June 26, 2013, after the failure of two proposals and four years of negotiation by the 
Council and European Parliament.153 It was decided that the RAPD would be implemented and 
transposed into the Member States’ national legislations two years after its adoption, which 
according to Article 51 of the RAPD was on July 20, 2015.154 The Member States have an 
additional three years to implement the new rules on deadlines for decisions on asylum 
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applications.155 Concerning the SCO provisions, which will be discussed in the next section, a 
comparison between the former and the recast APD revealed that notable improvements have 
been made. 
 
Before discussing the definition of the SCO concept, it is necessary to circumscribe our research 
and clarify the provisions that will be discussed in this section. Under the provisions of the APD, 
the safe countries of origin were to be designated at two distinct levels, the supranational (EU) 
level and the national level. The first provision is the common SCO list that was to be prepared 
by the Council of the European Union. According to Article 29(1) of the APD, 
[t]he Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consultation of the European Parliament, adopt a minimum common list of third 
countries which shall be regarded by Member States as safe countries of origin in 
accordance with Annex II. 
Thus the Council identified and adopted a list of safe countries of origin that all Member States 
would be forced to abide by and utilize for decisions on refugee applications from these 
countries. 
 
On March 8, 2006, one year after the APD entered into force, European Parliament opposed the 
legislative procedure established by the Council in Articles 29(1), (2) and 36(3) of the APD, 
which necessitated a qualified majority in the Council and Parliamentary consultation. 
Parliament submitted a plea to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) seeking annulment of these 
articles and ultimately, annulment of the entire Directive because of its infringement on EU law 
in relation to the process (co-decision procedure) for adopting common measures on asylum 
provided for by Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam as amended by the Treaty of Nice 
(Article 67(5)) in accordance with Article 251 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. According to these 
provisions, the Council, “[d]uring the transitional period of five years following the entry into 
                                                            
 
155 Id., art.51.2. 
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force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,”156 was mandated to adopt common asylum law provisions as 
determined in Article 63(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in accordance with the procedure 
considered in Article 67(1) of the Treaty authorizing the Council to act unanimously on the 
proposals from the Commission or the Member States after consulting European Parliament.157 
 
Parliament reasoned that according to the first indent of Article 67(5), as introduced by the 
Treaty of Nice, the Council should enact the secondary legislation (the Community legislation 
that “the Council has previously adopted, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article [...] 
defining the common rules and basic principles governing these issues”) in the field of asylum 
law, pursuant to the legislative procedure established by Article 251 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Article 251 required qualified majority votes in the Council (QMV) and the co-decision 
procedure between the Council and Parliament.158 Parliament took the view that since the APD 
was the last document adopted according to Article 63(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
terminated the transitional period of five years, enacting the common list of safe countries of 
origin and European safe third countries after this time frame was an act of secondary asylum 
legislation and that the Council should legislate the measures in question according to the 
legislative process under Article 67(5) and 251 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.159 Consequently, 
Parliament concluded that due to the Council’s disregard of the common legislation process and 
its consequent lack of competence in providing or amending the safe countries of origin list or 
the common list of European safe third countries, the contested articles in the APD had to be 
declared invalid.160 
 
                                                            
 
156 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, and certain related acts (Consolidated Version), prec., note 67, art.73k and 73o (1). 
157 Id., art.73o (1). 
158 European Court of Justice, Parliament v. Council, (2008) C-133/06, para.19-42, online:  
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62006CJ0133&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=>. 
159 Id., para.21. 
160 Id., para.19. 
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Taking into consideration the parties’ arguments, the ECJ found that under Article 7(1) of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam,161 EU institutions are mandated to act in accordance with the competence 
conferred and within the limits determined by the Treaty of Amsterdam.162 Secondly, despite 
“the political importance of the designation of safe countries of origin”163 and “the potential 
consequences for asylum applicants of the safe third country concept”164 expressed in Recital 19 
and Recital 24 of the APD respectively, the Council failed to provide detailed grounds to justify 
its decision to consider itself an exceptional power to amend the decision-making procedure as 
prescribed in indent 2 of Article 67(2) of the Treaty of Amsterdam,165 which enabled the 
Council, “acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, [to] take a decision with 
a view to providing for all or parts of the areas covered by this Title to be governed by the 
procedure referred to in Article 189b.”166 Thirdly, given the fact that the Council, by adopting the 
APD, provided “detailed criteria enabling the lists of safe countries to be established 
subsequently,”167 the enactment of the common list of safe countries of origin, the common list 
of European safe third countries and amendment of these two lists should be considered a 
common secondary legislative act intended to be accomplished in accordance with qualified 
majority votes in the Council and the co-decision legislative procedure between European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, provided for in Articles 67(5) and 251 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam.168 
 
The ECJ therefore upheld the European Parliament’s plea on the invalidity of Articles 29(1), (2) 
and 36(3) of the APD and subsequently annulled these provisions.169 Since the Council and 
Parliament have not yet prepared any common list, the focus in the next section will be on the 
                                                            
 
161 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, and certain related acts (Consolidated Version), prec., note 67, art.7(1). 
162 European Court of Justice, Parliament v. Council, prec., note 158, para.44. 
163 Id., para.48. 
164 Id., para.48. 
165 Id., para.47 and 58. 
166 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, and certain related acts (Consolidated Version), prec., note 67, art.73o(2). 
167 European Court of Justice, Parliament v. Council, prec., note 158, para.10-17, and para.65. 
168 Id., para.65-66. 
169 Id., para.67-69; Cathryn COSTELLO, prec., note 134, p.159. 
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SCO concept and the procedure for designating SCO countries at the national level, referring to 
the Commission proposals and the enacted provisions of the APD.  
 
The SCO concept discussed in this study refers to the third countries (non-EU Member States) 
that have been identified as safe countries of origin. Accordingly, we will not examine the 
concept of EU safe countries of origin as described in the Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of 
Member States of the European Union (Aznar Protocol),170 which is annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. Under its sole article, asylum requests lodged by citizens of EU Member States will 
be considered unfounded or inadmissible “given the level of protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms by the Member States of the European Union” and regards all EU Member States “as 
constituting safe countries of origin in respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in 
relation to asylum matters.”171 Each Member State is prevented from accepting and processing 
asylum applications from another Member State’s citizens unless certain conditions are met 
according to the Aznar Protocol.172  
Among the EU Member States, only Belgium has made a reservation to the Aznar Protocol173 by 
adding a declaration to the Treaty of Amsterdam. All the asylum legislations adopted under the 
Community’s discretion in the first pillar will exclusively govern issues involving asylum 
applications lodged by third country nationals, namely individuals who come from non-EU 
Member States. 
 
 
                                                            
 
170 Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the EU (Aznar Protocol), Protocol annexed to the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 305-306, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E/PRO/24&from=EN>. 
171 Id., art.1. 
172 Id. 
173 Belgium has proclaimed that “in accordance with its obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 
1967 New York Protocol, it shall, in accordance with the provision set out in point (d) of the sole Article of that 
Protocol (Aznar Protocol), carry out an individual examination of any asylum request made by a national of another 
Member State.” (Declaration no 56 by Belgium on the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the 
European Union, Declaration annexed to the treaty of Amsterdam). 
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2.1.1: The definition of the SCO concept 
 
A safe country of origin is described in Annex II of the APD as follows: 
A Country...where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a 
democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is 
generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Article 9 of Directive 2004/83/EC, 
no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.174 
This definition, repeated exactly in Annex I of the RAPD,175 is in line with Article 4(3) of the 
Qualification Directive (Article 4(3) of the Recast Qualification Directive) requiring the Member 
States to take the general situation of the country of origin into consideration while assessing an 
application for international protection.176 According to this definition, which is the same as in 
the previous document adopted in this regard, the Conclusion on Countries in Which There is 
Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution,177 the general safety of a third country is conceivable 
“on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the 
general political circumstances,”178 provided that the criteria set out in the APD are satisfied.  
The APD and the RAPD have provided one of the EU’s most comprehensive definitions to date, 
and generally, in a series of provisions other than national SCO definitions. By referring to the 
provisions of the Qualification Directive (and the Recast Qualification Directive), the APD and 
                                                            
 
174 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, Annex II. 
175 European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, Annex I. 
176 European Union, Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted, 29 April 2004, art. 4(3), online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0083:en:HTML> ; European Union, 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
guaranteed, art.4(3), online:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32011L0095&from=EN>; Hemme BATTJES, 
prec., note 19, p.346. 
177 European Union, Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution, prec., 
note 22, para.1. 
178 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, Annex II. 
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the RAPD have addressed almost all reasons for which international protection requests may be 
well founded.179 
 
First of all, Article 9 of the Qualification Directive, in accordance with Article 1A of the 1951 
Geneva Convention, defined acts of persecution as “sufficiently serious by their nature or 
repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from 
which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” or “an accumulation of various 
measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an 
individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a),”180 which can take different forms as 
described in paragraph 2 of Article 9.  
 
Second of all, the various types of serious harm, including mistreatment and threats, are clarified 
in Article 15 of the Qualification Directive as “death penalty or execution,” “torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin” or “serious and 
individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict.”181 
 
The definition of the SCO concept, combined with the Qualification Directive’s definitions, is 
more complete and detailed than in the Commission’s 2002 proposal, which briefly defined a 
safe country of origin as a country that “consistently observes the basic standards laid down in 
international human rights law from which there may be no derogation in time of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”182 The SCO definition provided in Annex II 
of the APD (Annex I of the RAPD) includes almost all forms of persecuting, harmful and 
                                                            
 
179 Hemme BATTJES, prec., note 19, p.347. 
180 European Union, Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted, prec., note 176, art.9(1) and (2). 
181 Id., art.15. 
182 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 2002, Annex II, para I, online: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:JOC_2002_291_E_0143_01&qid=1436380015190&from=EN>. 
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threatening acts that refugee applicants may provide to substantiate their international protection 
claims. The wider scope of the SCO concept in the final version of the APD, compared to the 
Commission’s 2002 proposal, is more helpful for SCO asylum seekers in proving the danger and 
discrimination they experience in their country of origin. Consequently, minority groups who 
face well-organized and multifaceted discrimination based on their gender, religion or ethnic 
origin, even in apparently democratic countries, may establish the real threat they experience in 
allegedly safe countries of origin.  
However, the difficulty arises when applying the criteria for assessing the general safety of a 
particular third country provided by the APD and replicated word for word in Annex I of the 
RAPD. There are significant differences between the criteria set out in the Commission’s 2002 
proposal183 and the versions adopted by the Council in 2005 and 2013 that may ultimately 
undermine the refugee protection standards guaranteed by the EU. Under paragraphs (a) to (d) of 
Annex II of the APD (paragraphs (a) to (d) of Annex I of the RAPD), the Member States are 
required, when evaluating the safety of a third country, to take into account the protection 
provided by the country of origin for its people against persecution or mistreatment according to 
certain standards, including: 
a) “[T]he relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in which they are 
applied”184: This criterium was previously expressed in Article 4(3)(a) of the 
Qualification Directive in 2004 (Article 4[3][a] of the Recast Qualification Directive), 
which required the Member States to consider inter alia, when examining an individual’s 
application, “all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking 
a decision on the application; including laws and regulations of the country of origin and 
                                                            
 
183 The Commission has made no changes on the criteria for designation of SCO in its proposal aimed at recasting 
the Asylum Procedures Directive of 2005. In this regard refer to: European Commission, Amended proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection status (Recast), COM (2011) 319 final, 1 Jun 2011, p.78, online:  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2011)0319_/com_com(2011)
0319_en.pdf>. 
184 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, Annex II, para. (a); European Union, 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, Annex I, para. (a). 
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the manner in which they are applied.”185 The APD and RAPD have therefore recognized 
the legislative acts of the third country as the primary and official sources for evaluating 
the extent to which protection against persecution and mistreatment is provided for 
nationals of the third country.  
b) “[O]bservance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and/or the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and/or the Convention against Torture, in 
particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the 
said European Convention,”186 and “respect of the non-refoulement principle according 
to the Geneva Convention”187: again, in this paragraph the APD and RAPD have the 
same formal approach as in paragraph (a), since they consider whether a third country 
accedes to the aforementioned international conventions and respects the rights and 
freedoms enacted under the provisions of these conventions as the second requirement for 
determining the country’s general safety. In contrast, there is no reference to international 
refugee and human rights legal instruments in the Commission’s 2002 proposal, but 
human rights, which the Commission considered fundamental, were specifically 
mentioned in Annex II of the proposal to serve as an indication of the safety of the 
country in question, including “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to 
freedom of associations with others, including the right to form and join trade unions and 
                                                            
 
185 European Union, Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted, prec., note 176, art.4(3)(a); European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection guaranteed, prec., note 176, 
art.4(3)(a). 
186 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, Annex II, para.(b); European Union, 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, Annex I, para.(b). 
187 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, Id., Annex II, para.(c); European Union, Directive 
2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (recast), Id., Annex I, para.(c). 
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the right to take part in government directly or through freely chosen representatives” and 
“the right to liberty and security of person, the right to recognition as a person before the 
law and equality before the law.”    
 
In fact, there was no priority or hierarchy between the human rights enumerated in Annex 
II of the Commission’s 2002 proposal, but expression of these fundamental human rights 
would demonstrate their importance in the EU Community’s view and could serve as an 
important guideline to assist the Member States in understanding the human rights that 
are key to the protection of a person and examining the real safety of a third country. 
However, the vague reference to rights and freedoms in the final versions of the APD and 
RAPD leaves the door open for the Member States to underestimate the importance of 
human rights violations by a third country. This may be the case when a Member State 
overlooks human rights infringements in a third country, stating they are not significant 
enough to declare the country unsafe, for reasons of diplomatic relations or the economic 
or politic interests of both countries as indicated in paragraph 19 of the APD Preamble.188 
In other words, with regard to designation of an SCO, deep concerns remain that 
irrelevant considerations such as intergovernmental relations taint the central objective of 
assessing the safety of a third country.189  UNCHR, in its comment on the APD Directive 
proposal, stipulated that “clear benchmarks” are vital in order to demonstrate the exact 
circumstances under which a country can be identified as an SCO and be included in the 
common or national list.190 
 
                                                            
 
188 Id., Preamble, para.19. 
189 Cathryn COSTELLO, prec., note 24, p.66. 
190 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNCHR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting or Withdrawing Refugee 
Status”, (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), 10 February 2005, p.40, online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/43661ea42.pdf>. 
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c) “[P]rovision for a system of effective remedies against violations of these rights and 
freedoms”191: in comparison to the Commission’s 2002 proposal, this provision does not 
comprehensively and carefully consider the real practices of the third country. According 
to paragraph I of Annex II of the Commission’s 2002 proposal, the Member States were 
required to take into account not only the third country’s practices to provide “generally 
effective remedies against violations of these civil and political rights and, where 
necessary, for extraordinary remedies,”192 but also its openness to monitoring of its 
human rights observance by international organizations.193 This provision, which briefly 
referred to “the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in which 
they are applied,”194 was omitted in the final version of the APD and the RAPD. 
According to both documents, the Member States are required to take into account 
different sources of information, including “the legal situation, the application of the law 
and the general political circumstances in the third country concerned”195 and 
“information from other Member States, EASO, the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and 
other relevant international organisations.”196 However, there is always a potential risk 
that the real practices of the country in question will remain uncovered. Even in cases 
where the effective remedy is accessible for all nationals of the third country, it is likely 
that its judicial body is not capable enough to supervise or ensure that the courts’ 
decisions are exercised. It is conceivable that in many cases, international organizations, 
                                                            
 
191 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, Annex II, para.(d); European Union, 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, Annex I, para.(d). 
192 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 2002, prec., note 182, Annex II, para. I D. 
193 Id., Annex II, para. I B. 
194 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, Annex II, para.(a); European Union, 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, Annex I, para.(a). 
195 Id., art.30(4). 
196 Id., art.30(5); European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, art.37(3). 
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NGOs or the embassies of foreign countries that regularly review the situation197 or 
periodically monitor the practices of the third countries have limited access to real 
information. At the very least, the third country’s receptivity to and cooperation with 
monitoring by these organizations demonstrates the transparency of its government. More 
importantly, efficient and regular review of the safe countries of origin, required by the 
RAPD and reiterated by UNHCR in its comments on the Commission’s 2002 proposal, 
provides the EU and its Member States with an opportunity to react efficiently and 
discover both gradual and sudden changes to the human rights situation in a third country 
previously identified as safe.198  
It can be concluded that designation of a third country as an SCO under these criteria does not 
constitute any meaningful or strong presumption of safety.199 The necessary conditions are 
vague, and the third country’s actual practices are ignored. Admittedly, the Council and 
European Parliament have provided the Member States with a wide margin of discretion to 
designate an SCO list and have facilitated application of this restrictive rule in the Member 
States’ respective national asylum legislations. 
Regarding the procedure for adding a country to the SCO list in a Member State’s national 
asylum legislation, contrary to the obligatory nature of the common SCO list, each Member State 
asylum is left to determine their national SCO list. The difference between the APD and the 
RAPD is as follows. 
According to the APD, two kinds of processes were planned. The first process concerned the 
identification of safe countries of origin using the same definition and criteria established by 
Annex II, as explained above. Under Article 30(1): 
                                                            
 
197 European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), prec., note 153, art.2. 
198 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNCHR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting or Withdrawing Refugee 
Status”, (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), prec., note 190, p.40. 
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Without prejudice to Article 29, Member States may retain or introduce legislation that 
allows, in accordance with Annex II, for the national designation of third countries other 
than those appearing on the minimum common list, as safe countries of origin for the 
purposes of examining applications for asylum. This may include designation of part of a 
country as safe where the conditions in Annex II are fulfilled in relation to that part.200 
While the Member States were obliged to observe the requirements stipulated in Annex II for 
introducing new rules or maintaining their current legislation on the identification of SCOs, they 
were also permitted to designate either a whole country or part of a country as safe,201 contrary to 
Article 30 of the Commission’s 2002 proposal, which permitted the Member States to designate 
only an entire country as safe according to the same criteria in Annex II considered for creation 
of a common list.202 The discretion granted to the Member States in the final version passed by 
the Council directly contradicted the definition provided in Annex II, which describes a safe 
country of origin as “a country” without considering, in any way whatsoever, any geographical 
exceptions. The question that should be asked is that if a third country is presumed to be safe 
based on its “general political circumstances,” as expressed in paragraph 1 of Annex II, how is it 
acceptable to designate only part of the county as safe and not the whole country? While denying 
the idea of partial designation of a safe country of origin in its comments on the Commission’s 
proposal, UNHCR answered that: 
[T]he designation of a safe part of a country does not necessarily represent a relevant or 
reasonable internal relocation or flight alternative. The existence of a “safe” part of a 
country may be but one element in an examination of whether a particular asylum-seeker 
has such an alternative. The complex questions which arise in the application of the 
                                                            
 
200 European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standard on procedures in the 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 34, art.30(1). 
201 Id., art.30(1) and Annex II. 
202 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, prec., note 182, are. 30(1) and (2). 
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internal flight alternative require, however, a careful examination of the individual case in 
the regular procedure and should not be dealt with in an accelerated procedure.203 
The second group of provisions on the designation of an SCO at the national level are Articles 
30(2) and (3) of the APD, according to which the Member States, by derogation from Article 
30(1) and Annex II, could “retain legislation in force on 1 December 2005 that allows for the 
national designation of third countries, other than those appearing on the minimum common list, 
as safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining applications for asylum”204 and/or 
“retain legislation in force on 1 December 2005 that allows for the national designation of part of 
a country as safe, or a country or part of a country as safe for a specified group of persons in that 
country.”205 In this regard, the criteria that had been used to identify SCOs were much less 
restrictive than the Annex II criteria, since it would be sufficient for the nationals of the third 
country to be generally subjected to neither “persecution as defined in Article 9 of Directive 
2004/83/EC” nor “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”206  
Under these two provisions, the Member States were allowed to maintain their current restrictive 
asylum policy or legislate new rules enabling them to designate a third country as safe with not 
only geographical but also with population exceptions. As the most worrisome feature, the 
criteria for identifying SCOs were so ambiguous and “unsatisfactory”207 that they would call into 
question the Member States’ ability to verify the safety of third countries and render the whole 
process suspect to political or economic intergovernmental considerations rather than the 
humanitarian and refugee protection objectives of asylum legislation. The Member States, under 
Articles 30(2) and (3), were not obliged to consider the international refugee and human rights 
                                                            
 
203 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNCHR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a 
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obligations of the third country, its real human rights practices or its respect for the rule of 
law.208  
More dangerously, based on these ineffective requirements, the Member States could assure the 
safety of a particular group of people in a third country without extensive knowledge of the 
cultural or judicial system in question or the religious or ethical beliefs of its society. How is it 
possible and acceptable to consider specific parts of a country safe while its government does not 
have sufficient authority to maintain security across its entire territory? As explained by 
UNHCR, in adopting the APD, the Council confused the distinct concepts of internal relocation 
and flight alternative with the SCO concept, which involves entirely different considerations and 
requires stringent scrutiny.  
These provisions proved that the main purpose of adopting the APD was not to establish a real 
and workable harmonization of the Member States’ asylum policies. In practice, the Member 
States’ objective, which was delegated to the Council, was to force the EU to acknowledge their 
neglectful and restrictive asylum measures.209 The harmful effect of the APD’s provisions for 
designating SCOs, in practice a collection of the Member States’ varied and contradictory 
practices with many substantial derogation clauses and exceptions, was to encourage the 
Member States to participate more than before in the competitive race to the bottom. As a result, 
the goal of creating a common asylum procedure to protect the rights of persons in need of 
international protection in a uniform way was completely missed. Subsequently, several Member 
States, including Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, seemingly 
legally amended their national asylum legislation and added some new countries to their national 
list of safe countries of origin before the APD was passed. In fact, they intended to take 
advantage of the chance to indirectly violate and circumvent the provisions of the Directive in 
such a way that they would not be obliged to change their national list at a later date by 
observing more rigid requirements under the Directive.210 As Costello has reiterated, “The 
temptation for Member States to use the Directive as an excuse to lower domestic standards may 
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prove irresistible, as the Directive contains no standstill clause.”211 Moreover, national 
legislations amendments before the adoption of the Directive made its process of decision-
making more complicated and time-consuming.212 
Some Member States like the Czech Republic, Finland, France, the Netherlands, the UK and 
Germany have retained their national legislation in force according to these requirements,213 
while  Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, Greece, Slovenia, Sweden and Spain did not implement 
these derogating provisions in their national legislation and remain bound by criteria in Annex II 
related to the common list.214 Greece legislated for designation of part of a country as safe under 
certain conditions, and the UK has permitted designation of part of a country as safe or of a 
country as safe for a specified group of persons.215 
Fortunately, under Article 37(1) of the RAPD, as in the Commission’s 2002 proposal, no 
different criteria and no exceptions based on territorial or population considerations have been 
determined for national legislation, either relating to the current legislation or the introduction of 
new asylum rules.216 This provision is one of the best amendments incorporated into the RAPD 
to address the criticism from refugee and human rights specialists and expert organizations, since 
it ensures effective coordination among the Member States’ asylum laws and provides more 
integrity for a Common European Asylum System. According to the new Directive, “Member 
States may retain or introduce legislation that allows, in accordance with Annex I, for the 
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national designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining applications for 
international protection.”217  
The RAPD, like its precedent, permits a generalized presumption of safety based on criteria in 
Annex I with the same deficiencies as the requirements of Annex II of the APD, but contrary to 
the provisions of the former Directive, Member States are not authorized to designate SCOs 
according to less restrictive criteria or with geographical or group-specific exceptions. There is 
no mention of the EU common list, and the possibility of determining a binding SCO list for all 
Member States has been completely eliminated. Yet the missing provision in the RAPD is that 
while the Member States are required to “regularly review the situation in third countries 
designated as safe countries of origin”218 and “notify to the Commission the countries that are 
designated as safe countries of origin,”219 there are no reliable arrangements to respond rapidly to 
sudden changes in a country of origin’s security situation.220 
Admittedly, the limited approach for national designation of SCOs followed from the 
Commission’s 2002 proposal, and the RAPD is the best way to establish harmonized procedures 
in application of SCO measures among Member States. It preserves the CEAS throughout the 
EU,221 provides efficient international protection to persons who truly need it, increases the 
integrity of the Member States’ asylum systems by preventing mistreatment of their national 
legislation and ensures a uniform and fair asylum determination procedure throughout the EU.222  
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A comparison of the APD and RAPD clearly demonstrates that the Council and European 
Parliament intended to restrict the Member States’ discretion to exercise the SCO rule through 
the RAPD, while the APD was a strong indication of the Member States’ reluctance to relinquish 
their restrictive asylum policies and of their focus on reducing the numbers of refugee 
applications as much as possible.223 The difficulties that the Commission and the Council faced 
during the debates for amendment of the original 2002 proposal resulted in “deadlock in 
negotiations,” in particular on subject matter relating to SCOs, STCs and appeal rights. As 
observed above, the only remaining way for the Council to satisfy all Member States in passing 
the APD was to adopt the relevant provisions with many restrictions and exclusions rooted in the 
Member States’ national practices.224 In the end, the APD reflected what the Member States had 
already been doing for decades.225 In this regard, UNCHR stated that 
[T]aking a very good European Commission draft as its starting point, the long process of 
inter-state negotiations has resulted in an Asylum Procedures Directive which contains no 
binding commitment to satisfactory procedural standards, allowing scope for states to 
adopt or continue worst practices in determining asylum claims.226 
The Council’s and European Parliament’s endeavour to improve and coordinate the application 
of the SCO rule among the Member States by adopting the RAPD must be appreciated. The wide 
range of disparities caused by the provisions of the former Directive had diminished the 
possibility of reaching the goal of creating the CEAS. The RAPD’s single set of criteria to 
determine SCOs, without any exception clauses, reduces the complexity of the EU asylum 
system and ensures more harmonization among the Member States in implementing the RAPD 
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provisions in their national legislation.227 Enacting SCO national designations brings about a 
proliferation of inconsistent and divergent standards among the Member States, but it should not 
be forgotten that during negotiations for adoption of the RAPD, there was strong resistance 
against European Parliament’s proposed amendments to get rid of national lists.228 The only way 
left to protect the general principle of Community law and respect international refugee and 
human rights law was to remove the derogation clauses incorporated in the former Directive and 
restrict the Member States’ discretion in denying SCO applicants their basic procedural rights.  
The last matter that should be taken into account is the fundamental notion of the SCO rule, 
recognized differently by the APD and the RAPD. Article 31(2) of the APD, which allowed the 
Member States to consider any application from a safe country of origin to be unfounded, has 
been removed in the RAPD. Transforming the SCO concept from a mandatory rule to a guideline 
for applying the accelerated procedure is a significant success for the Community’s asylum 
legislation.229 It seems that the Council and European Parliament have addressed the concerns of 
critics regarding the dangerous effect of Article 31(20) of the APD, which obliged Member 
States, even those without national SCO rules, to lower their national protection standards. One 
may argue that the RAPD has contradicted this improvement by passing Article 36(2), which 
stipulates that “the Member States shall lay down in national legislation further rules and 
modalities for the application of the safe country of origin concept.” However, upon closer 
examination of the RAPD, we will see that this argument is inconsistent with other provisions. 
According to Article 36(1) of the RAPD a third country, in accordance with criteria in Annex I, 
“may”230 be determined to be an SCO, while Article 37(1) explicitly states that “the Member 
States ‘may’ retain or introduce legislation that allows, in accordance with Annex I, for the 
national designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining applications for 
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international protection.”231 Thus, the Member States are free to decide whether or not to 
maintain a national SCO list, and the RAPD does not require the Member States to apply the 
SCO provisions in their national legislation.232 
  
The most worrying subject matter in terms of applying the preventive measure of the SCO rule is 
the Member States’ authority to impose widespread deprivation or limitation of the procedural 
and fundamental human rights of SCO asylum seekers during the determination process. Under 
paragraph 21 of the APD Preamble and paragraph 42 of the RAPD Preamble, it is established 
that “by its very nature” SCO designation “cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for 
nationals of that country,” but that “the assessment underlying the designation can only take into 
account the general civil, legal and political circumstances in that country.” Consequently, it can 
be concluded that “where an applicant shows that there are serious reasons to consider the 
country not to be safe in his/her particular circumstances, the designation of the country as safe 
can no longer be considered relevant for him/her.”233 Regrettably, according to European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles’ 2013/2014 annual report (Asylum Information Database: 
AIDA), even with the amendments implemented by the RAPD, there is an inherent risk of 
“undermining the quality of examination of international protection needs,” in particular because 
of the considerably varied approach of the Member States in transposing and implementing 
preventive measures such as the SCO and STC rules, and also owing to “the procedural 
disadvantage and the increased burden of proof they tend to create for the applicants concerned 
from the start of the procedure.”234 
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In the three next sections, we will reassess whether effective avenues are provided for SCO 
refugee applicants at the first instance of decision-making (the right to a personal interview) and 
at the appeal level (the right to appeal) to substantiate their persecution claims and reject the 
general presumption of safety regarding their country of origin. To limit the scope of the inquiry, 
we have decided to explain the legal and procedural deprivations that have the most crucial 
effects on the procedural fairness of decision-making procedures as reiterated by certain 
specialists.235 Those are the right to a personal interview, the right to appeal and reasonable time 
limits to make a decision. There are other procedural safeguards such as the right to legal aid or 
the right to a reasoned decision,236 but the three requirements mentioned above, commonly 
restricted in the asylum legislation of both the EU and Canada, have a vital role in ensuring the 
fairness of any determination procedure, especially in the field of asylum rights.237 
At the EU level, the right to a personal interview and the right to effective remedy are two of the 
core components of Community law that ensure the fairness of asylum decision-making 
procedures. However, before considering these two fundamental rights, it would be useful to 
briefly explain the procedure under which SCO applications may be assessed according to the 
APD. The harmful effects of the accelerated procedure, exaggerated in relation to the restrictions 
inflicted on the two rights mentioned above, will be illustrated in further detail in the following 
sections.   
2.1.2: Accelerated procedure 
 
Under Article 23(1) and (2) of the APD, the Member States were expressly required to conduct a 
determination procedure for refugee applications at first instance, in accordance with the 
fundamental principles and safeguards stipulated in Chapter II of the Directive,238 and to make a 
decision “as soon as possible”239 but “without prejudice to an adequate and complete 
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examination.”240 This provision was explained in Recital 11 of the APD: it would remain within 
the scope of each Member State’s discretion to organize a workable system for processing 
refugee applications, but the Member States, bound by the standards set out in the APD, would 
make the final decision on refugee applications as soon as possible with the goal of putting in 
place a fair and efficient determination procedure that served the interests of both the Member 
State concerned and the refugee applicants.241 
It should be noted that while the duration of the examination procedure had not been determined 
explicitly, even in the Commission’s proposal, the APD acknowledged a time limit of six months 
as an acceptable duration for examining and making a decision on a refugee application, since 
the Council stipulated that “where a decision cannot be taken within six months,” the Member 
States should either notify applicants of the delay, or give them updates on the time frame within 
which the final decision is expected to be rendered, upon request.242  
The disturbing point of Article 23 was that apart from the undetermined time frame, even in 
cases where the examination had not been finalized after six months and the applicant had been 
informed of the time frame within which the competent authority expected  to issue the decision, 
the host Member State had no obligation to respect this time schedule, since according to the last 
paragraph of Article 23(2) (b), such an anticipated time frame was not considered “an obligation 
for the Member State towards the applicant concerned to take a decision within that time-
frame.”243  
The harmful effects of the unspecified time limit were more evident in 14 cases, determined 
under Article 23(4) of the APD, according to which the Member States could apply the 
accelerated procedure while respecting the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II. The 
Directive therefore did not set out any time limits for the accelerated procedure and permitted the 
Member States to accelerate the determination procedure, which amounted to a wide range of 
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time frames among the Member States, varying from a one-month time limit in the Czech 
Republic to 15 days for the in-territory accelerated procedure for applicants who were not 
detained in France, to the extremely shortened duration of two days for the airport accelerated 
procedure in certain Member States like Germany.244 There were many discrepancies among the 
Member States in applying the accelerated procedure, including the grounds for application, the 
authority making decisions on the acceleration and the procedural rights omitted from the 
expedited procedure.245 The discretion provided to the Member States to speed up the 
determination procedure was counter to the EU’s central objectives in creating a common 
asylum system among EU Member States in accordance with the principles of EU law and, as 
reiterated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to eliminate secondary movement of asylum seekers 
through the EU.246  
In order to reduce these negative outcomes, the Council and European Parliament, through 
Article 31(3) of the RAPD, have obligated the Member States to make a decision within six 
months of lodging the application, in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees set out 
in the Directive.247 However, it seems that they have not been successful in constraining the 
Member States’ authority and appointing a single mandatory time limit for the first instance 
refugee procedure. Three other time limits are mentioned in the RAPD. The first concerns the 
cases in which the Member States are allowed to exceed the six-month time frame by postponing 
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the final decision to a maximum of nine months following the lodging of the application.248 
Under Article 31(3), this delay is subject to three conditions, including complex factual or legal 
issues related to the application, simultaneous refugee applications or the applicant’s failure to 
cooperate with the competent authority. In the second condition, according to the last paragraph 
of Article 31(3), the Member States are entitled to reschedule and add another exceptional time 
limit, not to exceed three months at maximum, to issue the final decision if they seek to “ensure 
an adequate and complete examination of the application for international protection.”249 
According to Article 31(5), the third and final time frame relates to the duration of the processing 
time, and shall not exceed “21 months from the lodging of the application.”250 These conditions 
are extremely vague and general, preventing applicants from objecting to the recurring deferment 
imposed on the determination procedure or from proving that the delay in the determination 
procedure is unjustified and contrary to Article 31(3) of the RAPD. 
The RAPD’s provisions on the first instance’s reasonable time limits therefore suffer from the 
same shortcomings as the previous Directive. The discretion granted to the Member States to 
extend the time limit for concluding each refugee application may cause “asylum in limbo,” 
when the refugee claimants must wait for a long time for the determining authority’s decision on 
their application, with no indication of a possible final decision in the near future. This 
uncertainty eventually leads to asylum seekers’ irregular or secondary movement to another 
Member State with the hope of being accepted by more favourable asylum legislation. The 
reason behind this ambiguous legislation is the high diversity of the determination procedure 
timescale among the Member States based on their respective administrative and constitutional 
law, which makes it impossible to set a single time limit with no exceptions. 
The next essential issue that should be taken into consideration is the provisions regulating 
expeditious procedures. In the RAPD, the cases in which the Member States may apply the 
accelerated procedure have been reduced to nine, compared to fourteen cases in the APD; 
however, both instruments allow the Member States to apply the accelerated procedure to 
                                                            
 
248 Id., art.31(3) and (4) and (5). 
249 Id. 
250 Id., art.31(5). 
59 
 
 
process SCO applications. Fortunately, the APD’s inconsistent provisions on the procedural 
rights of SCO applicants have been removed in the RAPD. In fact, in the APD, the Council 
required the Member States to respect the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II when 
accelerating the determination process, but they were also given the authorization to derogate 
from certain procedural rights ensured in Chapter II of the Directive, including the right to a 
personal interview and the right to stay pending appeal, with the purpose of guaranteeing the 
speed of this type of procedure. Consequently, applicants had no opportunity to prepare 
themselves for the determination procedure, gather the necessary documents, provide convincing 
evidence of their persecution claim and explain or correct inconsistent and contradictory 
statements or insufficient information they may have given during the preliminary interview.251 
Moreover, the competent officials were not afforded adequate time to rigorously process all the 
legal and factual aspects of refugee applications, which made them incapable of rendering a 
sound and reasoned decision and undermined the accuracy and fairness of the whole 
determination procedure. In effect, the fast-track procedure for assessing SCO asylum seekers, 
which did not fully observe the fundamental principles of EU law, the procedural safeguards 
incorporated in the APD and the international human rights obligations of the Member State 
concerned, had detrimental effects on both the host country’s asylum systems and refugee 
applicants, as reiterated in Recital 11 of the APD.252 Certain Member States such as the Czech 
Republic, Spain, Finland, France, Germany and Slovenia had transposed Article 23(4)(c)(i) in 
their national legislation.253  
Some may put forward the argument that the accelerated or prioritized determination procedure 
is one of the most helpful solutions for both the receiving country and asylum seekers, because 
speeding up the determination procedure aids in identifying applicants with a real and urgent 
need of protection and granting international protection sooner, prevents misuse of the Member 
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States’ generous asylum legislation and reduces the burden on competent officials in examining 
asylum applications. This reasoning could be accepted if applicants who were channelled 
through accelerated procedures enjoyed the same procedural rights and safeguards as regular 
applicants. But when the Member States are allowed to deprive SCO applicants of the most 
crucial procedural rights, such as the right to a personal interview254 or the right to remain in the 
host country while awaiting an appeal decision,255 or when they are able to impose severe time 
restrictions on their decision-making procedures, the only explanation is that their primary 
purpose is not to provide quality decisions or increase the fairness of first instance decisions, as 
reiterated in Recital 3 of the APD,256 but rather to reject asylum applicants at any cost as soon as 
possible.257 In this context, Article 23(4) represented one of the gravest threats to the procedural 
rights of SCO nationals, hindering their rights as ensured in the APD.258 
Omission of these conflicting measures in the RAPD will hopefully reduce the likelihood of 
erroneous decisions and the risk of violating fundamental human rights, the gravest of which is 
the refoulement of SCO asylum seekers, which could be exacerbated during the accelerated 
procedure. It seems that the Council and Parliament have taken these concerns into account, 
especially the case law of the ECJ, in passing the RAPD provisions on the procedural and 
fundamental human rights of SCO applicants during the determination process. For instance, in 
the case of H.I.D. and B.A. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner and Others,259 one of the 
issues, which was referred to the ECJ, was whether adopting administrative measures entitles the 
Member States to designate a particular class of refugee applications for examination through the 
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accelerated procedure based on the nationality or country of origin.260 The Court explained that 
the applicant’s country of origin or nationality may be considered justifying grounds and has a 
decisive role in accelerating an asylum application,261 based on the established case law of the 
Court,262 and under Recital 11 of the Preamble and Articles 23(3) and (4) of the APD, the 
Member States are permitted to organize, accelerate or prioritize the processing of refugee 
applications based on their national needs.263 However, this margin of discretion is subject to two 
conditions, according to the Court.  
First of all, the Member States should avoid any discrimination based on the nationality of 
asylum seekers whose application is decided on in an accelerated procedure by respecting all the 
procedural rights stipulated in Chapter II of the APD.264 According to the ECJ, “[T]he 
establishment of a prioritized procedure such as that in the main proceedings must allow in full 
the exercise of the rights that that directive confers upon applicants for asylum.”265  
 
Secondly, the time frame for the expeditious procedure must be fair and efficient, in the sense 
that the refugee applicant can  
[E]njoy a sufficient period of time within which to gather and present the necessary 
material in support of their application, thus allowing the determination authority to carry 
out a fair and comprehensive examination of those applications and to ensure that the 
applicants are not exposed to any dangers in their country of origin.266   
It should be emphasized that although certain refugee rights expert organizations such as 
UNCHR or European Council on Refugees and Exiles (hereafter ECRE) recognize the EU 
Member States’ discretion to accelerate the determination procedure, it is expressly limited to 
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cases of manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive applications.267 However, even in those cases, 
Member States must take into account certain factors in order to establish a fair and lawful 
accelerated procedure, including an adequate time limit for asylum seekers to submit their 
application to the determining authority; be prepared for the interview; consult a legal advisor or 
expert refugee organizations; provide additional supporting evidence, which in some cases can 
take a great deal of time to be sent from the country of origin; provide more flexible time limits 
for applicants who have experienced trauma and need more time than normal applicants to open 
up and substantiate their application during an interview; and provide sufficient time for the 
determining authority to gather information, examine the evidence provided and finally to render 
an adequately reasoned and just decision.268 In cases where acceleration of the asylum procedure 
is allowed, Member States should observe the principle of full and individual assessment of the 
merit of the applications by implementing all procedural safeguards in the EU directives or 
regulations and international refugee and human rights legal instruments.  
The accelerated determination procedure may be implemented in the most effecient way possible 
for abusive or manifestly unfounded applications, by means of a full and individual first instance 
determination based on the substance of the claims and a simplified appeal procedure with more 
limited time for lodging the appeal.269 In this context, the risk of violating the applicants’ 
fundamental rights, especially the right of non-refoulement, will be considerably minimized. 
When applying the accelerated procedure, the Member States must recall that the primary 
objective is to ensure a fair and efficient asylum procedure. Sacrificing procedural safeguards 
and the quality of the process for more speedy determinations, or imposing unreasonable time 
limits on either applicants participating in the determination procedure or on the decision-making 
authority to reach the final decision not only violates the right to asylum guaranteed by the 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,270 but also undermines the efficiency of 
the asylum system and prolongs the proceedings through appeal instances.271 According to ECJ 
case law, “[T]he detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s 
rights under Community law” must not render its exercise “impossible or extremely difficult.”272  
EU legislative bodies must consider that accelerating asylum procedures is not a sustainable 
solution to problems relating to the influx of asylum applicants, nor it is an acceptable way to 
lighten the heavy burden of accepting and processing an increasing number of refugee 
applications. Even if the Member States reject applications considered unmeritorious of 
international protection using the expeditious procedure, the rejected applicants, deprived of their 
basic procedural rights, can request a judicial review or submit an appeal that ends up prolonging 
the final decision, which in turn necessitates more resources. That is why ECRE stated that 
[T]he most effective way to increase the efficiency and the speed of decision-making is 
that receiving States adopt a policy of frontloading by investing sufficient recourses in 
order to enhance the quality and efficiency of first instance decision-making, thus 
avoiding unnecessary appeals.273 
The next two subsections will explain the APD and RAPD provisions on the right to a personal 
interview and the right to effective remedy, and their exercise during the accelerated procedure 
for examining SCO applications. 
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2.1.3: The right to a personal interview 
 
The reason the right to a personal interview is essential during the first instance of the decision-
making process is the fact that the information gathered at this stage has a decisive impact on the 
whole determination process and its final result, since the interview serves as one of the primary 
ways for the determining authority to evaluate the asylum seeker’s specific situation in the 
country of origin and the major elements of the refugee claim, in addition to providing the first 
and/or last chance for the asylum seeker to explain his or her request in person, clarify any 
ambiguity in the application and make a positive impression on the decision-maker.274 Providing 
adequate opportunity for asylum seekers to comprehensively substantiate, in person, their 
reasons for escaping their home country and why they merit international protection is one of the 
most crucial rights for refugees, and must be guaranteed by the receiving State during the 
procedure for determining refugee status (or for any other status related to international 
protection).275 The personal interview process should be regarded as a core component of any 
procedure requiring significant information relating to the substance of the application.276 In the 
next two sections, we will ascertain the general provisions set out in the APD and RAPD 
regarding the right to a personal interview and the detrimental effects of its denial on SCO 
refugee applicants. 
General remarks 
Prior to adoption of the APD, this procedural right’s central role in the assessment of refugee 
applications was highlighted in the Council Resolution on Minimum guarantees for asylum 
procedures277 and UNHCR’s 1983 Executive Committee Conclusion No. 30 (XXXIV).278 
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However, no indications can be found in either of these two documents concerning procedural 
details for conducting a personal interview or justificaitons for removing this meeting from the 
decision-making process. At the EU level, this fundamental right has been recognized as one of 
the basic guarantees and principles of the determination procedure in Chapter II of the APD and 
the RAPD.  
According to Article 12 of the APD, “Before a decision is taken by the determining authority, the 
applicant for asylum shall be given the opportunity of a personal interview on his/her application 
for asylum with a person competent under national law to conduct such an interview.”279 Article 
14(1) of the RAPD repeats this provision, requiring a personal interview on the substance of an 
application for international protection to be held “by the personnel of the determining 
authority.”280 This additional requirement would increase harmonization among the Member 
States’ determination procedures. 
Certain requirements were set out in the APD to provide a real opportunity for asylum seekers to 
present their claims in person. Some aspects of these requirements were completed by the 
RAPD. Article 12 of the APD imposed a general responsibility on the Member States to give 
each asylum seeker, but not dependent adults, a chance for a personal interview before a final 
decision is made. In order to help the determining authority obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of the factual and legal conditions of the application, the RAPD correctly obliged 
the Member States to conduct a personal interview with both the applicant and the dependent 
adult on behalf of whom the applicant has submitted an international protection request.281   
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Given the special situation of asylum seekers in the receiving country, including psychological 
conditions and the financial, cultural or linguistic problems they may experience, the APD 
necessitated that the personal interview be conducted by a qualified person who, as provided for 
in Article 13(3)(a), “is sufficiently competent to take account of the personal or general 
circumstances surrounding the application, including the applicant’s cultural origin or 
vulnerability, in so far as it is possible to do so.”282 However, it would have been more helpful if 
the Directive had laid down specific procedural provisions for sensitive interviews with 
applicants in more vulnerable situations or with special needs, such as applicants of a particular 
sexual orientation, to avoid violation of their fundamental rights, including the right to the 
integrity of the person, the right to human dignity and the right to respect for private and family 
life.283 In this regard, in the case of A, B, C v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie on the 
issue of proper and acceptable practices for examining refugee applications on the grounds of 
sexual orientation, the European Court of Justice has reiterated that it is the determining 
authority’s responsibility to adjust the process of collecting and assessing statements and 
information concerning the refugee application according to the individual situation of each 
refugee applicant and general circumstances surrounding the application.284 Fortunately, some 
Member States such as Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Lithuania, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have special arrangements in 
place to appoint an interpreter or interviewer of the same sex as the applicant.285  
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In this regard, Article 15 of the RAPD can be considered a complementary provision to the 
former Directive containing the requirement to conduct a fair and efficient personal interview, in 
the sense that it has addressed all the deficiencies of the former article and has required the 
Member States to take necessary steps to ensure that “the person who conducts the interview is 
competent to take account of the personal and general circumstances surrounding the application, 
including the applicant’s cultural origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
vulnerability”286 and to “wherever possible, provide for the interview with the applicant to be 
conducted by a person of the same sex if the applicant so requests.”287 
Article 13(3)(b) of the APD and Article 15(3) (c) of the RAPD require the Member States to 
appoint an interpreter during the personal interview “to ensure appropriate communication 
between the applicant and the person who conducts the interview.”288 The RAPD, contrary to the 
APD, has adopted more favourable conditions for refugee applicants in which communication 
between the applicant and the interpretor must be in the applicant’s preferred language “unless 
there is another language which he or she understands and in which he or she is able to 
communicate clearly.”289  
More importantly, to create the most appropriate psychological environment for the applicant, 
the Member States are required, whenever possible, to assign a same-sex interpreter for the 
applicant290 and ensure that the competent authority who conducts the interview does not wear a 
“military or law enforcement uniform.”291 UNHCR has welcomed these provisions for the 
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personal interview, reaffirming that when granting refugee applicants a personal interview, the 
Member States should undertake “all the reasonable measures.”292  
Despite these significant provisions, the personal interview is not explicitly defined in either the 
Commission’s proposal or in the adopted versions of the Directive of 2005 or 2013. This lack of 
definition creates a confusing situation. Since applicants are interviewed by different authorities 
at various stages of the determination procedure under each Member State’s national legislation, 
it is not clear which of these meetings should be considered a personal interview and must be 
held in accordance with RAPD requirements and fundamental human rights principles.293 It 
seems that the first paragraph of Article 13(3) of the APD and Article 15(3) of the RAPD have 
acceptably defined the personal interview as a meeting subject to certain requirements stipulated 
in the Directive that “allow applicants to present the grounds for their applications in a 
comprehensive manner.”294  
Based on this definition, one may conclude that the preliminary interview as held in several 
Member States, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
UK, even though it is conducted in the presence of the determining authority, may not be 
established as the personal interview under the provisions of Articles 12 and 13, since the main 
purpose of this preliminary interview is to gather and register the applicant’s personal 
information, such as age, sex, identity, family relationships, nationality, travel routes and travel 
documents.295 However, this argument is not convincing, since the information collected from 
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this type of interview has a conclusive role in determining the responsible Member State or the 
procedure under which the application should be examined.296 Also, the determining authority 
reassesses the gathered personal data in the next stages of the application to uncover any 
inconsistencies or contradictions. The preliminary interview and the information collected 
therein is as important as the first instance decision-making procedure, and may be supported by 
Article 4 of the Qualification Directive and the Recast Qualification Directive, which provide the 
necessary conditions for “assessment of applications for international protection.”297 According 
to Article 4(2), evaluation of the factual and legal elements of each application consists of  
[T]he applicant’s statements and all documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the 
applicant’s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), 
country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, 
identity and travel documents and the reasons for applying for international protection.298 
To complete and increase the quality of the entire determination procedure, the Council and 
European Parliament require the personal interview on the substance of an asylum application to 
be conducted “by the personnel of the determining authority.”299 It can be correctly concluded 
that according to the RAPD, any meeting on the substance of an international protection 
application must be recognized as a form of personal interview and therefore should be carried 
out by the competent authority qualified to assess the merits of the application in accordance 
with the requirements specified in the RAPD. Thus, the requirements and guarantees 
incorporated in Articles 14 and 15 of the RAPD should be recognized and implemented during 
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any meetings held before the personal interview.300 In some Member States such as Germany 
and Greece, a single personal interview is conducted to gather information for the purposes of 
registering and completing the applicant’s profile, and to collect information on the reasons for 
seeking international protection. Accordingly, the preliminary interview or any other meeting 
between the host country’s competent authority and refugee applicants with the purpose of 
gathering information on the factual or legal conditions of a refugee claim, at the border or in the 
territory, should be recognized as a personal interview under the terms of Articles 14 and 15 of 
the RAPD and must be conducted in accordance with EU law, fundamental international refugee 
and human rights law and the principles of procedural fairness. 
Rejection of the right to a personal interview 
The most problematic provision of the APD regarding the right to a personal interview was 
Article 12(2), according to which there were three possible cases when the Member States were 
entitled to disregard this right.301 One of these cases was when asylum seekers had come from an 
SCO or an STC and “the determining authority, on the basis of a complete examination of 
information provided by the applicant, considers the application as unfounded.”302 
This provision clearly indicates the precarious effect of the SCO measure on asylum seekers and 
the effect the general presumption of safety has on the principles of procedural fairness.303 The 
designation of a third country as an SCO justified the elimination of the refugee applicant’s 
participation in the fact-finding process, requiring only the determining authority’s consideration 
in order to grant or refuse international protection. Given the multifaceted and complicated issues 
arising from every refugee application, especially SCO applications examined in an accelerated 
procedure, the personal interview sessions are a non-negligible way of helping officials reach the 
correct decision. In other words, omitting the personal interview calls into question the accuracy 
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and validity of decisions rendered at the first instance, in particular in an expeditious process, 
and puts the onus of examining refugee applications on the appeal body. UNHCR has expressed 
its serious concerns about the Member States’ abilities to deprive certain applicant groups of the 
right to a personal interview and testimony, arguing that “all claimants should in principle be 
granted personal interviews, unless the applicant is unfit or unable to attend an interview owing 
to enduring circumstances beyond his or her control.”304 
This idea was reaffirmed by the Commission in its 2002 proposal and by the Council and 
European Parliament in the RAPD, which has allowed the Member States to exclude personal 
interviews solely on the basis that “the determining authority is able to take a positive decision 
with regard to refugee status on the basis of evidence available”305 or that “the determining 
authority is of the opinion that the applicant is unfit or unable to be interviewed owing to 
enduring circumstances beyond his or her control.”306  
Careful consideration of exceptional cases referred to by UNHCR, the Commission proposal, 
and the RAPD supports the interpretation that they have not intended to preclude asylum seekers 
from the right to a personal interview, but have simply aimed to express examples of situations 
in which refugee applicants are, unintentionally and by no fault of their own, unable to appear at 
the personal interview meeting, requiring the receiving countries to take into account the 
individual (either psychological or medical) conditions of the asylum seeker in holding or 
overlooking the personal interview. That is why, according to the last sentence of Article 14(2) 
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and Article 10(3) of the Commission’s 2002 proposal, “[w]here a personal interview is not 
conducted pursuant to point (b) or, where applicable, with the dependent, reasonable efforts shall 
be made to allow the applicant or the dependant to submit further information.”307 In this case, it 
would be more helpful if the RAPD mandated the presence of a legal advisor or other procedural 
requirements as indicated in the Commission’s 2002 proposal. 
Regarding the grave consequences of erroneous decisions on the life and freedom of asylum 
seekers, the obligation the RAPD imposes on the Member States to conduct a personal interview 
during the first instance decision-making procedure is in full compliance with fundamental 
human rights law, and is why Article 12(2) of the APD was eliminated in the new Directive. This 
amendment is significant for two reasons. 
First of all, the cases provided for under Article 14(2) of the RAPD are related to issues beyond 
the control or intention of asylum seekers, and, more importantly, are not based on 
discriminatory criteria such as the origin of refugee applicants. The SCO rule, provided as 
acceptable grounds in Article 12(c) of the APD for depriving asylum seekers of their 
fundamental right to a personal interview, is totally unrelated to the merit of the application. 
More dangerously, the SCO rule is in opposition to Article 3 of the 1951 Geneva Convention308 
and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights309 prohibiting discrimination on 
the grounds of race, religion or country of origin when applying the Convention’s provisions as 
reiterated in paragraph 9 of the Preamble of the APD, which states that “[w]ith respect to the 
treatment of persons falling within the scope of this Directive, Member States are bound by 
obligations under instruments of international law to which they are party and which prohibit 
discrimination.”310 In addition, depriving asylum seekers of a personal interview based on their 
nationality contradicts Article 21 of the legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of nationality “[w]ithin the 
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scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on 
European Union [...].” 
Secondly, designating a third country as an SCO creates an assumption of safety for the 
determining authority, thereby increasing the applicant’s burden of proof to reject that 
assumption by introducing additional evidence.311 In practice, it seems that this general 
predetermination of safety exempts the determining authority from the obligation to completely 
and comprehensively assess each application on a case-by-case basis,312 since SCO applications 
seem unfounded before they are even made unless the applicants are afforded adequate time and 
are able to present evidence to deny this initial determination.313 Furthermore, according to 
Article 31(8) (b) of the RAPD and Article 23(4) (c) (i) of the APD, when an asylum seeker is 
coming from a safe country of origin, the Member States are allowed to accelerate the 
determination procedure,314 which means the applicant has to gather supporting evidence or 
consult a legal advisor quickly and the determining authority is forced to reach the final decision 
in a short period of time. All these factors may result in a decision made without carefully 
considering the applicant’s particular situation, and the general aspects of the application place 
SCO asylum seekers at a greater risk of being refouled to a country where their life or freedom is 
in danger than any other group of asylum seekers. Empowering the Member States to derogate 
from the general principle of a personal interview during the determination procedure could 
amount to incorrect decisions based on inadequate information and ambiguous statements, which 
could result in violations of the fundamental principles of international refugee and human rights 
law, such as the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention315 and 
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the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.316  
Ultimately, any limitation or obstacle to the exercise of the right to a personal interview during 
the determination procedure that reduces the asylum seeker’s chance to explain the grounds for 
requesting international protection may violate the right to life, the right to liberty and security, 
the right to be protected from torture and the right to a fair trial incorporated in the European 
Convention on Human Rights317 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union,318 in particular when applications are examined in an expedited procedure because of the 
asylum seeker’s national origin. Although not related directly to the issue of personal interviews, 
in the case of Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European 
Communities, the ECJ, while highlighting the nature and objective of the process concerned, 
indicated that “a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public 
authority must be given the opportunity to make his point of view.”319  
As one of the avenues left for SCO asylum seekers to defend their claim and clarify their 
application, ensuring that a personal interview takes place is in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of refugee and human rights law. The provisions that guarantee the right to a personal 
interview for all asylum applicants is in line with Recital 42 of the RAPD’s Preamble and Recital 
21 of the APD’s Preamble, which affirm that the “designating of a third country of origin [...] 
cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for nationals of that country,” and more 
importantly adds that 
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[B]y its very nature, the assessment underlying the designation can only take into account 
the general civil, legal and political circumstances in that country and whether actors of 
persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are subject to 
sanction in practice when found liable in the country concerned.320 
It can therefore be concluded that SCO applications must be examined by means of an individual 
and comprehensive procedure in which the applicant is afforded a real opportunity to rebut the 
presumption of safety in his or her case.321  
UNHCR went a step further, requiring Member States to inform applicants at the beginning of 
the examination procedure if their national country has been designated as an SCO and notify 
them of the legal and procedural effects of this preventive measure during the determining 
procedure.322 Consequently, UNHCR criticized  Member States such as Finland or Spain that do 
not have a national designation of safe countries of origin and instead use this notion on a case-
by-case basis “without a transparent, formal, published” national list, since they indirectly 
deprive SCO refugee applicants of the opportunity to prepare adequate evidence in advance or to 
consult a legal advisor for assistance in disapproving the presumed safety of their national 
country.323 
Pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 36(1) of the RAPD (Article 31(1) of the APD), a third 
country can be designated as an SCO after individual examination of an application only if the 
applicant for asylum  
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has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe 
country of origin in his or her particular circumstances and in terms of his or her 
qualification as a beneficiary of international protection in accordance with Directive 
2011/95/EU.324  
If the Member States, under the provisions of the RAPD, are entitled to apply the accelerated 
procedure when examining SCO applications, the only efficient and reliable opportunity left to 
SCO asylum seekers in order to counterindicate the presumption of safety in their country of 
origin is a personal interview conducted with an interviewer who has adequate and up-to-date 
knowledge of the allegedly safe country. Granting a personal interview to applicants whose 
asylum requests are examined by means of an accelerated procedure, without increasing the 
burden of proof,325 is a significant step toward establishing the principle of full individual 
examination of every asylum application on its merits, as emphasized by the 1951 Geneva 
Convention326 and the Recast Qualification Directive,327 and ensuring procedural fairness of 
determination procedures in Member States’ asylum systems, as indicated in Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. As stressed by UNHCR, respecting the right to a personal interview in any 
judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making procedure, in particular the refugee status 
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determination procedure will increase the “fairness of procedure and the accuracy of 
decisions.”328 
Ultimately, in line with the aforementioned reasons, granting the right to a personal interview is 
in accordance with “the right to good administration” as guaranteed by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. According to Article 41(1) of the EU Charter, this 
right implies that “[e]very person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, 
fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union,” which includes 
the right to be heard, the right to have access to his or her file and the right to a reasoned 
decision.329 As established by the case law of the European Court of Justice, Article 41(1) 
constitutes an integral part of the European Union’s legal order.330  
In the recent case of Khaled Boudjlida v. Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques,331 the ECJ has 
attempted to give a comprehensive definition of the right to be heard, its centrality and vital 
position in judicial or administrative proceedings and the major requirements for providing this 
right. Although this case concerns the return order of a third country national staying illegally in 
France based on the Return Directive of 2008,332 the Court’s method and reasoning for 
interpreting the inherent nature of the right to be heard in all proceedings demonstrates that the 
right to a personal interview in the refugee determination procedure is an essential derivative of 
the right to be heard and is therefore guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. As reaffirmed by the Court, the right to be heard is recognized as an inherent 
part of the fundamental right to a defence, which is confirmed by Article 47 (right to a fair trial), 
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Article 48 (right to be assumed innocent and right to a defence), and Article 41(2) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.333 The right to be heard is defined by the Court as 
the opportunity for every person “to make known his views effectively during an administrative 
procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his interests adversely.”334 
According to the Court, this right must be observed for two reasons. It enables the person to 
correct any errors or clarify ambiguities in the submitted evidence by providing additional 
information about his or her personal circumstances and the general situation of the case, and it 
helps the decision-making authority to take into consideration all relevant information and 
essential aspects of the case in order to render a justifiable decision.335 Thus, as a general rule, 
the Member States are obliged to observe the right to be heard when they act within the scope of 
EU law.336 
However, as established by ECJ case law, the right to be heard is not, in essence, an “unfettered 
prerogative,” meaning that it can be subject to some restrictions under certain conditions. First of 
all, any limitations on a fundamental right guaranteed in a legal measure such as a regulation or 
directive must be in accordance with the general objectives pursued by that legal measure and its 
scheme.337 Second of all, these restrictions should not bring about “a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference” with the raison d’être of the infringed right.338 Thirdly, in the case of 
M.G, N.R v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, the Court accepted that the infringement 
or any irregularity in the exercise of the fundamental right to be heard during administrative 
procedures does not automatically render the final decision invalid, but that it is necessary to  
assess whether in light of the factual and legal conditions of the case concerned, the outcome 
could have been different if the applicant had been given an effective chance to present his or her 
point of view or provide more supporting evidence.339  
                                                            
 
333 Khaled Boudjlida v. Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Case C-249/13, prec., note 331, para.31. 
334 Id., para.36. 
335 Id., para.37-38. 
336 Id., para.40. 
337 M.G and N.R v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-383/13 PPU, prec., note 330, para.37. 
338 Id., para.43. 
339 Id., para.43-44. 
79 
 
 
In accordance with these requirements and the interpretation put forward by the Court, if we take 
the RAPD as our starting point, we will find the Commission, the Council and European 
Parliament’s central goals in passing the RAPD. As reiterated in the Preamble and in Article 1 of 
the RAPD, the first and most important purpose of the Directive is to provide minimum 
standards for implementing a fair and efficient common asylum procedure among the Member 
States and a uniform status recognized throughout the EU340 in full compliance with the 1951 
Geneva Convention,341 fundamental rights recognized by the EU Charter and observance of the 
Member States’s obligations according to international legal instruments to which they are 
signatories.342 Accordingly, restrictions on the rights provided for in the Directive must be 
applied with this intended goal in mind and within the scope of the Member States’ 
constitutional and international refugee and human rights responsibilities. Given all these 
considerations, Articles 12 and 13 of the APD have been removed in the RAPD, and the Member 
States are required to recognize the right to a personal interview during the determination 
procedure, in order to provide an effective opportunity for asylum seekers “to present the 
grounds for their applications in a comprehensive manner”343 before the competent authority 
makes a decision about the refugee application.  
These changes are in accordance with ECJ case law, which has reiterated that implementing the 
provisions of the EU legislation and applying the restrictions permitted by these measures is 
subject to the conditions and limitations set out by the Directive in question.344 For instance, in 
the case of Khaled Boudjlida v. Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, it was recognized as the 
Member States’ responsibility to adopt a return decision against a third country national residing 
illegally in their territory while taking into account the exceptions provided in the 2008 Return 
Directive, including the principle of non-refoulement. Accordingly, the competent authority must 
hear the person’s point of view before making any decision about returning the person to his or 
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her country of origin to avoid refouling third country nationals to a territory where their life or 
freedom is threatened.345  
Given the fragile situation of asylum seekers and that an incorrect decision has a greater impact 
on an asylum seeker’s life or freedom regarding returning to their country of origin than on other 
third country nationals residing in the EU, the Member States are obliged to provide all 
favourable measures, with due respect to their international obligations and the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU Charter, to ensure a correct and reasonable final decision on refugee 
applications. 
Due to the similar definitions of the right to a personal interview and the right to be heard 
outlined by the RAPD and the ECJ respectively, as well as the equal importance accorded to 
these two rights during any administrative proceedings in order to protect fundamental human 
rights, in particular during the refugee determination procedure, it may be concluded that the 
right to a personal interview during the determination process has been recognized as an inherent 
part of the right to be heard and that the Member States must respect it as an inherent component 
of the right to good administration guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.   
In sum, the complex reasons for and composite nature of asylum applications require the 
determining authority to gather “precise and up-to-date information from various sources”346 and 
to implement an assessment method that corresponds to the particular situation of each asylum 
seeker in observance of their fundamental rights.347 Conducting a personal interview is the best 
way to meet all these requirements.348 Furthermore, guaranteeing the personal interview, 
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especially in an accelerated procedure, reduces the risk of incorrect decisions and prevents 
appeals against determination decisions that prolong asylum proceedings before reaching the 
final decision. Prolongation of the determination procedure is in contrast with the primary 
objective of any efficient asylum system, which is to shorten the time asylum seekers spend in 
the receiving country, quickly identify legitimate refugees and accept or reject refugee 
applications within a reasonable period of time. In this regard, UNHCR has underlined that 
establishing a fair and efficient asylum procedure can guarantee the interests of all parties 
involved.349   
In light of the previous explanations, it is impossible to expect the Member States to make 
correct and fair decisions on asylum applications in due respect of their human rights obligations 
without granting a personal interview.350  
2.1.3 Right to appeal (right to an effective remedy) 
 
Under Article 39(1) of the APD and Article 46(1) of the RAPD, the Member States are required, 
with no exceptions, to ensure that applicants for international protection “have the right to an 
effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against [among others] a decision taken on their 
application for asylum.”351 Fortunately, it follows from these articles that contrary to the APD’s 
provisions on the right to a personal interview, the Member States are obliged to provide all 
applicants seeking international protection with the right to appeal decisions before a court or 
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tribunal, irrespective of their nationality, the former country they have come from or any other 
factors.352 The prominent position of this right has been reaffirmed in the Preambles of the 
aforementioned Directives as “a basic principle of Community law.”353  
In this regard, there is a remarkable difference between the RAPD and the APD. While in the last 
paragraph of Recital 27 of the APD, the effectiveness of the appeal or judicial review process 
depended on the administrative and judicial system of each Member State, in Recital 50 of the 
RAPD, there is no reference to this condition. This amendment is based on the APD’s and 
RAPD’s distinct approaches. Contrary to the APD, which recognized a wide range of discretion 
for the Member States in administrating and providing international protection applicants with 
the right to effective remedy, the RAPD has constrained the Member States’ authority in order to 
ensure that the right to effective remedy is administered in the most efficient way possible, and 
to further harmonize the Member States’ asylum systems with ECJ and ECtHR case law. It will 
be described, in further detail, in the following section. 
The fundamentals of this procedural requirement originate from the fact that because of the 
growing number of asylum requests, determining refugee status in Western societies is one of the 
most difficult administrative or quasi-judicial procedures even when carried out by competent 
officials, which heightens the risk of making a wrong decision at the first instance.354 This is, in 
most part, due to the unique questions and unprecedented issues arising during the decision-
making process.355 Accordingly, the likelihood of an erroneous decision urges almost all rejected 
applicants to request a judicial review or lodge an appeal opposing a negative decision before a 
tribunal or court of appeal. This general concern about potential wrong decisions is reinforced by 
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the reality that according to UNHCR, approximately 60% of rejected asylum seekers are 
recognized as refugees during an appeal.356 In 2007, 29,500 negative refugee applicant 
determinations made in a first tier examination worldwide were overturned and were granted 
international protection at the appeal level, according to statistics provided by UNHCR on the 
quality of decisions made in the first instance procedure.357  
Effective remedy before an independent and impartial judicial body is the last chance granted to 
rejected refugee applicants to seek protection from the violation of their human rights and 
refoulement to a country where their life or freedom is threatened.358 Therefore, the right to an 
appeal, guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union359 and the EU 
Convention on Human Rights,360 entails safeguarding the right to life, the right to be protected 
from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to liberty and security.361  
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This right is even more crucial in the case of SCO refugee claimants whose applications have 
been examined during an expeditious procedure with a higher burden of proof to reject the 
presumed safety of their national country.362 It is correct to recognize this right as a fundamental 
principle of human rights law363 whose significance has been reaffirmed by the jurisprudence of 
both the ECJ and the ECtHR. According to ECJ case law, the right to an effective remedy has 
been established as “a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by Article 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”364  
In the case of Labsi v. Slovakia,365 the ECtHR, concerning the conditions under which the right 
to effective remedy should be conferred on rejected asylum seekers as warranted in Article 13 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, upheld that before executing any final removal 
decision, the asylum applicant must have access to judicial redress “by means of a complaint” 
before a competent court.366 The Court expressed that depriving asylum applicants of the right to 
adequate redress contravenes the right to an effective remedy as ensured by Article 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.367  
Ironically, the APD and the RAPD necessitated that the judicial remedy be “effective,” but they 
did not give any clear definition of the quality required. The fundamental principles of human 
rights and the ECtHR and ECJ’s interpretations can compensate for this major deficiency. In this 
regard, two issues should be clarified: the general procedural rules for the comprehensive 
establishment and efficient implementation of this right, and its suspensive effect in preventing 
the execution of a deportation order.  
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General procedural rules 
Determining the basic principles to be applied during refugee determination procedures, from the 
first step of lodging an application to the final decision issued by a competent appeal court, has 
been a recurring controversial issue, due to the fact that the most important legal resource on 
international refugee rights, the 1951 Geneva Convention, does not contain any explicit 
procedural rules.368 At the EU level, the APD was almost silent on the procedural criteria for 
guaranteeing and increasing the efficiency of the appeal process. It merely required the Member 
States to establish time frames and other necessary rules for ensuring the right to appeal in 
accordance with their national legislations.369  
ECtHR case law grants the contracting States some discretion in carrying out their obligations to 
ensure the right to appeal; however, according to the Court, they must prevent the execution of 
measures that are inconsistent with the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.370 In the case of Brahim Samba Diouf v. Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de 
l’Immigration on the issue of whether the rejected refugee applicant had the right to challenge 
the determining authority’s decision to examine the application in an accelerated procedure, the 
ECJ explained the centrality of the right to judicial remedy and the requirement for its effective 
exercise. In this context, the Court upheld that although according to the provisions of the APD, 
the Member States were permitted to choose the procedure (either ordinary or accelerated) for 
examining refugee applications, national law must be applied in full conformity with EU law 
and, consequently, the courts must interpret national provisions while ensuring the “full 
effectiveness of EU law”371 and the achievement of the objectives pursued by the directive 
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concerned.372 The Court concluded that in order to ensure the principle of effectiveness, the right 
to remedy should be applied as required by Article 39(1) of the APD, in such a way that 
[T]he national court must be able to review the merits of the reasons which led the 
competent administrative authority to hold the application for international protection to be 
unfounded or made in bad faith, there being no irrebuttable presumption as to the legality 
of those reasons.373  
Furthemore, since the Directive imposed on the Member States the responsibility to observe their 
international obligations while legislating on issues such as the suspensive effect of the appeal,374 
they are not free to establish an appeal procedure irrespective of their international obligations. 
Accordingly, although certain principles and necessary provisions were left undetermined in the 
APD, they have been clarified by RAPD provisions, the fundamental principles of international 
refugee and human rights law, and Community law. 
First of all, the basic requirement that the Member States must observe, in order to comply with 
their international refugee and human rights obligations, is to establish a fair procedure, from the 
first instance through to the appeal body’s final decision, that impedes the refoulement of asylum 
seekers to a country where their life or freedom is in danger or where they are subject to inhuman 
punishment or degrading treatment.375 Thus, given the irreversible consequences if asylum 
seekers are returned to a territory where their life or freedom is in danger or where they are at 
risk of ill-treatment or torture,376 the Member States are obliged to respect the principle of non-
refoulement as the cornerstone of refugee rights protection in every phase of the determination 
procedure, even during a judicial review or appeal proceedings on the first instance decision. As 
expressed in the previous section, it is not rational to expect a State to be able to meet all its 
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constitutional and international refugee and human rights obligations without providing a fair 
and effective determination procedure.377  
The necessity of stipulating a reasonable timescale also applies to appeal instances. Although 
under Article 39(2) of the APD the Member States were required to “provide for time limits and 
other necessary rules for the applicant to exercise his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to 
paragraph 1,” regrettably, the Directive did not specifically determine the length of the time limit 
or the basic conditions that constitute effective remedy in the following articles, instead leaving 
these decisions to the discretion of the Member States. Under Article 46(4) of the RAPD, the 
Member States do not enjoy unconditional discretion in this regard and must comply with the 
same requirements as those governing first instance procedures, since according to its last 
paragraph, the time limit set out by the Member States should not make exercising the right to 
effective remedy “impossible or excessively difficult.”378 This measure is one of the best 
indications of the harmonization established by the Council and European Parliament between 
the measures adopted in the RAPD and the interpretation put forward by the ECtHR, inter alia, in 
the case of Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern.379 In order to 
ensure the effectivity and accessibility of judicial remedy, the Member States are obliged to 
respect the general procedural principles of Community law when establishing any time limits 
for appeal procedures. As stipulated by UNHCR, given the complexity of the judicial 
proceedings, the Member States should allow refugee applicants the necessary time “to 
undertake all the required procedural steps,” such as consulting a legal assistant, understanding 
the procedure and submitting the appeal.380  
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The time limits of 48 hours for applicants at French borders or for the fast-track procedure for 
detained applicants in the UK381, or the time limit of 72 hours to appeal rejected applications in 
accelerated procedures in Slovenia, adopted under the APD’s provisions, violate Community law 
procedural principles and make appeal proceedings useless.382 
Though Article 38(2) of the Commission’s 2002 proposal383 extended the scope of judicial 
remedy to both factual and legal issues, the APD does not specifically determine the extent to 
which the appeal body is entitled to review the determining authority’s decision. The uncertainty 
regarding the appeal court’s review competence undermines asylum seekers’ ability to 
completely exercise their right to judicial remedy. Given the complex and distinctive nature of 
each refugee application, the appeal body needs a wide scope of jurisdiction to be able to 
reassess all the factual and legal issues surrounding the refugee application in question and to 
fully understand the applicant’s particular position and the general situation of the case, in order 
to provide the most effective remedy for asylum seekers.384 Imposing restrictions on the appeal 
body’s jurisdiction in examining the evidence, reassessing the relevant issues of the application 
or the grounds for challenging the first instance decision undermines the fairness and efficiency 
of the appeal process and subsequently of the entire determination procedure. This interpretation 
is in accordance with the European Court of Justice’s case law.385 As well, ECtHR jurisprudence 
is specific on that point that judicial review has to be a “close and rigorous scrutiny” in order to 
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be considered a genuine, effective remedy.386 Consequently, the ECtHR has always provided 
itself with the jurisdiction to examine the facts and law in each case before it.387 
Under the national legislation of several Member States, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, the appellant body is entitled to review both factual 
and legal issues in cases with negative decisions on claims for international protection.388 
UNHCR emphasized that effective remedy as defined in Article 39 of the APD and Article 13 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights requires the appellant body to gather evidence 
rigorously during an independent investigation, which enables the court to reassess negative 
asylum application decisions by taking into account factual and legal issues.389  
The Council and European Parliament have taken these consideration into account by recasting 
Article 39 of the APD in such a way that under Article 46(3) of the RAPD, the Member States 
are expressly required to “ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc 
examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the 
international protection needs pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU, at least in appeals procedures 
before a court or tribunal of first instance.”390 
Although not expressed by either the APD or the RAPD, it would be the most helpful if the 
judicial body responsible for accepting the appeal were a separate court with the specific task of 
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reviewing refugee status determination decisions. The complex and composite nature of refugee 
applications makes it difficult and confusing for the ordinary judicial body to reassess refugee 
applicants. Specialized courts have been established in Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Poland 
and the UK.391 Asylum seekers are one of the most vulnerable groups in society, with many 
challenges such as financial or psychological problems, cultural and linguistic issues and so on. 
Allocating a distinct appeal body to consider the especial situation of rejected asylum seekers 
with simplified procedural rules, more generous time limits and automatic suspensive effects that 
allow asylum seekers to stay in the receiving country pending their appeal is the best way to 
protect the appeal right of asylum seekers and to guarantee compliance with fundamental human 
rights principles.392 This requirement is drawn from the last paragraph of Article 46(3) of the 
RAPD, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.393 UNHCR has pointed out that “the 
practicalities which are inherent in exercising a judicial right of appeal are notoriously technical 
and complex. It is crucial, therefore, that Member States minimize requirements and facilitate 
access to the right in practice.”394 
None of these three requirements was expressly stipulated in the APD, while the provisions 
relating to the procedural rules of appeal were legislated vaguely without any specific details. 
Fortunately, as explained above, these deficiencies have been amended by ECJ and ECtHR case 
law and have ultimately been incorporated into the RAPD. 
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In the next section, the most vital feature of the right to appeal, its suspensive effect, will be 
explained in detail. 
Suspensive effect of appeal  
Regarding best practices for ensuring the right to an effective remedy, the only specified rules 
incorporated into the APD required Member States to provide this right generally for all 
applicants;395 determination of time limits and other necessary rules for applicants to exercise 
their right to an effective remedy were left up to the Member States’ national legislation.396 
Regrettably, with regard to the sensitive subject matter of the suspensive effect of the appeal 
proceedings, the Member States, with the purpose of retaining their restrictive asylum 
legislations and manipulating the APD’s procedural rules, forced the Council to grant them 
discretion, the most disconcerting and controversial of which was stipulated in Article 39(3)(a). 
According to this article, Member States could, in accordance with their international obligations 
and where appropriate, lay down in their national legislation provisions for whether or not 
applicants were allowed to remain in their territory while awaiting the outcome of the appeal.397  
To rationalize this provision, Western countries have put forward the argument that generally, 
any procedural right or proceeding that prolongs an asylum seeker’s stay in the host State must 
be limited, since the longer refugee applicants remain in the country of asylum, the harder it will 
be to return them in the case of a negative final decision. The Western States, in most cases, see 
the appeal process as a pretext asylum seekers use to abuse the determination procedure, extend 
their stay and make deporting them legally or morally harder or more complicated. In addition, 
from the host country’s point of view, the appeal process is not part of the whole refugee status 
determination procedure, so it is legitimate and not at variance with the principle of non-
refoulement to return rejected asylum seekers to their previous country, even though the appeal 
body’s decision has not yet been rendered. 
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Consequently, the Member States, by virtue of the discretion afforded in Article 39(3)(a) of the 
APD, were empowered to keep their current asylum legislation or introduce new provisions on 
returning refugee applicants to their country of origin or the previous country they had come 
from while the appeal court was reassessing their application and a final decision had not yet 
been rendered.  
The initial version of this article, included in the Commission’s 2002 proposal, affected two 
distinct groups. The first was asylum seekers whose refugee applications had been examined 
during a regular procedure and whom the Member States were obliged to allow to remain in their 
territory while awaiting the results of appeal proceedings.398 Although the Commission had 
permitted the Member States to derogate from this general provision in accordance with national 
legislation in force on the date the Directive was adopted,399 they were obliged to mandate a 
court of law to decide, on a case-by-case basis, if applicants could stay or were required to 
leave.400 The second group involved refugee claimants whose applications had been decided in 
an accelerated procedure. According to the proposal, in this context the Member States were 
entitled to determine cases in their national legislation in which the suspensory effect of appeal 
would be denied for decisions made using such a procedure.401 Nevertheless, the Commission 
correctly and wisely required the Member States to  
[E]nsure that a court of law has the competence to rule whether or not this applicant for 
asylum may [...] remain on the territory of the Member State concerned, either upon 
request of the concerned applicant or acting on its own motion.402 
As a result, the Member States would not be free of their international human rights obligations 
if they denied rejected applicants, such as SCO asylum seekers whose refugee claims had been 
determined in an expeditious procedure, the right to remain while appeal proceedings were 
pending. In this context, a separate court should have been given the competence to decide 
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whether to let the rejected refugee claimant remain in the Member State’s territory during the 
appeal, taking into account the applicant’s special conditions and the general situation of the 
case, in accordance with the asylum seeker’s fundamental human rights. According to the 
proposal’s expression, no expulsion would be carried out before a court of law had issued a 
decision about the suspensive effect of appeal.403  
Unfortunately, this procedural requirement was not incorporated into the final version of Article 
39(3)(a) of the APD which, in practice, created a paradoxical situation. Member States were 
merely required to take into account their international obligations while also maintaining the 
discretion to grant or deny suspensive effect to rejected asylum seekers’ appeal requests and, 
more neglectfully, they were free from any responsibility to provide an opportunity for rejected 
asylum seekers to challenge this harmful deprivation in a specialized court of law. How can the 
Member States be expected to meet their international human rights obligations, the most 
important of which is the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, when they are free to send 
applicants back to their countries of origin without taking all the steps necessary to examine, 
process and make a decision on a refugee application? Is it acceptable that the first instance 
decision is sufficient to deport  asylum seekers to their country without taking a specialized, 
independent judicial body’s opinion into account, in particular when it is mandated to reassess 
new information and evidence provided by the refused asylum seeker? Is it reasonable to afford 
Member States the authority (given their preventive asylum policy and intolerance regarding the 
presence of asylum seekers in their territory) to decide whether or not an applicant may stay in 
its territory during the appeal procedure? UNHCR has called this article the “most worrisome” 
rule of the Directive.404  
It is regrettable that under the provisions of the APD, the right to appeal was enacted in such an 
ineffective way. As established by the ECJ’s case law, the principle of effectiveness requires that 
the provisions enacted by the EU be exercised and interpreted in conformity with the principles 
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of EU law and the objectives pursued by the regulation or directive in question.405 To respond to 
all these concerns, the final version of the RAPD obliges the Member States to  
[A]llow applicants to remain in the territory until the time limit within which to exercise 
their right to an effective remedy has expired and, when such a right has been exercised 
within the time limit, pending the outcome of the remedy.406  
Although this provision is the same as was adopted in APD, the suspensive effect of the right to 
appeal has not been guaranteed unconditionally in the RAPD. However, under Article 46(6) of 
the RAPD and contrary to Article 39(3)(a) of the APD, the Member States’ discretion to reject 
the suspensive effect has been restricted to four cases, one of which is when the application is 
rejected based on the SCO rule.407  
Article 46(6) suffers from the same deficiencies as its precedent, but there is a requirement in 
this provision that demonstrates notable progress compared to Article 39(3)(a). If suspensive 
effect of judicial review is denied, under Article 46(6) 
[A] court or tribunal shall have the power to rule whether or not the applicant may remain 
on the territory of the Member State, either upon the applicant’s request or acting ex 
officio, if such a decision results in ending the applicant’s right to remain in the Member 
State and where in such cases the right to remain in the Member State pending the 
outcome of the remedy is not provided for in national law.408  
In practice, this requirement increases the possibility of effective redress against the harmful 
consequences of SCO designation.409  
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Although the ambitious goal of unconditionally providing the automatic suspensive effect of the 
right to appeal has not yet been stipulated in the European asylum system, the Council and 
European Parliament have taken significant steps to establish common standards for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status in full accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention, in particular the 
cornerstone principle of non-refoulement, international human rights instruments to which the 
Member States are party and the fundamental rights recognized by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.410 The direct 
consequences of providing the right to stay in the host country during the appeal process, as 
stipulated under Article 46(5) of the RAPD and in full compliance with the principles of EU law 
and fundamental human rights, can be demonstrated as follows. 
First of all, if appealing the first instance’s decision does not automatically result in a stay of the 
deportation order, or if no separate judicial body is recognized to reassess the applicant’s urgent 
need to remain in the host country’s territory pending the appeal, in practice, asylum seekers 
cannot exercise their right to appeal, since the purpose of protecting the right to an effective 
remedy is to ensure asylum seekers a fair determination procedure and to protect them from 
being refouled to their country of origin by virtue of a full and comprehensive case-by-case 
assessment of each refugee application. Refusal of the suspensive effect of the appeal does not 
constitute a fair trial in the Member States as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union411 and the European Convention on Human Rights.412 Moreover, 
according to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights to which all EU Member 
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States are party, the right to appeal and the suspensive effect of appeal should be guaranteed for 
every person in the territory of the contracting States.413  
Secondly, given the irreparable harm that may occur based on erroneous deportation of rejected 
asylum seekers to their country of origin, the authorization provided in Article 39(3)(a) likely 
violates fundamental human rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights414 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,415 including the right to life, the 
right to be protected from torture, the right to liberty and security and the right to effective 
remedy and a fair trial.416 Therefore, denying the suspensive effect of the right to effective 
remedy contradicts the fundamental principles of procedural fairness and the effectiveness of EU 
legislation, rendering protection of the right to effective remedy meaningless.417 ECtHR 
jurisprudence has developed the centrality of the suspensive effect in refugee determination 
procedures as the precise and conclusive implication of the right to an effective remedy.  
For instance, in the case of Jabari v. Turkey,418 an asylum seeker lodged a complaint with the 
ECtHR regarding the deportation order she had been issued by the Turkish authority. She 
claimed that she had been denied the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed in Article 13 of 
the ECHR, since the Ankara Administrative Court did not consider her claim of being at risk of 
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inhuman punishment if returned to her country of origin, and the court was not entitled by the 
host country’s national legislation to suspend execution of the deportation order.419 In the Court’s 
view, regarding the absolute nature of the prohibition guaranteed in Article 3 (the right to be 
protected from torture or inhuman punishment) and its fundamental value in a democratic 
society, Article 13 required the contracting party’s authority to not only reassess the substance of 
the asylum seeker’s claim by virtue of “independent and rigorous scrutiny,”420  but also to 
reconsider the possibility of granting “appropriate relief”421 by suspending execution of the 
deportation order,422 due to the potentially irreversible harmful results that could occur if the 
asylum seeker were removed to her country of origin. In this case, the ECtHR built its reasoning 
on the decisive role of the right to an effective remedy in protecting the fundamental rights 
enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR, and the competent authority’s responsibility to review both 
the factual and legal aspects of each refugee application. However, it is noteworthy that the 
Court did not interpret Article 13 to impose a definite responsibility on the contracting States to 
automatically grant the suspensive effect to the effective remedy. Instead, according to the 
Court’s ruling, depending on the nature of the right claimed to be violated, the Member States 
are obliged to allow the judicial or administrative review authority to reassess the possibility of 
issuing a stay of execution of the contested measures.423 
More precisely, in the case of Čonka v. Belgium,424 the applicants, Slovakian Roma asylum 
seekers deported from Belgium, submitted a complaint to the ECtHR against the Belgian 
authority, asserting that the appeal procedure against the decision on their refugee application did 
not meet the requirements for effective remedy established by Article 13 of the ECHR, since  
this remedy did not have any automatic suspensive effect to stay the State’s deportation order 
and the competent authority was able to execute the deportation order without waiting for the 
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judgment in the appeal proceedings.425 The ECtHR reaffirmed its interpretation in the case of 
Jabari v. Turkey, as Article 13 merely requires the contracting States to provide a domestic 
remedy to examine the substance of the complaint on the likely violation of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR and also to afford appropriate relief. In fact, according to the 
ECtHR, the scope of the obligation imposed on the contracting States varies depending on the 
nature and essentiality of the infringement of rights claimed.426 As expressed by the Court, 
effective remedy, as ensured under Article 13, does not require the contracting States to consider 
automatic suspensive effect for any action against a decision made by the competent authority, 
but rather “requires that the remedy may prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to 
the Convention and whose effects are potentially irreversible.”427  
Nevertheless, the Court stipulated that under the provisions of Article 6 and 13 of the ECHR, the 
remedy must be effective in practice and in law, and the review authority, either judicial or 
administrative, must be granted adequate competence to guarantee the effectivity of the afforded 
remedy.428 In fact, in this case, the Court took a step forward to increase protection of the right to 
effective remedy, since although in Jabari v. Turkey, the Court had made it sufficient for the 
contracting State to consider whether there was any possibility of granting suspensive effect to 
the remedy provided by the review body concerned, in Čonka v. Belgium, the ECtHR recognized 
effective remedy as not a mere “statement of intent or a practical arrangement,”429 but rather as 
the contracting States’ duty to organize their judicial or administrative body in such a way as to 
guarantee the suspensive effect of the proceedings against the decisions contested whenever 
appropriate and necessary.430 This interpretation has been consistently reiterated and upheld in 
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subsequent cases and decisions of the ECtHR.431 Ultimately, in the case of Labsi v. Slovakia, the 
Court ruled that 
[G]iven the irreversible nature of the harm which might occur if the alleged risk of torture 
or ill-treatment materialised, and the importance which the Court attaches to Article 3, the 
notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires (i) close and rigorous scrutiny of 
a claim that there exist substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of the applicant’s expulsion to the country of 
destination, and (ii) a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.432 
In this judgment, the Court has completed its case law by necessitating that depending on the 
gravity of the consequences of violation of the right in question, the review authority has a 
responsibility to recognize and observe the suspensive effect of the effective remedy.433 
Although the ECtHR’s ruling did not entail the automatic suspensive effect of any right or 
freedom alleged to be violated by the contracting State concerned, the Court’s interpretation 
based on the gravity of the infringed right has acted as the best recourse for asylum seekers who 
were denied full recognition of the right to an effective remedy. In fact, contrary to the 
provisions of the APD, which considered the suspensive effect of the appeal a subsidiary right in 
terms of the right to effective remedy and left its application to the discretion of the Member 
States, ECtHR jurisprudence has granted a distinct position to the suspensive effect of appeal as 
an inherent component of effective remedy, the observance of which is guaranteed by Article 13 
of the ECHR. As expressed by the Court in the case of Čonka v. Belgium, the rights and 
freedoms ensured by the ECHR, in particular the right to effective remedy, require that the 
Member States take real steps to guarantee compliance. This requirement constitutes “one of the 
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consequences of the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, 
which is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention.”434 
In terms of the main subject of our research, providing an automatic suspensive effect for appeal 
proceedings is vital in cases where the asylum seeker’s country of origin is an SCO and is given 
as the reason for processing the refugee application in an accelerated procedure with more 
limited time frames. In effect, affording the right to appeal and permitting rejected SCO refugee 
claimants to stay in the host country and explain to the appeal court in person their fear of 
persecution or torture in their country of origin is the best way to compensate for the deficiencies 
and procedural flaws of first instance expeditious procedures, which helps the Member States to 
meet their international refugee and human rights obligations. Denying the suspensive effect of 
the appeal process in both the APD and the RAPD demonstrates the prevalence of the 
presumption of safety throughout the whole determination procedure, from the first step of 
lodging the refugee application to the last instance of appeal. Furthermore, this deprivation 
indicates rejection of the principles of procedural fairness and deprives SCO asylum seekers of 
their fundamental refugee and human rights. In this context, acknowledging rejected SCO 
asylum seekers’ right to remain in the host country during the appeal process complies with the 
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality affirmed in Article 21 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union435 and Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.436  
Based on all the justifications and considerations mentioned above, it can be concluded that the 
right to effective redress is now recognized as a “general principle of [the] European Union.”437 
Its automatic suspensive nature has not been recognized unconditionally by ECJ and ECtHR case 
law and is subject to the grave consequences resulting from violation of the right in question. 
                                                            
 
434 Čonka v. Belgium, Application no.51564/99, prec., note 370, para.83; Rosemary BYRNE, prec., note 433, p.80. 
435 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, prec., note 52, 
art.21. 
436 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights), prec., note 53, art.14. 
437 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and 
Recommendations for Law and Practice (A UNHCR research project on the application of key provisions of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive in selected Member States)”, prec., note 211, p.429. 
101 
 
 
Although contrary to relevant measures in the APD, the RAPD has limited the Member States’ 
discretion in rejecting the suspensive effect of the appeal process, to correspond much more 
adequately to the general principles of Community law and the Member States’ international 
human rights obligations,438 EU Member States regrettably maintain some authority in granting 
or rejecting the suspensive effect of appeal proceedings for SCO applications. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The first phase of the creation of the CEAS, brought forward in the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
reaffirmed by the Council in Tampere in 1999, was terminated by the adoption of the APD, 
which came into force on December 1, 2005. As previously outlined, the new and sensitive 
subject matter of the APD regarding harmonization of asylum procedures among EU Member 
States resulted in the longest adoption negotiations to date and also provoked widespread 
objections from refugee and human rights experts and NGOs. On two occasions, UNHCR 
explicitly took a stance against the most controversial provisions of the Directive concerning 
STCs, SCOs and restrictions imposed on the right to an effective remedy.439 UNHCR regretted 
that the Community missed the opportunity to amend Member States’ preventive practices and 
blamed the Directive for setting the Community back in terms of its human rights obligations, 
since it incorporated many exceptions into EU asylum legislation and established Member 
States’ dubious practices as the accepted norm.440 The refugee and human rights violations 
caused by the implementation of the Directive were so serious that UNHCR requested that the 
Council drop adoption of the APD entirely.441  
                                                            
 
438 Matthew HUNT, prec., note 30, p.528; Cathryn COSTELLO, prec., note 134, p.186-188. 
439 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Lubbers calls for EU asylum laws not to contravene 
international law”, prec., note 223;  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR regrets missed 
opportunity to adopt high EU asylum standards”, prec., note 226. 
440 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Lubbers calls for EU asylum laws not to contravene 
international law”, prec., note 223; Matthew HUNT, prec., note 30, p.517. 
441 UNHCR, “Lubbers calls for EU asylum laws not to contravene international law”, prec., note 223. 
102 
 
 
In addition, an unprecedented coalition of 10 expert refugee and human rights organizations, 
including ECRE, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, called upon the Commission 
to withdraw the proposed APD in 2004, stating that the current instrument was “unacceptable as 
a legal basis for minimum standards in the European Union”442 because of its ambiguous 
language, incoherent provisions, discriminatory approach to asylum seekers in establishing 
different and complicated procedures based on nationality or travel routes, and the large amount 
of discretion granted to the Member States to derogate from the minimum standards established 
by the Directive.443 
Regarding the SCO rule, as the main objective of this inquiry, the primary source of the 
controversy of the provisions was the enormous difference between the goal expressed at the 
Community level (harmonization of asylum law and policy) and the Member States’ true goal in 
mobilizing their resources. For the EU Member States, establishing CEAS was “a secondary 
objective” as they focused on the mechanisms to protect themselves from economic, social and 
security difficulties caused by the presence of asylum seekers.444 During the first phase of 
asylum policy harmonization, Member States were not ready to abandon their most powerful 
weapons for deflecting asylum seekers, such as the STC and SCO rules that had been legislated 
in their national asylum systems for decades.445 Transforming quasi-exceptional rules such as the 
SCO rule into accepted measures of EU asylum legislation, as well as the proliferation of 
divergent practices among Member States through implementation of the APD, made it apparent 
that harmonizing asylum law and policy was more an optimistic fantasy than a true goal.446  
The negative reactions to and comments on the ADP provisions focused on the fact that its 
harmful effects, especially preventive measures such as the SCO rule and the procedural and 
legal deprivations imposed on SCO asylum seekers, were not limited to the borders of the EU, 
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but that its measures would be expanded to other parts of the world and eventually undermine the 
global refugee protection system.447 
At the regional level, the EU lost its ability to reasonably manage the movement of asylum 
seekers throughout the Community, and instead concentrated its asylum policy solely on 
deterrent measures as tools to push refugee claimants out of the EU and reduce the cost of 
accepting and settling asylum seekers. However, the best solution for overcoming the difficulties 
caused by an increasing number of asylum seekers is to put in place a comprehensive and well-
studied program that pursues two parallel objectives. The Member States should establish an 
effective, burden-sharing system for receiving and accepting refugee claims among themselves, 
and the Community should invest more resources and efforts into protection and settlement in 
the regions from which the asylum seekers are coming.448  
In terms of a global asylum policy, the EU’s preventive approach not only contravenes the 
fundamental principles recognized by regional and international refugee and human rights legal 
instruments, but also sets a negative precedent and paves the way for more refugee rights 
violations in other parts of the world. The European Union, as world’s leading regional 
organization, has been attempting to establish a modern and systematic means of managing the 
movement of asylum seekers within its territory; the EU’s initiatives and minimalist approach 
toward asylum legislation therefore have a direct effect on asylum policies in other parts of the 
world, which weakens the protection that can be offered to refugees all over the world.449 
Despite all these flaws, the historical importance of the APD should be kept in mind since as 
previously mentioned, it was the first legally binding instrument at the regional level in the field 
of refugee rights to set minimum standards for a determining authority to grant refugee status 
and establish basic procedural rights for asylum seekers in lodging their applications. These 
minimum standards have been improved upon by the interpretations of the ECJ or ECtHR, as 
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well as the provisions of the RAPD. Moreover, though the Directive has set lower standards, its 
role as a guideline for passing more favourable rules in Member States with less developed 
asylum systems, especially new EU Member States, should not be underestimated.450   
The recasting process has allowed the EU legislative bodies to address certain concerns and 
criticism from commentators and human rights NGOs. Since the Amsterdam Treaty entered into 
force, the main goal at the EU level has been to harmonize asylum policy and law among the 
Member States, with the ultimate objective of establishing a common asylum system that 
guarantees “efficiency and fairness.”451 Not surprisingly, the original APD failed to achieve this 
goal. This was in part because of the decision-making mechanism put in place to legislate asylum 
law requiring unanimous votes of the Member States in the Council, and which conferred a mere 
consulting role on European Parliament. As was briefly noted, during the second phase of the 
creation of CEAS, European Parliament gained a significant role with the passing of the RAPD 
and its conformity with the fundamental principles of Community law.  
The first phase of legislation served the main purpose of maintaining the Member States’ low 
protection standards, allowing their deterrent asylum policies to continue, incorporating their 
complex practices into Community asylum law and imposing unlimited clauses for derogation 
from the general procedural principles guaranteed by the APD.452 The final version of the APD 
became a regionally accepted instrument that legalized and spread the application of deterrent 
measures, in particular safe country practices.453  
Nevertheless, the second phase of legislation in asylum law and policy was based on qualified 
majority votes (QMV) in the Council and the co-decision of European Parliament. During this 
period, European Parliament maintained a co-legislator role, which was a decisive factor in 
recasting and improving the instruments enacted during the first phase. European Parliament’s 
endeavour to remove a variety of the Member States’ preventive practices, such as the SCO 
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national list, and to include the general principles of Community and international human rights 
law into the RAPD was remarkable.454 Although European Parliament has not been able to 
eliminate the SCO rule, it has managed to restrict the Member States’ discretion to derogate from 
general guarantees and has ameliorated the protection of fundamental procedural rights for 
asylum seekers, in particular the right to a personal interview and the right to an effective 
remedy.455 In fact, the positive reforms implemented during the second phase of development of 
a common EU asylum system, as Costello and Hancox have pointed out, are the product of the 
new idea that “efficiency must serve fairness, not vice versa.”456   
Under the RAPD measures, though the Member States are authorized to determine the time limit 
for decisions on asylum applications, they are also obliged to conduct a full and comprehensive 
personal interview for all asylum applicants, regardless of their national origin or travel route. 
Furthermore, while it is left to the discretion of the Member States to accelerate the 
determination procedure for SCO applications, they are required to recognize all applicants’ right 
to effective remedy before an independent court or tribunal mandated to review both the factual 
and legal issues of the application, even those coming from safe countries of origin. The RAPD 
should generally be welcomed, but there is still a long way to go before a fair and efficient 
CEAS is created that fully respects the general principles of Community law and international 
refugee and human rights law.457 
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Chapter 2: Canada’s immigration law 
 
In this chapter, the main focus of the study will be on Canadian immigration law relating to the 
concept of designated countries of origin (hereafter DCOs), the Canadian version of the SCO 
rule, and the procedural and/or legal consequences for asylum seekers originating from such 
countries.  
The most important issue that should be clarified is that while the primary objective of this 
inquiry is to conduct a comparative study between the European Union and Canada regarding the 
SCO and DCO rules, in some cases, it is extremely difficult or confusing to find and cite the 
exact provision from one of these legal systems corresponding directly to a provision of the other 
system or containing the same content as the relevant measure legislated by the other system. 
Therefore, in order to follow the plan set out in the Introduction, we will reassess the measures 
Canada has passed based on the following: the procedure for designating a DCO, the accelerated 
procedure for holding a personal hearing and making decisions on refugee claims, and appeal 
proceedings. In order to carry out the primary purpose of comparing the two systems, in each 
section, we will mention the relevant provision adopted by the EU, explained in the previous 
chapter.   
The second point to be clarified is that although the reasons for preventive and restrictive policy 
and rules in Western industrialized countries have already been explained in the Introduction 
section, the evolution of Canadian immigration law differs from that of Western European 
countries, since the emergence and development of restrictive asylum policies are the product of 
both global and domestic elements.458 For a better understanding of the rationale behind the 
adoption of restrictive rules in refugee law, we will commence this chapter by reconsidering the 
historical development of Canadian immigration law, which has led to today’s refugee law 
theories and practices. The differences between the EU’s and Canada’s asylum legislation can be 
categorized as follows: 
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1. Canada’s geographical location and distance from traditional refugee-producing regions 
and incidents in the world, including the World Wars in Europe and civil wars in the 
Middle East, Africa and Asia 
2. The difficulties that asylum seekers faced in reaching Canada before globalization and 
the expansion of transport facilities across the continents  
3. Specific racial and economic ideologies of Canadian society and governments  
4. The decisive role of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,459 which has 
improved the protection of the fundamental rights of non-citizens through the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the measures adopted by the government.460 
Historically, Canada’s geographic location has been the major obstacle for migrants in reaching 
its border and entering the country. However, liberal ideologies of the 1970s and 1980s, 
globalization and pressure from Western European allies to accept more refugees changed 
Canada’s traditional position on the arrival and resettlement of asylum seekers in its society. The 
rise of military and Marxist dictator regimes in Central and South America in the 1960s and 
1970s, as well as insecurities caused by drug cartel wars, especially in Mexico, since the late 
1990s caused an influx of refugee claimants arriving at Canada’s borders. As a result, Canada 
experienced the same difficulties as the Western European States. Although the outcome has 
been the same in both territories, namely the struggle of Western host countries to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers in their territory and hasten the removal of failed asylum seekers, the 
two have used diverse approaches to accomplish this ultimate goal. Before discussing DCO 
measures, it is therefore essential to explore the history of Canada’s immigration law in order to 
understand the prevailing vision of Canadian society on immigration and more specifically on 
refugee claimants. 
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Part 1: Historical developments 
Before the 1970s, although the Canadian border was open to some refugees with certain racial 
considerations, Canada had neither a specific asylum policy nor a codified refugee status 
determination procedure. Most of the time, asylum seekers had been considered equal to 
immigrants, and the conditions for accepting refugee claimants had been the same as for 
immigrants, that is, based on the government’s economic goals. In other words, in most cases the 
government’s financial and economic goals were the leading factors in accepting or rejecting 
asylum seekers, rather than humanitarian reasons.461 It is evident that apart from the view each 
nation has of its identity and fundamental values,462 some experts in immigration law history 
have noted that since Confederation, Canadian immigration policy has been regarded as the 
cornerstone of population growth and economic expansion, and subsequently creates a more 
independent country and a more powerful actor on the international stage and in 
intergovernmental relations.463 
Moreover, accepting immigrants and refugees into Canadian society in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries was not the result of the contemporary governments’ liberal attitude toward 
immigration policy.464 In spite of increased and generous admission of immigrants, in particular 
from central and southern Europe, Canada has had many examples of codified discriminatory 
rules in order to exclude and deport third country nationals based on their racial or ethnic origin 
since the late 19th century.465 For instance, in the 1880s, the Chinese population in Canada was 
growing rapidly, as many Chinese immigrants came to work on construction projects like the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. The federal government adopted preventive laws with the aim of 
reducing the number of Chinese immigrants, such as the Federal Franchise Act of 1885 
impeding these immigrants from voting in federal elections, or the Federal Chinese Immigration 
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Act in the same year, which imposed an extra $50 tax on Chinese immigrants that reached $500 
in 1903.466  
Another example is the incorporation of new rules into immigration law, such as the Continuous 
Passage Act of 1908,467 which necessitated that foreign nationals arrive in Canada by way of a 
“continuous journey” without any interruption in their trip in order to be accepted in Canada as 
immigrants. Consequently, immigrants had to travel to Canada directly from their country of 
origin. Considering the difficulty of travelling between continents and Canada’s particular 
geographical location, it is obvious that this legislation was intended to deter immigrants from 
southeast Asia, especially Japan and India, countries from which the population of immigrants in 
Canada had been growing during that period.  
Another significant example of Canada’s stance against certain ethnic, racial, religious or 
national groups is the Canadian government’s reaction and response to human rights violations 
and refugee crises that have occurred in other parts of the world. For example, during the Second 
World War, many countries around the world, including Western European countries, 
implemented restrictive immigration laws, but the Canadian government’s attitude toward 
certain ethnic refugees was even more severe and preventive. During this period, Canada 
adopted discriminatory immigration measures against Japanese immigrants and Jewish refugees, 
which led to the deportation of many Japanese immigrants from Canada to Japan and prevented 
907 Jewish refugees who had escaped from the Nazi regime in Europe from reaching the 
territory of Canada.468  Canada pursued this exclusionary policy in the first years after the end of 
World War II and accepted only 5,000 Jewish refugees, which, compared to Western European 
acceptance rates, was one of the lowest numbers among Western democratic countries at that 
time.469  
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However, a new attitude gradually emerged regarding refugee claimants and immigrants based 
on two considerations. Because of economic expansion and job creation in Canada, as in the 
Western European countries, demand increased for foreign workers as a labour force 
contributing to economic prosperity. The influence of churches and human rights organizations 
also encouraged the government to enact more open and less discriminatory provisions. 
Eventually, due to pressure from its European allies, Canada admitted nearly 250,000 displaced 
persons from Europe between 1947 and 1962.470 
In contrast with this generous trend, a new element arose in the mid-20th century that served as 
the main pretext for rejecting refugee claimants: the Canadian government’s profound fear of the 
influence and spread of Communist ideology in the country. This fear caused delays and 
justifications for rejecting asylum seekers from central and eastern European countries. For 
example, between 1946 and 1958, more than 29,000 applicants were rejected for national 
security reasons.471 Canada’s resistance to signing the 1951 Geneva Convention was based on the 
government’s belief that adopting the Convention would limit the country’s right to exclude and 
reject refugee claimants on security grounds,472 since the government suspected human right 
organizations, such as the UN’s International Refugee Organization, of being influenced by the 
Communist States.473 
In the 1960s before Canada adopted the 1951 Geneva Convention, despite improvements to 
Western Europe’s asylum legislation, Canada accepted asylum seekers from Europe who were 
resettled in Canada, in most cases due to pressure from the Western European States. The 
government’s response to the refugee crisis was delayed, and there was no specific asylum 
policy governing acceptance of asylum seekers. Most of the time, they were accepted according 
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to the requirements established for selecting economic immigrants and were treated in 
accordance with immigration policy.474   
Fortunately, after Canada signed the 1951 Geneva Convention in 1969, due to its active 
participation in the international community, human rights cooperation with the UN,  
commitment to multiculturalism475 and expansion of values defending immigration and anti-
discrimination trends in Canadian society, new generous but still selective rules arose regarding 
immigration, refugee claims and family reunification in the late 1960s and the 1970s.476 As a 
result, in the early 1970s Canada began to accept more refugee claimants from overseas 
(especially European asylum seekers),477 leading to the adoption of the first series of rules that 
specifically addressed accepting refugee claimants and administering refugee status 
determination procedures, the Immigration Act of 1976.478  
In this new series of immigration laws, immigration and refugee policy objectives were clearly 
determined for the first time, and Canada acknowledged its obligations to achieve the democratic 
goals of reuniting families, observing Canada’s international obligations toward refugees and 
reaffirming its humanitarian traditions regarding displaced and persecuted persons.479 All these 
positive changes raised Canada to one of the main resettlement countries providing refuge for 
asylum seekers by the mid-1970s.480   
The remarkable upheaval of the late 1960s brought about a growing political and public 
consensus that procedural fairness and due process protections should exist in terms of the entry, 
acceptance and expulsion of asylum seekers based on explicit and transparent provisions, 
reasoned decisions and the possibility of challenging the result of the determination before an 
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independent tribunal.481 In 1967, a series of measures were adopted to this end called The 1967 
Regulations.482 One of the provisions required the establishment of the Immigration Appeal 
Board and implementation of basic due process protections in the immigrant admission process. 
It was an unprecedented step forward for Canadian immigration legislation, encouraging 
legislators to adopt more favourable and protective immigration and refugee protection rules in 
the following years.483 This democratized and quasi-liberal refugee policy was followed by three 
events that unfortunately reversed the government’s direction regarding asylum seekers and their 
presence in Canadian society.  
First of all, the energy crisis and the deep economic recession that occurred in the 1970s in all 
industrialized countries, including Canada, caused a shortage of resources for resettling refugee 
claimants as well as a lack of job creation. This situation led to the unwillingness of refugee-
receiving countries to accept and sponsor more refugees from overseas. During the recession, 
skilled and educated immigrants were needed to increase investment and find new sources of 
income in order to revitalize economic activity.484 
Second of all, increased globalization resulted in the spread of information and access to 
transportation, which helped asylum seekers reach distant lands like Canada. Since the end of 
World War II, most asylum seekers were selected from overseas, especially from refugee camps 
in Western Europe, and were sponsored by relatives in Canada, refugee and human rights 
organizations, or churches and the federal government, with particular attention to refugees’ 
abilities to contribute to economic activities in Canada. Before the 1960s, 90 per cent of refugee 
claimants were of European origin, but since the 1980s and 1990s, significant changes in the 
origin of asylum seekers meant that less than 25 per cent of refugees were from Europe while 
refugee claims from the Middle East and Africa reached 50 per cent.485  
                                                            
 
481 Ninette KELLEY and Michael J. TREBILCKOK, prec., note 3, p.18. 
482 Immigration Regulations, Order in Council PC 1967-1616,1967. 
483 Ninette KELLEY and Michael J. TREBILCKOK, prec., note 3, p.356-358. 
484 Id., p.352-353. 
485 Id., p.381. 
113 
 
 
Thirdly, a sudden increase in refugee claimants at the border and in the territory of Canada 
occurred partly due to the vast numbers of rejected Central and South American asylum seekers 
coming from the shared border between Canada and the United States.486 In Canada, the number 
of refugees selected from overseas jumped from 7,300 in 1977 to 52,000 in 1991. As well, the 
number of inland refugee claimants rose from a few hundred in 1977 to several thousand in the 
1980s, peaking at 37,000 in 1992.487  
Consequently, in the 1980s Canada was confronted with a serious backlog of refugee claims that 
raised concerns about the inefficiency of the refugee admission administration and the 
destruction of refugee status determination procedures. This refugee crisis obliged the 
government to control refugee movement at the border by enacting more deterrent refugee 
rules.488 However, since the 1990s, the Canadian immigration system’s efficiency in admitting 
suitable immigrants based on the country’s economic requirements and in protecting asylum 
seekers has experienced an increased number of public and political controversies. Critics 
became louder in 1999 when four boats containing hundreds of undocumented Chinese 
immigrants reached British Colombia, on the west coast of Canada. All of these Chinese 
nationals requested refugee protection in Canada.489 Since the mid-1990s, tensions between the 
public safety of refugee-receiving countries and their international refugee and human rights 
obligations have increased.490  
While Canada was confronted with another increase in the number of inland refugee claimants in 
the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century,491 the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, in the United States exacerbated the situation inside Canada and outside, drawing 
particular criticism from its southern neighbour, the United States, which accused Canada’s 
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immigration and refugee border security of being inefficient492 and spread xenophobic sentiment 
and racialized reactions against immigrants and refugees in the Western countries.493  
All these considerations led to the adoption of new immigration and refugee laws in 2002 and 
additional amendments in 2010 and 2012, which were in stark contrast with the liberal trend of 
the 1976 Immigration Act. They clearly reflect an exclusionary asylum policy and expose the 
government’s main concerns as reducing the number of inland refugee claimants, strengthening 
border controls and making it more difficult to access the determination procedure and achieve 
refugee status, with the primary purpose of protecting national security and public safety. The 
major differences between the 1976 Immigration Act and the government’s more conservative 
asylum legislation in force since the early 2000s are: 
1. Lack of specificity. This shortcoming is a major detour from the previous legislation of 
1976. Since 2002, the framework of immigration and refugee policy has been determined 
broadly; the relevant rules have been codified in general terms, while the details have 
been left to the executive body to designate and implement by regulation or order, with 
minimal parliamentary and judicial supervision. The ambiguity and indefiniteness 
concerned many immigration and refugee advocates and human rights activists because 
of the dangerous departure from the legislative accountability established by the 1976 
Act.494 
2. Broadened inadmissibility criteria. Contrary to the previous series of laws, the grounds 
for rejecting refugee claims and restricting asylum seekers’ eligibility to have their 
refugee requests heard during the determination procedure were extensively codified in 
the new legislation of 2002. Security concerns play a significant role in this change.495 
3. Extension of grounds for rejection. Although in new legislation, the international 
protection granted by Canada extends to Convention refugees (refugee applicants whose 
claims are considered according to the definition and requirements of the 1951 Geneva 
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Convention) and to a new group called “protected persons” (persons at risk of torture or 
inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment if they are returned to the country from 
which they escaped), many preventive or limiting provisions can be found depriving 
certain groups of having their refugee claims fully and fairly heard through the refugee 
determination system, such as refugee claimants from DCOs or STCs.496 
4. Unprecedented government empowerment. The broad authority accorded to immigration 
officers and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to detain or deport certain 
refugee claimants has provoked human rights criticism, since these detentions and 
deportations are mostly executed without observing the principles of due process and 
procedural fairness.497 This deficiency has reappeared in the process for designating 
SCOs. 
The history of Canadian immigration law is the best illustration of the fact that apart from the 
country’s economic interests, the primary concern and focus of policymakers and legislators in 
the field of immigration has historically been to accept third country nationals from similar 
cultures, in particular, immigrants of British origin.498 Every time the number of immigrants or 
refugees of a certain ethnicity or from a certain nation rises, the Canadian government tries to 
restrict their admission and presence by enacting deterrent or limiting immigration and refugee 
laws.499 The sudden increase in refugee claims from Hungary, in particular Roma refugees, and 
Mexico, since late 2009 was one of the main reasons for introducing and incorporating the 
preventive measure of “designated countries of origin” in Canadian refugee legislation in 2010. 
Furthermore, the comparison between previous and contemporary immigration and refugee 
legislation demonstrates that contrary to the liberal and human rights considerations of the 1970s 
and the 1980s, since the mid-1990s, the major priority in this field has been security concerns, in 
particular public safety and border control. It is the rationale behind the government’s restrictive 
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policy on immigrant admissions, refugee claimant acceptance and the enforcement of new rules 
like the STC or DCO rule.500 
As outlined previously, the SCO principle (DCO in Canadian refugee law) is a more recent 
initiative in the refugee legislation of Western countries. Canada incorporated the DCO rule into 
the Balanced Refugee Reform Act of 2010 and in more detail in the Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act of 2012. Since the provisions of the Balanced Refugee Reform Act of 
2010 on DCOs never came into force, the next section will be dedicated to the DCO concept and 
the process by which it has been codified into the Protecting Canada Immigration System Act of 
2012.501 
 
Part 2: Bill C-31: Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act 
Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s and exacerbated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
security concerns were the leading motive for the substantial shift in the Western countries’ 
approach regarding immigration and refugee policy and law, in particular in the United States 
and Canada.502 Although it was later revealed that these terrorist attacks had been mobilized and 
committed by third country nationals who had entered the United States legally, and no link was 
found between these inhuman actions and individuals entering Canada to apply for international 
protection,503 the horrified feelings caused by these incidents allowed the Conservative 
government to bring forward and impose previously prepared restrictive provisions on the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which completely contradicted the liberal trends of the 
1970s and 1980s.504 The changes were made in response to widespread criticism of Canada’s 
current immigration and refugee policy,505 with the main goal of resolving the recurrent backlog 
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of inland refugee claims, reducing the number of refugee claimants entering Canada and securing 
external borders. Ramraj has interpreted this trend as a shift from liberty to security.506 
The government put in place a new inland refugee system that included a rapid decision-making 
procedure based on limited procedural requirements, restricted access to the Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada’s Refugee Appeal Division for some rejected claimants, restricted 
some asylum seekers’ access to certain fundamental rights such as the right to free basic 
healthcare or the right to work, a new fast-track process in the early stages of the decision-
making procedure targeting asylum seekers from designated safe countries, and the rapid 
removal of individuals with unfounded asylum claims. All these measures were implemented to 
dissuade potential asylum seekers from coming to Canada’s border, reduce the time refugee 
claimants spend in Canada’s territory and speed up the process of rejecting and deporting failed 
asylum seekers. The new system was established by amending the 2001 Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act in 2010 and 2012507 and has generated widespread criticism, bringing 
Canada’s inland refugee procedure into the spotlight.  
The concept of DCOs was added to Canadian refugee legislation through the introduction of Bill 
C-11 in 2010, which was eventually adopted as the Balanced Refugee Reform Act. As mentioned 
above, the provisions of Bill C-11 on DCOs were never implemented and were replaced by Bill 
C-31 provisions. In the next section, the DCO rules incorporated into Bill C-31 will be assessed. 
Bill C-31, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee 
Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration Act, titled Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act,508 was introduced in the 
House of Commons on February 16, 2012. It was later sent to the House of Commons Standing 
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Committee on Citizenship and Immigration for more rigorous scrutiny on April 23, 2013, and 
was returned to the House of Commons with 15 amendments on May 14, 2012. Bill C-31 
received royal assent on June 28, 2012, and came into force on December 5, 2012.509  
The new Bill C-31 made further changes to Canada’s inland refugee determination system. 
Although according to the government proclamation these reforms were put in place for 
legitimate objectives including the protection of the integrity of Canada’s immigration system,  
the prevention of misuse of Canada’s generous asylum legislation, the establishment of a faster 
and fairer asylum system for legitimate refugees, addressing problems relating to human 
trafficking and ensuring Canada’s security and public safety,510 as the Canadian Bar 
Association stated, the short time limit for discussing and passing Bill C-31 prevented 
Parliament and refugee rights organizations and experts from debating and considering in 
adequate detail the real negative impact, human rights violations and constitutional 
infringements caused by this new legislation.511  
The main reforms to the inland refugee status determination system concerned the creation of 
five different groups of refugee claimants: refugee claimants originating from designated 
countries of origin, refugee claimants with manifestly unfounded claims, refugee claimants 
whose request has no credible basis, designated foreign nationals and refugee claimants coming 
from a safe third country. Every group is subject to different procedural rules for lodging a 
refugee application with the Refugee Protection Division, depriving claimants of various 
fundamental or procedural rights, including the right to appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division, 
different timelines for pre-removal risk assessment and restrictions on the automatic stay of 
removal or eligibility for a work permit, health insurance coverage or permanent residence. It is 
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evident that all these differences between refugee claimants and restrictions of their 
fundamental rights are in opposition to the goals claimed by the government, as they prevent 
refugee claimants from accessing a complete and fair refugee determination procedure in law 
and practice. In fact, as Wanda Yamamoto, former President of the Canadian Council for 
Refugees (hereafter CCR) has commented, the government’s new legislation “emphasizes 
speed and categorizations over fairness and individual protection.”512 
It is not an exaggeration to conclude that incorporating the DCO concept into Canada’s inland 
determination procedure was one of the Canadian government’s most significant amendments to 
Canada’s asylum system. During the first meeting on the introduction of Bill C-31, Citizenship 
and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney explained the DCO concept as the first and the most 
notable modification put forward by Bill C-31. According to Kenney, the DCO provisions were 
intended to identify “non-refugee producing countries,”513 deter abuse of “Canada’s generous 
asylum system”514 and quickly reject asylum seekers arriving from safe countries, who Kenney 
defined as “bogus refugees.”515 
Given the significant effect of the DCO provisions on the coherence and accuracy of Canada’s 
asylum system, the reforms implemented by Bill C-31 have had the most harmful effects on 
DCO refugee claimants. The short time limits for lodging refugee requests and the vast 
deprivation of fundamental procedural and human rights during the determination procedure 
create precarious circumstances that, in most cases, force claimants to withdraw or abandon their 
refugee claims or prevent them from presenting a well-prepared and strong international 
protection request, which consequently leads to higher rejection rates. Regrettably, as one of the 
criteria for determining the general safety of a country, the high rate of rejected or abandoned 
refugee applications results in a vicious circle that reinforces and reiterates the idea of the 
designated country’s general safety, preventing reconsideration of the real practices in the 
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country in question or of any sudden changes in its human rights situation. That is why according 
to the CCR’s 2014 report, two years after implemention of the Protecting Canada’s Immigration 
System Act, DCO refugee claimants “are the leading group of concern for NGOs”516 among 
groups who are subjected to deprivation and limitations under the new refugee system. As 
Showler reiterated, the deficiencies in the new refugee determination process “encourage 
frivolous claims and serve neither the interest of Canada nor genuine refugees.”517 
In the following subsections, Bill C-31’s provisions on the criteria and procedure for designating 
a DCO, as well as DCO refugee applicants’ fundamental right to a personal hearing and appeal 
will be discussed in detail. 
2.1: DCO designation: sophisticated process and ambiguous criteria 
It should be specified at the outset that contrary to EU asylum legislation on the SCO rule, the 
DCO concept is not precisely and comprehensively defined in Canada’s asylum legislation under 
the provisions of either Bill C-11 or Bill C-31. The only way to understand the Canadian 
government’s view on the DCO rule is through the definitions occasionally provided by 
government authorities. During a press conference for introducing Bill C-31, Jason Kenney, then 
Immigration and Citizenship Minister, illustrated the DCO concept as including countries that 
generally do not produce refugees, in that their nationals are not in real need of international 
protection.518 However, the Minister did not clarify based on which grounds these countries 
would be deemed generally safe for their nationals. On another occasion, in a backgrounder note 
put forward by the government, DCOs were described vaguely as third countries that “do not 
normally produce refugees, respect human rights and offer State protection,”519 while granting 
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full discretion to the government (the Immigration and Citizenship Minister) to designate DCOs 
and organize the procedures under which DCO applications should be processed and decided.  
On a third occasion in a more detailed backgrounder note, the government specified the major 
elements that constitute a DCO while requiring the Minister to review his decision on the third 
countries on the DCO list by consulting with other Canadian federal government departments, 
even in the case of designation based on quantitative criteria.520 The government stipulated that 
the review should be based on a select set of conditions, including  
[D]emocratic governance, protection of right to liberty and security of the person, 
freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of religion and association, freedom from 
discrimination and protection of rights for groups at risk, protection from non-state actors 
(which could include measures such as state protection from human trafficking), access 
to impartial investigations, access to an independent judiciary system, and access to 
redress (which could include constitutional and legal provisions).521  
The government’s attempt to add transparency to the procedure for designating DCOs while 
taking into account the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms is appreciated as a significant start point. However, these additional criteria have 
not been endorsed or imposed by any legal provision passed by Parliament. There is therefore no 
way to monitor whether or not the Minister will apply them when adding a new country to the 
DCO list since, even if other Canadian federal government departments have been consulted, the 
final DCO list is at the Minister’s sole discretion. 
None of these three statements provides any applicable standards for identifying and designating 
DCOs. The fundamental deficiencies in the DCO provisions, namely the lack of a specific 
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definition, conditions that are too general and unreliable to ensure the accuracy of DCO 
identification, the sole authority of the Minister to determine DCOs and Parliament’s inability to 
oversee the government’s proceedings, serve the best interests of the government by allowing 
DCO refugee applications to be rejected quickly. These circumstances increase the risk of 
determining DCOs based on the government’s political, economic or intergovernmental interests, 
while the ambiguity makes the process more confusing for DCO refugee claimants, since they do 
not know if their national country is considered safe and what supporting documents they must 
prepare and submit to disprove the general presumption of the safety of their country of origin. 
While Parliament did not impose any reform on measures concerning the procedure for 
designating DCOs522 between the first and final versions of Bill C-31, certain differences exist 
among the provisions proposed under Bill C-11 and the amendments added to Bill C-31 in 
clauses 58 and 84 which demonstarate, on the one hand, the improvement of the government’s 
standpoint regarding the concept of safety in the third country while one the other hand in some 
cases reduces the transparency and accucary of the process for designation of the DCO list. 
The most significant differecnce between Bill C-11 and Bill C-31 is that according to the later, 
the Immigration and Citizenship Minister is only granted the authority to designate an entire 
third country as a DCO, instead of part of it or for a particular group of its nationals (s.109.1 
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(1)).523 This improvement is the government’s effective response to criticism expressed by 
human rights NGOs and experts. For example, the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving 
Immigrants has reiterated that even in countries that are seemingly safe and democratic, certain 
groups such as women or LGBTQ individuals face systematic persecution that remains 
undocumented and beyond the reach of human rights organizations or the general society.524 In 
some cases, individuals’ lives or freedom are threatened or they endure violence or persecution, 
not only from the authorities but also from people in their personal life or community.525 
Moreover, as UNHCR affirmed, it is irrational to consider part of a country to be safe if the 
authority governing that country is not able to establish and maintain public safety in the entire 
territory for all inhabitants.526  
In sum, although the provisions proposed by Bill C-11 made it possible to designate a third 
country as a DCO with a regional or population exception, as the EU had legislated in the 2005 
version of the APD, the government, fortunately, took into account serious concerns expressed 
by experts in refugee and human rights law and removed the exception established under the 
previous s.109.1 (1), as did the Council and European Parliament when they recast the APD 
provisions and passed the RAPD.  
Regarding the designation of DCOs a “two-step process”527 has been put in place. In effect, 
under the new section 109, there are two different scenarios in which the Immigration and 
Citizenship Minister (hereafter the Minister) can designate a country as a DCO based on 
                                                            
 
523 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, prec., note 54, s.109.1 (1), Government of Canada, Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, Summary of Changes to Canada's Refugee System in the Protecting Canada's immigration 
System Act, 2012,  online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2012/2012-02-
16f.asp>. 
524 Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigration, “Brief to Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 
Re: Bill C-31, “Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act”, 22 April 2012, p.3, online:  
<http://www.ocasi.org/downloads/Bill_C-31_OCASI_Brief_to_CIMM.pdf>. 
525 Id.; Amnesty International Canada, “Unbalanced Reforms: Recommendations with respect to Bill C-31”, 7 May 
2012, p.16, online: <https://www.amnesty.ca/sites/amnesty/files/2012-05-31unbalancedreforms.pdf>. 
526 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNCHR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting or Withdrawing Refugee 
Status”, (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), prec., note190, p.40-41. 
527 Government of Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Backgrounder-Designated Countries of Origin, 
prec., note 519. 
124 
 
 
quantitative or qualitative criteria.528 These two groups of conditions are enacted hierarchically 
so that to identify the country as a DCO, the Minister should implement the quantitative 
measure. If it is not applicable, the Minister may then consider the qualitative standards. This 
process will be clarified below.  
Quantitative criteria: according to s.109.1 (2) (a), the examination of a third country is primarily 
triggered if the number of refugee protection claims by the nationals of the country in question, 
with a final determination issued by the Refugee Protection Division (hereafter RPD), is equal to 
or higher than the threshold criteria determined by the order of the Minister. If the application 
numbers are met, the next decisive criteria that should be taken into account is the withdrawal, 
abandonment or rejection rate of refugee claims of the nationals of the country under inquiry.529 
At this point, two cases should be separated: 
i. In the first instance, the Minister considers the total number of refugee applications 
submitted by the nationals of the third country in question which, during the time limit 
established by the Minister’s order, have been finally rejected or determined by the RPD 
to be withdrawn or abandoned. If the result of the difference, indicated as a percentage, 
between this number and the total number of refugee claims made by the nationals of the 
third country in question that, during the same period, have been decided by the RPD, is 
equal to or greater than the percentage provided for by the Minister’s order, the third 
country in question may be designated by the Minister as a DCO.530 
ii. In the second phase, the Minister should reconsider only the total number of abandoned 
or withdrawn refugee claims from the nationals of the third country in question, as 
determined by the RPD. In this situation, if the number obtained by dividing the number 
mentioned above by the total number of refugee applications made by the nationals of the 
country in question, on which the RPD has made the final determination, is equal to or 
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greater than the percentage laid down by the order of the Minister, the third country may 
be determined as a DCO531.  
According to the Order Establishing Quantitative Thresholds for the Designation of Countries of 
Origin issued by the Minister on December 15, 2012, the thresholds for designating a country 
have been determined as follows: 
1. The rate of refugee claims by the nationals of a country in question for which final 
decisions have been issued by the Refugee Protection Division that triggered the review 
of the country must be equal to or higher than 30 refugee requests “during any period of 
12 consecutive months in the three years preceding the date of the designation.”532 
2. The rejection and/or withdrawal and abandonment rate resulting in designation of a 
country as a safe country of origin is 75 per cent or above.533 
3. The rate of withdrawal and abandonment has been determined by the Ministerial order as 
60 per cent or higher.534 
As the first negative point, paragraph (i) and paragraph (ii) of section 109.1(2) (a) are phrased in 
such a way as to make them difficult and confusing to understand and interpret accurately. Also, 
as is apparent, these measures are legislated generally, while the details are to be determined by 
the order based on the authority granted expressly to the Minister to establish all conditions 
required for the procedure of designating SCOs. It is not clear based on which considerations 
these rates have been obtained and indicated in the Regulation. The most disturbing point is that 
the order of the Minister is free from Parliamentary survey.  
Given the sensitive subject matter of DCO rules, the irreversible effects of an inaccurate 
designation on DCO asylum seekers’ lives and freedoms (the protection of which is guaranteed 
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under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms535) and the potential violation 
of the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, the best approach for identifying DCOs is the 
process by which the government’s suggested DCO list is discussed and endorsed by the 
people’s elected representatives in Parliament. We could be optimistic that Canada’s 
international and constitutional refugee and human rights obligations will be taken into account 
and observed. However, under the unprecedented asylum policy established by the new 
legislation, the Minister is the only person empowered to determine the details and provide the 
DCO list, with no judicial accountability and without Parliamentary oversight.536 The only means 
left to challenge and change the government’s current position is public opinion and court 
rulings.  
Upon review of the Federal Court of Canada’s case law, many interpretations have requested that 
the government ensure that Canada’s asylum legislation conforms with international refugee and 
human rights law. For instance, though the case of Freitas v. Canada537 did not directly involve 
the issue of DCOs, Justice Gibson and others attempted to clarify the objectives of the 1951 
Geneva Convention in order to demonstrate the central purpose that the government should 
pursue when legislating Canadian immigration provisions. Referring to the interpretation 
provided by Justice Bastarache, who described the 1951 Geneva Convention as “a manifestation 
of the international community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without 
discrimination” in Pushpanathan v. Canada,538 Justice Gibson concluded, as reiterated in section 
3(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, that the government’s most important 
objectives when establishing policy and enacting measures in immigration and refugee law 
should be “to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm 
Canada’s commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of 
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resettlement” and to “grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s humanitarian ideals, fair 
consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution.”539 The Canadian government 
and Parliament are therefore not authorized to pass any measures in Canada’s immigration and 
refugee law irrespective of Canada’s international refugee and human rights obligations and its 
humanitarian tradition as reaffirmed and guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
Qualitative standards: according to section 109.1(2) (b), “[I]n the case where the number of 
claims for refugee protection made in Canada by nationals of the country in question in respect 
of which the Refugee Protection Division has made a final determination is less than the number 
provided for by order of the Minister,” the qualitative criteria can be considered in order to help 
the Minister decide whether to designate the country under review as a DCO or not. The 
quantitative standards are absolute and have the major role in determining the safety of a third 
country in the absence of quantitative criteria.  
In this regard, the safety of the third country in question may be determined if the Minister is of 
the opinion that three conditions are met: “[T]here is an independent judicial system, basic 
democratic rights and freedoms are recognized and mechanisms for redress are available if those 
rights or freedoms are infringed, and civil society organizations exist.”540 All three criteria are 
necessary in order to assess a country as safe, but they alone are not enough and suffer from 
certain fundamental shortcomings that undermine the accuracy, neutrality and equity of the 
whole process of DCO designation.  
Though demonstrating the government’s intention to discover the real human rights practice of 
the third country, these requirements are written in general and vague terms that in practice 
prevent the Minister from reaching a correct, reliable and convincing conclusion about the 
general safety of third countries. More precise and detailed criteria would be helpful for both 
DCO asylum seekers and the RPD, enabling DCO asylum seekers to know the specific grounds 
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upon which the general safety of their native country was determined, and consequently to 
provide more convincing evidence to substantiate their refugee claim. More specific standards 
also lead to more correct and reasonable final decisions, which ultimately prevent prolonging the 
determination procedure due to a judicial review by the Federal Court. However, these 
ambiguous criteria may not meet the expectations or respond to the concerns of refugee and 
human rights experts, since as Showler has indicated, “The devil will indeed be in details.”541  
 
Secondly, contrary to what was predicted in Bill C-11, in the new section 109.1 (2) (b), the 
Minister is not obliged to engage and consult with refugee and human rights experts or NGOs 
during the designation procedure. This shortcoming reduces the accuracy and transparency of the 
Minister’s decision542 while increasing the risk of politicizing the designation procedure.543 
The third negative point is the lack of objective standards in the qualitative criteria against which 
the third country’s human rights record can be weighed and evaluated.544 It is not clear how the 
Minister should put in place reasonable measures to assess different degrees of human rights 
violations in a third country. In fact, it is irrational to consider that all types of human rights 
violations have the same level of negative effect on a human being or on his or her ability to 
enjoy life. How can the Minister compare the right to non-discriminatory access to education 
with the right to life, liberty and security? Alternatively, how does the Minister compare the right 
to be protected from torture with freedom of conscience and religion?545 These unanswered 
questions about the DCO rule reject the possibility of designating a third country as a DCO. As 
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Amnesty International Canada maintains, “[I]t is impossible to assign a quantifiable 
measurement to human rights violations.”546 
Section 109.1 (2) (b) does not require the Minister to take into consideration the country under 
review’s openness to monitoring by national and international human rights organizations, as 
envisaged by EU asylum legislation,547 which although not a definite measure, is a useful means 
of uncovering the third country’s real practices.  
The element with the most damaging effect on the accuracy and fairness of the RPD’s final 
decisions on DCO applications is the absence of measures requiring the Minister to take into 
consideration the real practices of the third country in adhering to international refugee and 
human rights legal instruments; providing judicial redress when the fundamental human rights of 
its people have been violated; and the willingness and ability of law enforcement services, like 
the police force, to monitor the execution of judicial redress. In many cases involving judicial 
review of the RPD’s negative decision on a DCO refugee application, the Federal Court has 
based its interpretation on this fundamental deficiency as the major factor in recognizing the 
RPD’s final decision as erroneous and invalid. We will return to this matter later.  
Ultimately, no mechanism, based on either quantitative or qualitative criteria, has been put in 
place for cases of sudden changes in human rights patterns in a DCO or the procedure for 
periodical review of third countries presumed safe.548  
All these deficiencies point to the disturbing fact that the Canadian government, just like the EU, 
has been using a formal and inoperative approach for identifying DCOs,549 since the criteria that 
is not mentioned and that is the most vital factor is the way the third country provides State 
protection for its citizens in practice. This legislation method is not in accordance with the 
                                                            
 
546 Id. 
547 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Submission on Bill C-31 Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act”, prec., note 542, p.11; The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global 
Consultations on International Protection/Third Track: Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures)”, 
31 May 2001, para.39, online: < http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b36f2fca>. 
548 Amnesty International Canada, “Unbalanced Reforms: Recommendations with respect to Bill C-31”, prec., note 
525, The Canadian Bar Association (National Immigration Law Section), “Bill C-31: Protecting Canada’s Immigration 
System”, prec., note 511, p.5. 
549 Id., p.15. 
130 
 
 
factual questions relating to the human rights abuses in many countries,550 which increases the 
likelihood of incorrect decisions on refugee applications. It also paves the way for countries to be 
able to reject asylum seekers at any cost, even in violation of the fundamental principles of 
procedural fairness and international refugee and human rights law, including the principle of 
non-refoulement, the right to life and freedom and the right to be protected from torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Nevertheless, the first DCO list, based on the quantitative criteria, was unveiled by a ministerial 
order on December 15, 2012, and included Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America.551 On the same day, the Minister issued the second DCO list based 
on the qualitative criteria, comprising Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden.552 
As expected, the designation of certain Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, has provoked widespread criticism. The first 
question regarding this dubious designation was according to which considerations has Hungary 
been identified as a DCO alongside Germany and the United States? In other words, is it logical 
to designate a country like Hungary as a DCO, given its poor track record in protecting the 
fundamental human rights of ethnic or religious minorities as reported by international human 
rights organizations in several cases, and which had the highest rate of refugee application in 
Canada in 2011?553 It is absurd that the federal government has identified certain countries such 
as Croatia or Estonia as DCOs, while other States that are apparently more democratic and have 
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much better human rights records are not incorporated in the list, such as Switzerland, New 
Zealand, Australia and Norway.554  
To justify this questionable designation, the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship argued that 
in 2011, more asylum applications were submitted in Canada by EU nationals, mostly from 
Hungarian citizens, than were received from Asia and Africa.555 The Minister explained more 
specifically that since 2008, when Hungarians were granted a visa exemption for entering 
Canada, some 6,000 refugee applications from Hungarian citizens were finalized in Canada, 62% 
of which were abandoned or withdrawn by the applicants while about 33% were rejected by the 
RPD;556 therefore, during this period, 98% of asylum applications received by the Canada were 
from Hungary. Referring to Hungarian citizens’ unrestricted mobility within the 27 EU Member 
States and their free access to many countries around the world, Kenney arrived at the conclusion 
that almost all the refugee applications lodged by Hungarian citizens were unfounded,557 that 
Hungarian citizens do not need international protection and that they instead come to Canada to 
“benefit from the generosity of Canada’s social welfare system.”558  
This reasoning is not acceptable in light of the harsh living conditions ethnic minority groups, in 
particular the Roma, experience in the EU. First of all, though Hungarian citizens, like other EU 
citizens, have free access to other EU Member States’ territory, they cannot request international 
protection as provided for in major international refugee and human rights instruments such as 
the 1951 Geneva Convention, since given the general safety of all EU Member States recognized 
by the single provision of the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the EU 
(Aznar Protocol), refugee requests from any EU Member State citizen will be rejected in another 
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Member State’s territory except under specific conditions.559 In the second place, the Minister’s 
argument that Hungarian citizens have free access to the territory of 27 EU Member States is 
unfounded, since while all EU citizens have unlimited mobility rights within the borderless EU, 
they can only stay in another EU Member State if they find a job within three months of their 
entry. Otherwise, they will be deported to their national country. Although according to the 
Minister’s statistic, Hungary satisfied the quantitative criteria of a 75 per cent rate of rejection, 
abandonment or withdrawal required to be a candidate for the DCO list, basic questions remain 
unanswered or ignored by the federal government, which make the presumption of safety in that 
country dubious.  
At first glance, it is confusing that most of the refugee applications lodged in Canada are from 
the EU, despite its remarkable development in asylum legislation and protection of refugee and 
human rights. Although the Minister clarified that most of these refugee claimants were coming 
from Central and Eastern European countries, he failed to mention that most of these countries 
are suffering from social, economic and political deficiencies even decades after their 
transformation from Communist regimes to democratic governments.  
Given the systematic ethnic and religious discrimination and persecution that has been carried 
out against Roma or Jewish communities (in some cases with the participation of the police force 
or quasi-military racist or extremist groups, especially in Hungary and the Czech Republic) and 
that has been documented and reported on several occasions by international human rights 
organizations, widespread anti-Roma sentiment, hateful feelings and discrimination throughout 
the EU against the Roma,560 is it rational to contend that almost all Roma asylum seekers are 
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unfounded refugee claimants who could have been safely and successfully resettled in the EU?  
It can be assumed that some of the refugee applications made by Roma in Canada are unfounded, 
but the high rate of requests, the discrimination against them in their national country and hateful 
sentiment against them across Europe create a situation of unsafety and a real need for 
protection, rather than one of safety and unfounded refugee claims. Even Jason Kenney, during 
his trip to Hungary in 2012 before presenting the DCO list, expressed deep concerns about the 
rise of xenophobic extremism and neo-Nazi political parties, who he described as “crazy” and 
“hateful xenophobic nutbars” in terms of their actions against Roma and Jewish communities.561  
The fact is that although European countries have to provide a certain level of human rights 
protection as one of the main requirements for acceptance as an EU Member State, it is evident 
that the administrative and judicial systems, human rights observation levels and accessibility to 
and effectivity of fundamental justice offered by new EU Member States such as Hungary or the 
Czech Republic are quite different from the Western EU Member States. These recently joined 
EU Member States have a long way to go before reaching the same level as Western EU 
countries in respecting the main international and regional human rights and refugee legal 
standards.  
Nevertheless, the life and death of genuine refugees are in the hands of the Minister of 
Immigration and Citizenship, who can designate countries like Hungary or the Czech Republic 
as DCOs without any obligation to consult an independent panel of experts, contrary to what was 
required in Bill C-11, and in spite of alarming indications of the miserable living conditions and 
the human rights violations their citizens, in particular the Roma, endure and which have been 
affirmed by the Federal Court in several cases. It is hoped that the Federal Court’s case law can 
compensate for the procedural fairness and fundamental rights that have been denied DCO 
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refugee claimants by finding the errors in the RPD’s final decisions, providing more effective 
tools for RPD Board Members to affirm or reject the general safety presumed for DCOs and 
calling for the government to reconsider the idea of general safety by removing certain countries, 
especially Hungary, from the DCO list.  
The Federal Court’s focus, in most cases, has been on considering the inherent deficiencies of 
the provisions on DCO designation reflected in the RPD’s final decisions, in particular the lack 
of a fact-finding mechanism regarding the real practices of DCOs in providing adequate, 
effective and accessible State protection for its citizens, which the Federal Court has considered 
the most decisive requirement.  
For instance, in Hercegi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),562 one of the first 
judicial reviews submitted to the Federal Court after Hungary was designated as a DCO, the 
applicants, two Hungarian Roma families seeking refugee protection in Canada, requested that 
the Federal Court set aside the negative decision made by an RPD board member and rule for a 
re-determination to be carried out by the RPD.563 Based on the transcript of the hearing to 
examine the refugee applicants’ evidence, the Court found the board member’s insistence on 
further documentation to back up the Hungarians’ claims of not being provided State protection 
unreasonable. In effect, the Federal Court was of the view that although Hungary had been 
recognized as a DCO, in the particular case of these applicants, it was up to the board member to 
answer the major question of whether the applicants had been receiving State protection in their 
national country or not.564  
Referring to the reasons the board member offered to support the existence and accessibility of 
State protection in Hungary, Justice Hughes correctly concluded that the board member had not 
properly addressed the State protection issue, since “[i]t is not enough to say that steps are being 
taken that someday may result in adequate State protection. It is what State protection is actually 
provided at the present time that is relevant.”565 As Justice Hughes stipulated in another case, 
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Lopez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), it is an error of law if the 
determining authority focuses solely on serious efforts made, measures passed or statements 
expressed by the country of origin when investigating the State protection provided by the third 
country’s government. Rather, the board member must determine “the actual effectiveness of the 
protection.”566  
In order to establish the efficiency and accessibility of State protection, and therefore the safety 
of the home country, the determining authority must base its findings on what the third country’s 
government is actually doing and the results gained in practice, not the government’s endeavours 
or intentions.567 The Court concluded that the board member had been confused when examining 
the documents presented by the applicants, that the determining authority’s approach to dealing 
with the question of State protection was “unsatisfactory”568 and that the evidence provided by 
the applicants overwhelmingly proved that Hungary was unable to offer adequate State 
protection to its Roma citizens. Thus, the Court returned the two families’ applications to be 
determined by a new board member separately.  
Although the Federal Court’s interpretations may serve as guidelines for RPD board members 
when implementing the Minister’s DCO list and establishing the general safety of a third country 
in a specific refugee claim case, the Court failed to reiterate the harmful effect the presumed 
safety of DCOs has on the fairness and accuracy of the overall determination procedure. In fact, 
this case clearly reflects the predominance of third countries designated as DCOs, which imposes 
a higher burden of proof on DCO refugee claimants to rebut the presumed safety of their national 
country and prevents the determining authority from correctly considering the legal and factual 
issues of DCO refugee applications. The vague criteria for identifying DCOs, as was apparent in 
this case, do not require the RPD to take into account the real practices of DCO governments in 
protecting their citizens’ fundamental human rights and providing adequate State protection. 
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In one of its recent cases, Varga v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),569 the 
Federal Court explained in great detail the fundamental elements that constitute “adequate State 
protection.” In this case the applicants, a Hungarian family, submitted a judicial review to the 
Federal Court challenging the RPD’s decision to deny them the refugee protection they had 
requested in Canada. The RPD board member had rejected the applicants’ refugee claim for two 
reasons: “[T]he Applicants did not provide “clear and convincing evidence that, on a balance of 
probabilities, state protection in Hungary is inadequate,” and because the applicants “did not take 
all the reasonable steps, under the circumstances, to seek state protection in Hungary prior to 
seeking international protection in Canada.”570 
At the outset, the Court stated that although it is up to the applicants to rebut the existence of 
State protection in Hungary as defined by the Canadian government, the board member should 
take an active role in fact-finding regarding the presumption of safety and whether the State 
protection provided by the DCO’s government for its citizens is adequate.571 According to the 
Court, in order to establish the presumption of safety with regard to the particular refugee 
applicants, the determining authority should investigate the adequacy and accessibility of State 
protection in the DCO by considering and assessing the evidence submitted by the applicant and 
other reliable and relevant sources.  
Regarding the RPD’s role in ascertaining the level of State protection in the third country, two 
issues should be taken into consideration, according to the Court. The first consideration 
involves the official form of the country in question, including the “nature of the state” and its 
organizations. The Court admitted that in this case, proving the first issue does not provoke 
considerable disagreement based on the fact that Hungary is a democratic country that controls 
its territory effectively and has functioning security and police institutions that ensure the 
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observance and supremacy of its laws and constitution.572 In this regard, the presumption of 
safety for Hungary is proven and established.  
The second consideration should be made based on the content and quality of the protection 
provided by the government of the country in question. The Court expressed that, as established 
by the Federal Court’s case law, the most important condition required for State protection is that 
it be “adequate.”573 Contrary to the first element, proving the second element leads to many 
difficulties. In order to reach a convincing and reasonable conclusion, the Court clarified that the 
RPD must perform a “two-step analysis.”574 This analysis includes the “factual standards” for 
measuring and comparing the State protection offered by the DCO’s government and the DCO’s 
real practices in guaranteeing State protection, which are gained by comparing the factual 
standards and the evidence the applicant has provided or that the RPD discovered. If the result of 
the comparison demonstrates that the factual standards have been met, then the RPD may firmly 
conclude that the DCO grants adequate State protection to its citizens.575 
Concerning the factual standards of adequate State protection based on the Federal Court’s case 
law, certain conditions should be implemented in order to demonstrate the required quality of 
adequate protection offered by the government. For example, “actual police surveillance, visible 
presence, and immediate response to investigate and take action against the commission of crime 
and when crime occurs [which] can be considered to be adequate State protection at the 
operational level.”576 The Court added that although it is generally accepted that under certain 
circumstances, even a well-trained, professional police force cannot react in time to prevent the 
commission or recurrence of a crime, it must be established that they have made their “best 
efforts” in the sense that “the force’s ability and expertise is developed well enough to make a 
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credible, earnest attempt to do so, from both the perspective of the victim, and the concerned 
community.”577  
In this case, the Federal Court issued one of the most brilliant interpretations of adequate State 
protection by taking into account both sides of the issue. Not only should the country’s police 
force and judicial body be well trained, educated and motivated enough to ensure the prevalence 
of State protection in society, but the victims of crime and society as a whole should also be 
satisfied with the efficiency and effectivity of the police force’s or law enforcement department’s 
operations and the judicial body’s proceedings.  
The Court correctly refused the evidence the RPD used to prove adequate State protection by 
considering it to be a “reviewable error of fact,” since all the reports the RPD referred to in order 
to demonstrate the existence of adequate State protection in Hungary were in fact indications of 
efforts made or measures taken by the Hungarian government to provide State protection, the 
results of which did not lead to the quality required for State protection to be adequate and 
effective as established in the Court’s jurisprudence in the previous case.578 
The Court considered the evidence provided by the applicants’ counsel, which rejected reports 
claiming that the Hungarian government had made serious efforts to combat and prevent the 
commitment and recurrence of racist crimes against the Roma minority group. The Court 
affirmed these documents, stipulating that the evidence upon which the RPD had relied to prove 
the existence of adequate State protection in Hungary was not convincing, since all the 
Hungarian government’s efforts and reforms to improve the functionality of its law enforcement 
agencies and eliminate corruption among police officers had not had a meaningful effect in 
protecting the Roma against the racial abuses or discriminatory treatment they experienced at the 
hands of the police force or extremist groups. According to the Court, the Hungarian government 
had failed to offer adequate and effective state protection to the Roma, reiterating that 
“unsuccessful ‘best efforts’ to reach a standard of operational state protection is not state 
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protection, let alone ‘adequate’ state protection.”579 Thus, the Court concluded that since the 
RPD had relied on inaccurate and irrelevant documents, its conclusion that the Hungarian 
government had provided adequate state protection for the Roma was “erroneous.”580 
Ultimately, given the systematic, racially motivated crimes committed by extremist groups and 
the discriminatory persecution carried out by the police force against Roma individuals in 
Hungary, as well as the Hungarian government’s inability and unwillingness to protect Roma 
effectively from the deep and widespread violation of their fundamental rights, the Federal Court 
was of the opinion that the RPD had failed in fact-finding about the existence and accessibility of 
adequate State protection for Roma people in Hungary, rendering the RPD’s decision 
unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the refugee application should be reassessed by a 
new RPD board member. 
This decision is one of the best indications of the positive role the Federal Court has played in 
the refugee determination process after the implementation of DCO legislation and regulations. 
In many cases, the Federal Court serves as the last resort for DCO asylum seekers who have been 
denied refugee protection based on the general presumed safety of their national country, 
irrespective of their particular situation and the factual or legal conditions of their refugee claim. 
Fortunately, Justice Campbell reaffirmed his new method in Hornak v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration)581concerning Roma refugee applicants fleeing the Czech Republic 
whose refugee protection claim was rejected by the RPD. In this recent case, Justice Campbell 
repeated his reasoning that although extraordinary serious efforts have been made by the Czech 
government to grant systematic protection to Roma people, these efforts may not be recognized 
as adequate State protection, given their ineffective and inconclusive results. According to the 
Court, the RPD made a fundamental fact-finding error regarding the existence of adequate State 
protection in the Czech Republic for Roma people, since “no attempt is made to define the 
content of State protection against which the evidence of in-country conditions, including the 
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evidence of the Applicants’ experiences, can be applied and compared to conclude whether State 
Protection, in fact, exists.”582  
With regard to the decisive role of the Federal Court’s interpretation in assessing the RPD’s 
incorrect decisions on DCO refugee applications, Raoul Boulakia, a member of the Refugee 
Lawyers Association of Ontario, has stated that the Federal Court’s rulings reveal the “basic 
flaw” in the recent asylum legislation, in particular, the Minister’s designation of DCOs. In 
effect, the Federal Court’s findings on the absence of adequate and effective State protection in 
DCOs demonstrate the unreasonableness of the current circumstances under which the Minister 
is granted the full authority to designate certain countries as DCOs even though there is objective 
and convincing evidence proving that these designations are not based on the real situation in 
some countries presumed safe.583 
2.2: The right to a personal hearing: a flawed guarantee 
Under the provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (hereafter IRPA), refugee 
claims have been divided into two different categories: refugee protection claims made inside 
Canada and refugee protection claims submitted outside Canada.584 Since the concept of DCO 
applies to inland refugee applications in the IRPA, this section will concentrate on the first 
group.   
According to section 99(3) of the IRPA, refugee applications made inside Canada are further 
divided into two groups: refugee claims presented inside Canada at the port of entry and claims 
made inside Canada other than at the port of entry. One of the most notable differences between 
these two groups is the varied time limits for refugee claimants to provide their Basis of Claim 
form (hereafter BOC form), a document in which the asylum seeker gives necessary detailed 
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information about himself or herself, including identity, family, travel history and all other 
documents based on which he or she seeks refugee protection in Canada.585  
Under section 99(3) and 99 (3) (1) of the IRPA, subject to section 159.8 (1) of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulation (hereafter IRPR),586 if the refugee application is submitted 
inside Canada but not at the port of entry, the refugee applicant is required to provide the BOC 
form to the Canada Border Services Agency officer or to Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
“not later than the day on which the officer determines the eligibility of their claim,” or as 
indicated by the government, “during the eligibility interview.”587 In other words, refugee 
claimants are obliged to present the BOC form the same day they submit the refugee application. 
However, refugee claimants who make their application inside Canada at the port of entry can 
present their BOC form to the RPD within 15 days of the referral of their application to that 
division.588  
Irrespective of whether the refugee claim is made inside Canada, either at the port of entry or 
not, before the RPD proceeds to a decision on the refugee application, an Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) officer assesses the application to determine if it is eligible to be 
referred to the RPD. During this phase, while it is incumbent upon applicants to prove their merit 
by presenting reliable documents, completely filling out the BOC form and truthfully answering 
the officer’s questions during the eligibility interview,589 the officer determines, within three 
working days, if the refugee claim can be sent to the RPD or if it has to be rejected.590  
The problem under section 100(1) on the procedure for determining the eligibility of the refugee 
claim is its tightened time scale. Given the multifaceted considerations officers must take into 
                                                            
 
585 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant’s Guide, modified on 21 January 2016, online: 
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account while evaluating the eligibility of refugee claims, including inadmissibility, security or 
serious criminality grounds and convictions for human rights violations,591 as well as the burden 
on refugee applicants to gather all the necessary documents and fill out the BOC form in a 
language other than their native language on the same day they make the refugee protection 
claim, it is irrational to expect officers to be able to reach a sound and reasonable decision on the 
eligibility of the refugee claim within just three days.  
The one-day time limit for providing the BOC form and other supporting evidence and the three-
day processing time for determining the admissibility of refugee claims point to the fact that the 
government and Parliament have underestimated the significance of eligibility examinations in 
the whole determination procedure, or that they have not accepted the eligibility test as a major 
part of the decision-making process. As explained in Chapter 1 on EU asylum legislation, given 
the vital role of the preliminary interview or eligibility examination in the procedure to make 
decisions on refugee applications and to reject or refer refugee applicants to the RPD in Canada’s 
asylum system, all these primary examinations must be carried out according to the same 
fundamental principles of procedural and human rights as are recognized for the ordinary 
determination procedure.  
As a positive point, because of the vulnerable situation of refugee claimants at the port of entry, 
“for reasons of fairness and natural justice,”592 the RPD is empowered to extend the 15-day time 
limit, permitting refugee claimants to gather the information required and submit the BOC 
form.593 This provision is helpful for DCO refugee applicants, who are confronted with a heavier 
burden of proof from the first step of lodging their application because of the presumed safety of 
their national country, and who consequently need more time to provide convincing documents 
rejecting their national country’s presumed general safety in their case. 
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In the next step, if the officer considers the refugee application eligible to be referred to the RPD 
for the determination process, he or she shall assign a date for a hearing before the RPD.594 The 
essential place of the hearing in the determination procedure and its vital role in respecting the 
fundamental principle of procedural fairness has been recognized and affirmed in Canadian 
asylum legislation, such that the right to a hearing has been guaranteed for all refugee applicants 
indiscriminately and equally, regardless of their country of origin or their travel route. However, 
as expressed in section 100 (4.1) of the IRPA, subject to section 159.9 of the IRPR, which is 
even more constrained than what was proposed in Bill C-11,595 there is no single time frame for 
conducting the hearing under the reforms incorporated by Bill C-31, and different time frames 
for participation in the hearing process have been established based on the country of origin.596 If 
refugee claimants have come from a DCO, they have to attend the hearing session either 30 days 
after their refegee application is referred to the RPD, if the claim is made inside Canada at the 
port of entry,597 or 45 days if the refugee claim is made inside Canada other than at the port of 
entry.598 All other refugee claimants are required to be present before the RPD 60 days after their 
application has been sent to the RPD, regardless of whether they have submitted their claim at 
the port of entry or other than at the port of entry.599 DCO refugee applicants are subject to a 
shorter time frame to prepare for the hearing session compared to ordinary refugee applicants.  
This provision is a clear indication of the government’s desire to increase the efficiency of the 
determination procedure by accelerating the processing time for refugee applications that are 
assumed to be unfounded, before the RPD has made a thorough and rigorous determination. 
Consequently, preventing abuse of Canada’s generosity in granting international protection by 
imposing more limits on asylum seekers’ procedural rights, especially on DCO refugee 
applicants, was one of the government’s main concerns in amending the former asylum 
legislation.  
                                                            
 
594 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, prec., note 54, s.100(4.1). 
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Although many human rights organizations have stated on several occasions that Canada’s 
refugee determination system is too lengthy and time-consuming, undermining the efficiency of 
the system and impairing Canada’s ability to meet its constitutional and international 
obligations,600 the processing time for refugee claims should be established based on the time it 
takes to offer adequate protection to those who need it, not as a tool to deter refugee 
applications.601 It is regrettable that the government and Parliament, in proposing and passing 
these changes, have forgotten that one of the main objectives of Canada’s refugee determination 
system is to establish provisions that are “in the first instance about saving lives and offering 
protection to the displaced and persecuted.”602 However, it seems that the government’s main 
purpose is to reject asylum seekers and return them to their countries of origin. The time 
restrictions adopted under Bill C-31 have compromised and sacrificed fairness for speed and 
spurious efficiency.603 
Though in theory the right to a hearing has been recognized and ensured for all refugee 
applicants under the new provisions, in practice, the hearing is too constrictive for DCO refugee 
applicants, as it denies them an adequate opportunity to counsel legal sources, prepare necessary 
documents and present a complete file to the RPD. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that 
DCO refugee claimants are being deprived of the full and complete exercise of their fundamental 
procedural right to a hearing during the determination procedure. 
It is difficult, or in some cases impossible, for asylum seekers to access all necessary resources, 
whether medical, psychological or legal and gather, in 30 or 45 days, all documents required to 
support their claim. In many instances, asylum seekers have left their home country in such a 
short time that they do not have the necessary evidence. Moreover, because of the social, 
financial and linguistic difficulties asylum seekers experience as they struggle in the new society, 
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they are often too disoriented to understand the administrative and legal complexities of lodging 
a refugee application. This situation is exacerbated in the case of asylum seekers fleeing their 
country because of their sexual orientation, since they have to provide all the medical or 
psychological reports required to prove their refugee claim. It is a time-consuming process to 
receive current, official and reliable documents from the country of origin and have them 
translated into English or French.604  
 
Second of all, a report by the CCR one year after implementation of Bill C-31 found that the 
unreasonable and unworkable time limits had caused so much stress and in some cases severe 
panic in refugee applicants that they were unable to participate positively and actively in the 
hearing procedure, which eventually leds the RPD to the conclusion that their refugee 
applications were unfounded.605 This was the case for refugee applicants who have experienced 
serious trauma, such as sexual assault or torture.606 Moreover, it is impossible for refugee 
claimants suffering from PTSD, such as women who have been the victims of sexual assault or 
violence or LGBT individuals, with different cultural, social or religious values, to be prepared 
to attend a hearing and trust the determining authority enough to explain their terrible 
experiences in such a restricted period, considering the long years of shame and fear they have 
experienced in their national country and during their journey to the receiving country.607 
 
This tightened schedule for preparing DCO refugee claimants’ cases increases the risk of 
presenting a weak claim and subsequently that the case will fail during the determination 
procedure, which in turn could result in a poor reputation for legal professionals in this field over 
time. As the CCR has reiterated, NGOs are concerned about lawyers’ high rejection rates of 
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DCO refugee cases.608 These unreasonable time limits therefore indirectly violate the refugee 
claimants’ right to counsel as affirmed in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and in 
practice make it void.609 
More reasonable and flexible time scales in the IRPA regarding certain exceptional 
circumstances under which refugee claimants would be offered more chances, in particular 
regarding their medical or psychological conditions, to appear at the hearing session would 
comply with the principle of procedural fairness. Furthermore, flexibility in scheduling the 
hearing date would give the determining authority adequate time to provide supplementary 
evidence, research the actual human rights practices of the third country in question and assess 
the liability for the events the asylum seeker claims.610 Accelerating the determination 
procedure without taking into consideration the financial, psychological, cultural, legal and 
administrative constraints that refugee applicants face leads to a hearing with an unprepared 
refugee applicant based on insufficient documents. Consequently, a hearing held without 
proper evidence undermines the accuracy, fairness and efficiency of the hearing. Recurring 
delays in finalizing the determination process and incorrect decisions based on poor 
documentation are the inevitable results. This unfair procedure and weak decisions will cause 
more requests for judicial review before the Federal Court and counter the government’s goal 
of rushing the refugee procedure and reducing the difficulties of removing rejected refugee 
claimants. The irrational time limits imposed on DCO refugee applicants prevent Canada from 
fulfilling its constitutional and international human rights obligations. 
Taking into account the unreliable and unworkable criteria for identifying DCOs explained in 
the previous section, incorrect decisions on DCO refugee applications and consequent refouling 
of refused DCO asylum seekers to a country where their life, freedom or physical integrity is 
threatened is contrary to the explicit signification of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Geneva 
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Convention611 and Article 3 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,612 though it occurs unfortunately all too often. In this 
situation, imposing additional restrictions on fundamental procedural rights such as the right to 
a personal hearing is not only in stark contrast with the principle of non-refoulement, but also 
contradicts the fundamental right to life, liberty and security stipulated by the revolutionary 
decision in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) guaranteed for “every 
person physically present in Canada”613 by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.614   
In Singh v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada answered the question of whether the 
procedure for determining and reviewing the decision on the appellants’ refugee claims, as set 
out under the current Immigration Act of 1976, denied the rights they are afforded under the 
principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. As Dickson, Lamer and Wilson explained in this case, though Canada has 
explicitly acknowledged its commitment to observing the principle of non-refoulement for 
protected persons and refugees under the Convention,615 and taking into consideration the 
potential life-threatening consequences of denying refugee status to asylum seekers with a 
well-founded fear of persecution, the principles of fundamental justice dictate that refugee 
claimants are entitled to assert their right to life, freedom and personal security as ensured in 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during the procedure established for 
determining their refugee claims.616 Thus, Dickson, Lamer and Wilson concluded that the 
principles of fundamental justice require that the refugee claimant concerned be granted 
“adequate opportunity to state his case.”617 The time frames of 30 or 45 days for DCO refugee 
applicants to be present in a hearing session lack the basic quality of adequacy and accordingly, 
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the Supreme Court should proclaim the provisions, including these time limits, unconstitutional 
and in violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Differentiating among refugee applicants based on their national county directly violates the 
principle of non-discriminatory treatment of asylum seekers as established under Article 3 of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention618 and enshrined in section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms as “the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination.”619 
On several occasions, the government has put forward convincing reasons for these rules, such 
as preventing misuse of Canada’s liberal asylum system by bogus asylum seekers and 
responding quickly to people who truly need international protection, in order to rationalize and 
legalize the recent reforms introduced by Bill C-11 and Bill C-31. However, ameliorating the 
current asylum legislation should not deprive a certain group of asylum seekers of their 
fundamental human and refugee rights as ensured in the major international legal instruments 
and the Constitutional Act of Canada. Accordingly, as reiterated in section 15(2) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,620 the government and Parliament are entitled to 
reform the provisions in force with the goal of providing more favourable conditions for 
disadvantaged individuals or groups, but based on the principles of fundamental justice, this 
permission should not be construed as a pretext for unreasonably limiting the basic human 
rights of certain individuals or denying them altogether, especially asylum seekers, one of the 
most vulnerable and deprived groups in society. Such deprivation cannot be “justified in a free 
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and democratic society,” as specified in section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.621   
That is why according to CCR, of the changes incorporated into the new asylum system, the 
DCO rule and the tightened time frames have had the most severe impact on the fairness of 
Canada’s asylum system, particularly for DCO refugee applicants.622 
In the next section, which is the last section of our discussion, we will assess if the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy has been unconditionally ensured for all refugee applicants in 
Canada’s asylum legislation, with particular attention to the intervention of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in increasing the compliance of the provisions in force with the fundamental 
principles of international refugee and human rights law and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. 
2.3: Right to appeal (right to an effective remedy) 
The Refugee Appeal Division (hereafter RAD) is one the most advantageous measures of 
Canada’s asylum legislation. It was enacted in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 
2001 but did not come into force until 10 years later, in December 2012. The RAD is a new 
section of the Immigration and Refugee Board, where rejected refugee claimants or the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration are able to appeal final decisions rendered by the 
RPD. According to section 110 (1) of the IRPA and the amendments imposed by Bill C-31, 
[A] person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a 
question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division 
against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person’s 
claim for refugee protection.623 
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The most considerable argument that justifies the necessity of providing all refugee applicants 
with the real right to appeal before the RAD is the massive discrepancy between the acceptance 
rates of first instance decision-making officials. Due to the changes implemented by Bill C-11 
to the Immigration and Refuge Board, first-level decision-makers are civil servants rather than 
political appointees, but according to analysis of the results of first level decisions on refugee 
cases, most of the time the results can be predicted based on which adjudicator reviews the 
refugee application in question, as certain decision-makers are known to have lower or higher 
acceptance rates than others.624 
Although the Immigration and Refugee Board insists on the quality and consistency of first 
instance decisions, the wide variation in the results of first instance adjudicators leads us to two 
logical conclusions. First of all, that there is “a level of arbitrariness”625 among first level 
decision-makers in determining refugee status and that, depending on factors such as gender, 
geographical location and ideology (either liberal or conservative), the final results of the 
determination procedure will inevitably differ. Secondly, there is an urgent need for an 
independent, accessible and effective appeal process for all refugee applicants.626 
 
UNHCR described the importance of an appeal body to perfect the refugee claim determination 
procedure as “a fundamental feature of a credible refugee status determination system.”627 In 
practice, an appeal body is one of the most decisive ways to increase the accuracy and fairness of 
a host country’s asylum system and provide more consistency among decision-making 
authorities.628 Before the creation and implementation of the RAD, Canada’ asylum system had 
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been criticized for its inability to correct the errors that inevitably occurred during the 
determination procedure as its most considerable flaw.629 
 
Taking into account the importance of the right to effective remedy as a last resort afforded to 
rejected asylum seekers, establishing an appeal body can be considered one of the most 
revolutionary developments and liberal trends in Canada’s asylum legislation, with the goal of 
constructing an asylum system that is in accordance with the international refugee, human rights 
and constitutional legal obligations undertaken by the Canadian government and enshrined in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially observance of the principles of 
fundamental justice.630  
 
By instituting an independent, expert appeal body for reviewing the merit of refugee requests, 
Canada has joined the ranks of Western countries with the most humanitarian refugee systems, 
harmonized with the global expansion of human rights law, while still acknowledging the risk of 
incorrect decisions on refugee requests, as they are one of the most difficult and complicated 
quasi-judicial decisions.  
 
While this fundamental right was affirmed for all failed refugee claimants in the Balanced 
Refugee Reform Act of 2010 and welcomed by human rights organizations like Amnesty 
International Canada as a “necessary element in any fair refugee determination system,”631 these 
progressive measures have been omitted in the current legislation brought forward by Bill C-31. 
According to section 110(2) of the IRPA, seven cases have been provided for under which the 
RPD’s decisions may not be opposed before the RAD, including “a decision of the Refugee 
Protection Division allowing or rejecting a claim for refugee protection made by a foreign 
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national who is a national of a country that was, on the day on which the decision was made, a 
country designated under subsection 109.1(1).”632 Rejected DCO refugee claimants or the 
Minister are not entitled to appeal the RPD’s final determination.   
 
It is evident the Canadian legislator’s approach regarding DCO refugee applicants has been more 
radical than what has been enacted by the European Council and European Parliament, despite 
the fact that while the SCO rule was implemented and adopted by EU Member States, the right 
to effective remedy is recognized for all asylum seekers, even the nationals of SCOs, in the 
Asylum Procedures Directive of 2005 and the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive of 2013.  
Canada’s negligent asylum policy has been condemned by refugee and human rights 
organizations. UNHCR warned that implementing the DCO principle should not “[serve] to 
block any access to a status determination procedure,” or “[result] in serious inroads into 
procedural safeguards.”633 With regard to the inevitable erroneous decisions that occur during 
the determination procedure, which may be exacerbated in the case of DCO refugee claims 
because of unreasonable criteria and additional procedural restrictions during the accelerated 
hearing and decision-making process, guaranteeing full access to an independent appeal body is 
the minimum redress that the receiving country can provide to decrease the harmful effects of 
expeditious procedures, prevent refouling of asylum seekers to countries where their life, 
freedom or physical integrity is threatened, prohibit discriminatory treatment of refugee 
claimants based on their nationality and respect the principles of fundamental justice for all 
persons, including refugee claimants, physically present in Canada.  
In essence, this preventive measure can be seen as the government’s strong intention to 
discourage and reduce the number of refugee claimants at any cost, even violation of the 
fundamental human rights principles enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the principles of non-refoulement and prevention of torture and degrading or 
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inhuman treatment ensured by major international refugee and human rights legal instruments 
such as the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.634  
Even if the general safety of a third country could be supposed, the individual nature of refugee 
status determination, as set out in the 1951 Geneva Convention,635 requires that asylum seekers 
be granted adequate opportunity to disprove the presumption of the safety of their country of 
origin in their particular case. This principle implies that rejected refugee claimants also have 
the absolute right to effective redress to a distinct appeal body other than the determining 
authority, which is authorized to consider both the factual and legal questions that have risen 
from their case. Unfortunately, imposing an absolute bar on the right of appeal to the RAD 
leaves room for judicial review only, carried out by the Federal Court. Although judicial review 
of final decisions on refugee applications constitutes a significant portion of the Federal Court’s 
work (3,655 out of 8,403 applications submitted in 2014),636 the Court is not as efficient and 
effective as the RAD in ensuring the fundamental rights of rejected asylum seekers and curing 
the basic deficiencies and inevitable injustices that occur during the first instance decision-
making procedure. 
In the case of Y.Z v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),637 decided on July 23, 
2015, the Federal Court of Canada found inconsistencies in the denial of the right to appeal to 
the RAD to DCO refugee applicants, in this case a single gay man and a gay couple 
respectively from the designated countries of Croatia and Hungary. This right is enacted under 
section 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA and section 15(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, and is not justifiable under section 1 of the Charter. Accordingly, the Court declared 
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that the provision be impugned and that section 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA has neither effect nor 
force, granting the DCO refugee claimants the right to appeal to the RAD. 
Where relevant, the Federal Court’s interpretations in the case mentioned above will be referred 
to and explained in more detail to shed some light on and support our reasoning regarding the 
unconstitutionality of section 110.2(d.1) of the IRPA. 
According to section 72(1) of the IRPA, the Federal Court may conduct a judicial review of 
“any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised — 
under this Act.” Thus, the RPD’s rulings on DCO refugee applications, subject to section 110 
(2) (d.1), may undergo judicial review by the Federal Court.  
The primary negative outcome of this provision is that contrary to the basic requirement of a 
more simplified procedure because of the disorientation and confusion asylum seekers 
experience in the host country as they struggle with many administrative, legal, psychological 
and financial difficulties, DCO refugee applicants are obliged to follow more complicated 
procedures to receive an effective remedy against the RPD’s final decision before the Federal 
Court, in comparison to the procedure set out for appealing ordinary refugee determinations 
before the RAD.638  
Limited time frame: according to section 72(1) of the IRPA, before the judicial review is 
initiated by the Federal Court, the applicant must file an application for leave to the Federal 
Court. Rejected asylum seekers do not have an automatic right to judicial review; rather, they 
must obtain the leave of the Federal Court. Until the leave is granted, the Federal Court will not 
commence a judicial review of the RPD’s final decision.639  
The troubling aspect of this provision is the extremely short time limit for presenting the 
application for leave to the Federal Court. Rejected refugee claimants have only 15 days (in the 
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case of inland refugee claimants like DCOs) after the RPD sends its written reasons for the 
final decision to submit their application for leave.640 In this case, the 15-day time frame is not 
enough time to consult a legal professional, provide the documents required and correctly 
submit the application for leave, which should include information such as the name of the 
parties, the details of the case, the final decision made, the measures taken, the question put 
forward, the requested redress, the grounds on which the relief is sought and so on.641 The time 
limit for responding to the application for leave is even shorter. Under section 8(1) of the 
Federal Court Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, the respondent has only 
10 days after the application for leave is received to file a notice of appearance. The application 
for leave must be perfected within 30 days by filing an application record that should contain 
the application for leave, the RPD’s decision under review, the RPD’s written reasons, the 
memorandum of argument and the supporting affidavits.642 It is clear that in order to request 
judicial review of the determination before the Federal Court, denied refugee claimants  have to 
complete a complicated administrative process, intensified by the excessively short time 
schedule.643 
Lack of hearing: the Federal Court judge decides whether to grant or reject the leave based on 
the court file and the evidence provided by the parties without a hearing, except in exceptional 
cases.644 When the applicant is the rejected refugee claimant, he or she has no chance to explain 
to the court in person the reasons for seeking leave and the grounds on which he or she is 
seeking a judicial review of the final determination.  
Unreasoned decisions: the Federal Court has no obligation to give the reasons for approval or 
rejection of an application for leave, and applicants are not entitled to appeal the court’s 
decision in the case of rejection.645 There are no guidelines or reliable tests outlining the 
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circumstances under which the Court will grant the leave.646 This situation makes it difficult for 
the applicant and his or her legal counsel to determine how they should provide the evidence 
and creates stressful circumstances for them regarding the outcome of the proceedings. Even 
when the reasons are given, detailed information is not provided, since all of the Federal 
Court’s justifications are general and vague except in very infrequent cases.647 For example, in 
one case where the reason for denial of leave was given, Mina v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Shore indicated that “[i]n an application for leave and for 
judicial review, a serious, arguable case with serious issues must be submitted.”648 
Inconsistent leave decisions: one of the most discouraging issues regarding the accuracy of 
judicial review proceedings is the wide variation in approval of applications for leave from one 
judge to another649 and the high rate of rejection of leave by the Federal Court. Based on a 
recent inquiry by Rehaag,  between 2005 to 2010, leave was granted in only 14.44% per cent of 
cases.650 The result is even lower according to statistics provided by Amnesty International 
Canada, indicating that the rate of granting leave is as low as 7.5%. Given the reforms and the 
restrictive measures imposed on the IRPA, such as DCO or STC rules, it is not surprising that 
the low rate of leave granting has not ameliorated in recent years. Based on more recent 
statistics from Justice Mactavish, the acceptance rate of application leave in 2014 was only 
24.9%, including requests for judicial review of both refugee determinations and of the Pre-
removal Risk Assessment.651 
Restricted judicial view: even if leave is granted, the judicial review is more constrained than 
RAD appeal proceedings. In fact, while the RAD is mandated to review both the factual and 
legal aspects of each application, the Federal Court has jurisdiction only to reassess legal 
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issues, so it does not consider the merit of refugee claims comprehensively.652 Consequently, 
the Federal Court neither reconsiders the credibility of the claim nor examines new evidence, 
but reviews only the RPD’s decision and the documents, evidence or reports available and 
referred by the RPD at the time of the hearing during the determination procedure.653  
Under these circumstances, the effectiveness, fairness and validity of the Federal Court’s 
judicial review is dubious. The Federal Court’s limited jurisdiction is most damaging in the 
case of rejected LGBT refugee claimants for two main reasons. These applicants have 
experienced many years of oppression in order to deny or hide their sexual identity, which 
brings about deep-rooted mental and psychological health problems and social isolation. 
Consequently, it takes them more time than other refugee claimants to disclose all the factual 
issues of their case or their self-identity and recount their whole experience. As explained 
before, LGBT refugee protection cases are more challenging in terms of gathering and 
providing all the necessary and valid documents to substantiate the refugee protection request 
comprehensively, since as LaViolette noted in the case of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), “[A]vailable country documentation is often deficient or non-
existent when it comes to persecution of sexual minorities.”654 One of the most fundamental 
flaws of the judicial review conducted by the Federal Court is that judges are prevented from 
receiving new evidence not available during the first instance determination procedure, 
especially in the case of rejected asylum seekers requiring judicial review of their claim on the 
grounds of sensitive subject matter such as sexual orientation, gender identity or gender-based 
violence and discrimination.655    
Denial of automatic stay of removal: the last and the most worrisome issue, which 
demonstrates the unworkable and inefficient judicial review system implemented by Bill C-31 
for the Federal Court, as well as the importance of providing DCO refugee applicants with the 
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effective right to appeal to the RAD, is the issue of denying the suspensive effect of appeal for 
DCO refugee applicants who request judicial review of their refugee protection determination 
before the Federal Court.  
Generally, under the current asylum system established by the IRPA and the IRPR, every 
foreign national whose claim is eligible to be referred to the RPD is issued a conditional 
Specified Removal Order based on the circumstances described in sections 228(3) and 229(2) 
of the IRPR. However, when the refugee claim is rejected by the RPD, the date the removal 
order comes into force depends on whether refugee protection was requested by a DCO refugee 
claimant or an ordinary one.  
According to section 49(2) (c) of the IRPA, the removal order becomes enforceable “on the 
expiry of the time limit referred to in subsection 110(2.1) or, if an appeal is made, 15 days after 
notification by the Refugee Appeal Division that the claim is rejected.”656 With regard to the 
fact that DCO refugee claimants are deprived of the right to appeal before the RAD, the 
removal order is applicable 15 days after the day on which the rejected refugee claimant 
receives the reasons in writing from the RPD.657 When the removal order is enforceable, the 
subject of the order, the foreign national, has to leave Canada immediately.658 
When submitting an application for leave before the Federal Court to contest the RAD’s 
decision, the removal order is automatically stayed until the final result is issued,659 except 
when “the subject of the removal order is a designated foreign national or a national of a 
country that is designated under subsection 109.1(1) of the Act.”660 Based on these provisions, 
DCO refugee claimants, contrary to ordinary asylum seekers, are denied the suspensive effect 
of judicial review, and rejected DCO asylum seekers can be deported to their country of origin 
before the judicial review has been finalized, unless they obtain a judicial stay of removal from 
the Federal Court.   
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Depriving DCO refugee claimants of the right to remain in Canada pending the decision of the 
leave judge or the final result of the Federal Court’s judicial review constitutes discriminatory 
treatment against a particular group of asylum seekers based on their country of origin, contrary 
to the explicit implication of Article 3 of the 1951 Geneva Convention and section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which requires the Canadian government to 
provide equal protection and enjoyment of the law irrespective of a person’s “national or ethnic 
origin.”661 In the case of Y.Z v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal 
Court provided a detailed reasoning responding to the question of the discriminatory and 
unconstitutional character of section 110(2) (d.1) of the IRPA. 
According to the Court, the best way to uncover the inconsistency of the provision that disputes 
section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the test established by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Withler v. Canada (Attorney General).662 When 
conducting the “substantive equality inquiry,” two issues should be clarified: “(1) Does the law 
create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? and (2) Does the distinction 
create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?”663  
With regard to the first question, the Supreme Court illustrated that a comparative analysis 
should establish that a “distinction” has occurred, leading us to the conclusion that in this 
particular case, DCO refugee applicants, deprived of the right to appeal to the RAD, are treated 
differently than non-DCO asylum seekers based on the same or analogous grounds of 
discrimination enumerated in section 15(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.664 As 
one of the conflicting points between the applicants and respondents, it should be determined 
whether or not the distinction set out in section 110(2) (d.1) is based on “national origin,” 
prohibited in section 15(1) of the Charter. Based on the interpretation provided by Justice 
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Mactavish in the case of Canadian Doctors for Refugees v. Canada (Attorney General),665 a 
distinction based on national origin as indicated in section 15(1) of the Charter signifies “a 
prohibition on discrimination between classes of non-citizens based upon their country of 
origin [...] consistent with the provisions of the Refugee Convention, article 3 of which 
prohibits discrimination against refugees based upon their country of origin.”666 Basing its 
reasoning on this definition in the case of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), the Federal Court correctly reached the conclusion that the differentiation 
established in section 110(2)(d.1) between DCO and non-DCO refugee claimants is a clear 
distinction on the basis of national origin since, as specified by the Court, “[i]f the claimant 
comes from one of the countries designated under subsection 109.1(1) of the IRPA, his or her 
claim will be assessed without the potential benefit of or access to an appeal to the RAD, unlike 
claimants from non-DCO countries.”667 In other words, whatever the considerations might be 
to designate a country as a DCO or remove it from the DCO list, the only reason for treating 
DCO asylum seekers differently that non-DCO refugee applicants is that they originate from 
and are nationals of DCOs, a distinction exercised regardless of the personal characteristics of 
DCO asylum seekers.  
Ultimately, the Court specified that the distinction in section 110(2) (d.1) is based on one of the 
grounds prohibited by section 15(1) of the Charter, since “it creates two classes of refugee 
claimants based on national origin: those foreign nationals from a DCO and those who are not 
from a DCO.”668 This argument is reinforced by the foregoing explanations about the 
complicated administrative steps DCO refugee claimants must take to submit a judicial review 
request before the Federal Court and the inefficient jurisdiction granted to the Court for 
conducting the judicial assessment of the RPD’s final determination, compared to the 
simplified appeal procedure for non-DCO refugee applicants before the RAD. 
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Considering the second question, the Supreme Court clarified that the inquiry should answer 
the question of whether the impugned provision or decision brings about “substantive 
inequality” in the sense that it causes a detriment by invoking and maintaining prejudice or 
stereotype against a particular group of refugee claimants irrelevant to their actual 
characteristics or situation.669 In the second phase of the test, depending on the nature of the 
case, a comparative study should be carried out between the two groups, in this case DCO and 
non-DCO refugee claimants, with the goal of reaching a “contextual understanding” of the 
DCO refugee applicants’ situation not only within the legal, but also the social and political 
contexts, which will help to uncover the disadvantages against them caused by the impugned 
law or decision perpetuating the misjudgment or stereotype.670  
With regard to DCO refugee claimants deprived of the right to appeal to the RAD, in the case 
of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the respondents asserted that the 
DCO regime is not founded on stereotypes but on reliable information, profound inquiry and 
rigorous review establishing the general safety of the country of origin in question.671  
However, the Court disagreed with this claim, recalling the government’s repeated statements 
during the first steps of IRPA reforms in order to prevent abuse of Canada’s asylum system by 
bogus asylum seekers from safe and non-refugee producing countries and to ensure full access 
to a fair and efficient refugee status determination procedure for eligible and well-founded 
refugee claimants. During the conference introducing the DCO rule and its procedural and legal 
consequences for DCO refugee claimants, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, relying 
on the aforementioned explanations, proclaimed that most of the changes to the IRPA were 
aimed at unfounded and bogus refugee claims from safe countries such as Hungary. As 
indicated by the Court, all the justifications provided by the government and the legal or 
procedural distinctions between DCO and non-DCO asylum seekers marginalize DCO 
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nationals, reinforcing the stereotype that they are all “queue jumpers” and bogus applicants 
seeking only to abuse Canada’s asylum legislation.672   
To defend their argument, the respondents referenced statistics demonstrating a decline in the 
rate of abandonment or withdrawal of refugee claims and a slight increase in the rate of 
accepted refugee requests since certain countries such as Hungary had been designated as safe, 
as evidence that the DCO regime was working well. The people who wanted to abuse the 
Canadian asylum system were deterred, while genuine refugee claimants were accepted.  
The Court rejected this argument, stating that although all these statistics seem convincing and 
true, they point to the fact that there are well-founded refugee applicants seeking genuine 
refugee protection among the DCO asylum seekers being denied the right to appeal. More 
importantly, there is no need to deprive all DCO refugee applicants of the right to appeal to the 
RAD in order to deter by fraudulent DCO refugee claimants from misusing Canada’s 
determination procedure, since under sections 107(2), 107.1, 110(2) (c), and 110(2) (b), 
fraudulent or abusive claims that the RDP determines to have no credible basis, as well as 
manifestly unfounded, abandoned or withdrawn refugee claims, are denied the right to appeal 
to the RAD.673 Accordingly, the Court specified that 
[D]enying an appeal to all DCO claimants, regardless of the RPD’s determination, 
effectively means that the stereotypical “bogus” DCO claimant is being preferred to the 
RPD’s individual assessment of a claimant’s story. There is no reason to expect that the 
RPD is any less likely to make a mistake when it rejects genuinely-advanced claims 
from DCOs than it is when it rejects claims from non-DCOs with similar rates of 
acceptance [...]. Denying an appeal to claimants from DCOs thus does not correspond to 
whether those claimants are actually abusing the refugee system, nor does it correspond 
to whether they actually need an appeal less than claimants from non-DCOs.674 
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Based on the Supreme Court’s stipulations in the case of Withler v. Canada, the equality 
required by section 15(1) of the Charter is not limited to the formal and legal aspects of the 
disputed provision, but rather directly concerns the substantive equality675 that has been denied 
DCO refugee claimants vis-à-vis non-DCO asylum seekers on the discriminatory basis of 
national origin and denies their right to appeal to the RAD. This unfavourable provision also 
reinforces the historical prejudice of “undesirable refugee claimants” with unfounded or 
fraudulent refugee applications who do not deserve the refugee protection that Canada 
provides.676    
The Federal Court finally declared that section 110(2) (d.1) infringes on section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, since “this is a denial of substantive equality to 
claimants from DCO countries based upon the national origin of such claimants.”677 
Even though the government’s objective in enacting these provisions, as indicated on several 
occasions, was to prevent bogus asylum seekers from misusing the Canadian asylum system 
and increasing the efficiency of the inland determination procedure, because of the grave 
consequences of returning refugee applicants whose claims have not been determined to their 
home country, limits on rejected refugee claimants’ ability to stay in Canada while awaiting the 
leave decision or final judicial review of the Federal Court is one of the most obvious instances 
of infringement of the non-refoulement principle, clearly prohibited in the major international 
refugee and human rights instruments of law.678  
Even though it could be acceptable to accelerate the judicial review process for fraudulent or 
clearly abusive refugee applications, preventing refugee claimants from remaining in Canada 
until the Federal Court has made a final decision on their claim solely because of the general 
safety presumed for their country of origin eliminates their right to judicial redress and leads to 
the denial of the fundamental human rights to life, liberty and security of person ensured in the 
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the violation of which is not “justified in a free and 
democratic society.”679  
Unfortunately, in the case of Y.Z v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the 
Federal Court, while acknowledging the respondents’ assertion, ruled that depriving DCO 
refugee applicants of the right to appeal to the RAD does not violate the principles of 
fundamental justice ensured under section 7 of the Charter, since the Supreme Court stipulated 
in the case of Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration that “there is no 
constitutional right to an appeal.”680  
However, the Federal Court then addressed the most fundamental issue arising from section 
110(2) (d.1), which was the Court’s ruling establishing that depriving DCO refugee claimants 
of the right to appeal to the RAD violates section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, and whether this inconsistency “can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society,”681 which is the fundamental consideration required in section 1 of the 
Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of R. v. Oakes,682 for the first time set out a 
two-step test for the Court to examine whether or not the limits imposed on certain persons’ 
Charter rights and freedoms are reasonable and legitimate in any free and democratic society.683  
It must be determined whether the measures limiting the rights or freedoms guaranteed in the 
Charter are “of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom” (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 supra, at p. 352), in the sense that 
the objectives must consider “pressing and substantial” issues in a free and democratic society 
as the minimum standard. 
The party resorting to section 1 must demonstrate that the measures enacted are definitely 
justifiable and reasonable, calling for “a form of proportionality test” as established in the case 
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of R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. In the view of the Supreme Court, while the features of the test 
may vary depending on the case before the court, any proportionality test must constitute three 
fundamental elements: firstly, the impugned provision must be adopted carefully as to 
guarantee the objectives contended, in the sense that there must be a rational connection 
between the measures enacted and the objectives sought. Secondly, even in a case with the 
required logical relation, these measures must restrict as much as possible the right or freedom 
concerned. Lastly, there must be a proportionality between the impact of measures restricting 
the right or freedom ensured by the Charter and the objectives recognized as sufficiently 
important.  
To clarify this test, in the case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,684 the Supreme Court 
explained that section 1 imposes the burden on the government to demonstrate that with regard 
to its pressing and substantial goal, the violation of an individual’s or a group’s rights or 
freedoms is rationally justified by the greater public interest. The court must then analyze 
whether the legislator could have passed provisions infringing on the individual’s rights or 
freedoms within a more limited scope. Finally, the court is required to assess whether there is a 
reasonable balance between the negative effects of the measures in question on the rights or 
freedoms of the persons subjected to them and those measures’ favourable impact in serving 
the broader interests of society as a whole.685 
Accordingly, the Federal Court expressed that in the case of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), “the central question is whether the negative impact of 
paragraph 110(2) (d.1) on the rights of DCO claimants vis-à-vis other refugee claimants is 
proportionate to the pressing and substantial goal of paragraph 110(2)(d.1) in furthering the 
public interest.”686  
To answer this question, the Court first affirmed the reforms carried out on the IRPA, since 
before the introduction of Bill C-11 and Bill C-31, Canada’s asylum system was sophisticated, 
time-consuming and inapplicable, with many unnecessary procedural steps in order to reach a 
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final decision on refugee claims or deport failed refugee claimants. The government therefore 
focused on eliminating unnecessary administrative rules, expediting the determination 
procedure and accelerating the removal of rejected refugee claimants as the substantial and 
pressing objective, reducing the average number of days refugee claimants stay in Canada from 
the time they submit a refugee claim to their removal from Canada, in the case of a failed 
refugee request.687  
Based on this primary indication, the Federal Court reasonably concluded that the objective of 
section 110(2) (d.1) of the IRPA is to reduce or limit recourse available to DCO refugee 
claimants, which in ordinary cases is granted to all refugee claimants, and consequently to 
accelerate the removal of DCO refugee claimants from Canada compared to other failed 
asylum seekers. According to the Court, the government also expected that these reforms might 
discourage fraudulent asylum seekers from coming to Canada and trying their chances of 
receiving refugee protection.688 
After determining the government’s objective in introducing and passing section 110(2) (d.1), 
even though it was recognized as a pressing and substantial objective, the proportionality test 
established by the Supreme Court will now be applied to the case of R. v. Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd.  
The Federal Court explained that if we accept that there is a reasonable and rational relation 
between the government’s objective and denying DCO refugee claimants the right to appeal to 
the RAD as the first constitutive element of the inquiry, in the second step the Court is required 
to establish that section 110(2) (d.1) is minimally impairing the right to appeal and there is no 
other solution possible for the government to reach its broader objective of increasing the 
efficiency and fairness of Canada’s asylum system and preventing manifestly unfounded or 
fraudulent refugee applicants from safe countries from abusing Canada’s inland determination 
procedure. In other words, the Court must consider if other alternatives exist for the legislator 
to reach the ultimate goal of serving the larger public interest. The Federal Court stated that the 
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respondents failed to prove that depriving DCO refugee claimants of the right to appeal to the 
RAD was the last resort available to the government to satisfy its objective. Even if we 
accepted the respondents’ claim that one of the government’s purposes in reforming the IRPA 
was to deter abuse of Canada’s asylum legislation, this goal has been achieved and enacted in 
other sections of the IRPA, by means of the RPD’s determination recognizing refugee claims as 
manifestly unfounded or having no credible basis. In both cases, failed refugee claimants have 
no right to appeal before the RAD. Refugee claimants who have abandoned or withdrawn their 
claims are not entitled to appeal before the RAD.  
According to the Court, an additional deterrent provision against DCO refugee applicants is not 
justifiable, since “the stated goal of deterring abusive or unfounded claims could be achieved 
by the combined effect of section 107.1, subsection 107(2) and paragraphs 110(2)(b) and (c) of 
the IRPA.”689 
On the subject of depriving DCO refugee claimants of an automatic stay of removal while 
requesting a judicial review of the RPD’s negative decision before the Federal Court, the Court 
has declared that “[a]n appeal to the RAD is a significant benefit for claimants, and denying 
this appeal to some claimants based on their country of origin is a serious impairment of their 
right to equality,”690 and as a result, that “[d]enying an appeal to all claimants from DCOs is 
not proportional to the government’s objectives; it is an inequality that is disproportionate and 
overbroad and cannot be saved by section 1 of the Charter.”691 
It is obvious that the right to effective remedy established in the asylum system prior to the 
Federal Court’s decision in the case of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) was meaningless, since rejected DCO refugee claimants were provided no real 
chance to effectively seek the judicial redress and fundamental justice they were unlawfully 
denied during the first instance determination procedure.692 UNHCR has stipulated that the 
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right to appeal “is a fundamental requirement of a fair and efficient asylum procedure, to which 
no exception should be made,” since the appeal procedure is the last opportunity to observe the 
principles of fundamental justice and protect rejected asylum seekers from being unfairly 
refouled to a country where their life, freedom or integrity of person is threatened,693 in 
accordance with sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the 
end, the failure to guarantee the right to effective remedy is a clear violation of the right to 
request refugee protection enshrined and recognized for all persons, irrespective of their 
country of origin, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.694 
Concluding remarks 
The Harper government’s legacy to Canada’s asylum system, followed by consecutive IRPA 
reforms and ambiguous, discriminatory and, in some cases, contradictory provisions, resulted 
in puzzling and stressful situations for refugee claimants in Canada. Although the government 
has had legitimate objectives in amending Canada’s asylum legislation by introducing Bill C-
11 and Bill C-31, including calming security concerns; curing the inherent flaws in Canada’s 
asylum system, such as an unreasonably long and sophisticated inland determination 
procedure; limiting procedural recourse and accelerating the deportation of fraudulent and 
unfounded refugee applicants who intend to abuse Canada’s asylum legislation, hoewever, 
according to the government’s standpoint, the only solution has been to dissuade and deport 
these undeserving asylum seekers by applying preventive measures such as the STC or DCO 
rules, and depriving these fraudulent refugee claimants of the fundamental procedural and 
human rights enjoyed by ordinary asylum seekers, the most important of which are the right to 
                                                            
 
693 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Submission on Bill C-31 Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act”, prec., note 542, p.17. 
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a full and unconstrained personal hearing and the right to an effective remedy, as ensured by 
the establishment of the RAD. 
Regarding recently passed initiatives, the government has been furthering its preventive asylum 
policy by spreading the stereotype that most asylum seekers from safe countries, and DCO 
refugee claimants in particular, are bogus or are queue jumpers with the sole purpose of 
misusing the asylum rules enacted under previous liberal trends. As explained above, in spite of 
certain improvements in Bill C-31 comparing to Bill C-11, in practice, the government has 
created a new multilayered asylum system that classifies refugee claimants as worthy or 
unworthy and differentiates among them on the basis of factors unrelated to the merit of their 
refugee protection claims, such as their national country (DCO rule) or the travel routes they 
have taken to reach Canada (STC rule). This discriminatory approach calls into question the 
fairness and independence of Canada’s asylum system, while also leaving it vulnerable to 
political, economic or intergovernmental considerations.695  
The introduction of the DCO rule in Bill C-31, in spite of the government’s legitimate objective 
as to target certain shortcomings in Canada’s inland refugee system such as time-consuming 
determination procedures or identification of unfounded refugee applications, and, one the 
other hand, reforming some defects in Bill C-11 such as designation of DCO without 
population or regional exceptions, one the other hand, resulted in increased antirefugee 
sentiment in Canada, as well as incorrect messages, and exaggerated reports about floods of 
refugees and the harmful effects of their presence in Canada have contributed to the 
indifference of Canadian society toward the increasingly restrictive practices of the government 
while inciting intolerance of refugees in the country.696 This unfriendly atmosphere diminishes 
opportunities to improve the flaws of the current asylum system while paving the way for more 
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infringements of the international and constitutional human rights obligations to which the 
government is committed.697 
Although the Federal Court and the Supreme Court have acknowledged the unsafety of the 
DCO rule and its inability to prove effective State protection for refugee claimants in several 
cases, and have also uncovered the unconstitutional character and discriminatory distinctions of 
the legislated preventive measures relating to DCO refugee claimants explained in the previous 
sections, many parts of the story have been left untold.  
The government has never satisfied basic concerns relating to the transparency and reliability 
of the process by which the Minister identifies DCOs. More delicate and sensitive questions 
remained unanswered in the IRPA and the Ministerial order for determining the general safety 
of a third country. In fact, the inadequate and unreliable criteria (either quantitative or 
qualitative) used to create the DCO list and deprive DCO asylum seekers of their fundamental 
procedural rights support the conclusion that the government regards democracy as a label to 
be attached to a third country definitely guaranteeing effective State protection.698  
However, as the Federal Court specified in the case of Sow v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), State protection should be granted based on a rigorous inquiry, taking into 
consideration significant issues such as “the quality of the institutions providing that 
protection,” “the adequacy of state protection at an operational level” and “persons similarly 
situated to the applicant and their treatment by the state.” Accordingly, the Court stipulated that   
[D]emocracy [...] requires institutions and principles to give effect to the values that the 
term encompasses. These may include, amongst others, an independent judiciary and 
defense bar, access to justice and a police force that is independent in the exercise of its 
investigatory function.699  
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These considerations are missing from the criteria established by the IRPA and the Ministerial 
orders.  
The massive and unlimited discretion granted to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to 
designate DCOs, along with widespread deprivation of any effective opportunity for DCO 
applicants to comprehensively substantiate their applications, as specified by the Federal Court 
in the case of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), does not guarantee that 
refugee protection will be provided to those who really need it, as contended by the 
government in reforming the current asylum system. When the government’s main focus is to 
reject, as quickly as possible, people who do not deserve protection, it does not give individuals 
who are in need of refugee protection enough time and resources to explain their merit.700  The 
new asylum system is helpful in rare cases only for an extremely limited group of refugee 
applicants with strong documentation, competent legal representation and a supportive 
community.701 
The second unanswered question, with regard to the dubious designation of Central and Eastern 
European countries such as Hungary and Croatia as DCOs, is how much of the designation 
process is influenced by geopolitical and economic factors rather than human rights concerns? 
One of the main reasons for suspicion is that while preparing the DCO list, the Canadian 
government was negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU. It is suspicious that the Federal 
government had identified all EU Member States except Romania and Bulgaria as DCOs, with 
the goal of convincing them to ratify the trade deal.702  
For example, since 2008 citizens of the Czech Republic have been required to have a visa to 
travel to Canada because of the growing number of refugee applicants from that country, 
                                                            
 
700 Tobi COHEN, “Number of asylum claim drops dramatically after Ottawa releases list of ‘safe’ countries”, August 
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especially the Roma. However, in the midst of the negotiations to ratify the Comprehensive 
Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union, the Czech 
Republic threatened not to ratify the agreement if Canada did not remove the barriers for its 
citizens to travel to Canada.703 Although the federal government did not immediately remove the 
visa requirement, it put the Czech Republic on the DCO list. The same policy has been applied 
against Hungarian citizens, especially Roma asylum seekers. In 2009, the federal government 
exempted Hungarian citizens from visa requirements, but following a sudden increase in the 
number of refugee application made by Roma individuals, Hungary became the primary source 
of refugee applications in Canada. In order to resolve the complicated situation caused by the 
unprecedented number of refugee applicants from Hungary and ensure the ratification of the 
trade deal by all EU Member States, the federal government included Hungary as a DCO on the 
first DCO list issued in 2012 to facilitate the rejection of refugee applications by Roma and 
Jewish individuals from Hungary.704  
The Harper government’s restrictive asylum policy resulted in a growing number of 
undocumented foreign nationals who found lodging refugee applications useless because of the 
unfair refugee determination system in Canada, which consequently makes it more difficult for 
the federal government to manage its resources effectively in order to process refugee 
applications and settle asylum seekers in its territory.  
The harmful effects of the deterrent asylum legislation on overseas resettlement programs have 
resulted in a dramatic decrease in the number of refugees resettled from outside of Canada since 
2012, though the federal government has given the increase in the resettlement number as 
justification for a more restrictive inland refugee claim process.705 Despite increasingly horrific 
human rights violations occurring every day all around the world, the Canadian government 
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remained reluctant to accept refugees compared to Western European countries, especially prior 
to the 2015 Canadian federal election and subsequent Liberal majority in Parliament. It is 
obvious that Canada would rather turn its back on refugees rather than act as a responsible 
member of global society by providing effective and proper protection for genuine asylum 
seekers. Although the new Liberal government has committed to bringing 25,000 Syrian 
refugees to Canada by February 29, 2016706 in response to the civil war in Syria, one of the worst 
humanitarian crises in the world since World War II, it has not been making a significant effort 
to accept asylum seekers and provide international protection for real refugees since the start of 
the civil war in Syria compared to Western European countries.  
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General Conclusion 
Since the 1951 Geneva Convention established the international refugee protection system and 
the expansion of its provisions in the contracting States’ domestic asylum legislation, providing 
refugee protection has led to two conflicting outcomes. Especially among Western countries, a 
country’s ability to control the movement of asylum seekers, accept and resettle recognized 
refugees has been considered clear evidence of the State’s sovereignty over its territory and its 
political and economic power, which represents that country as an active actor in 
intergovernmental relations and global society. However, a negative result is that the 
unprecedented flow of asylum seekers to the borders of Western countries since the mid-20th 
century has caused deep concerns about the presence of asylum seekers in Western societies, in 
particular in the case of refugee claimants from countries that traditionally do not produce 
refugees.   
In order to respect their international obligation to provide refugee protection while satisfying 
fundamental suspicions about the efficiency of the international refugee system, exacerbated by 
security concerns about the presence of refugees, and the growing economic burden of accepting 
and examining refugee applications, the Western States began rearranging their domestic refugee 
legislation based on their previous asylum policy.   
Although the change in Western asylum policies from supportive to deterrent began in the mid-
20th century, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the civil wars in the Middle Est and the North 
Africa hastened the establishment of preventive asylum policy and legislation among the 
Western countries, such that all these States have been competing to put in place more restrictive 
asylum rules than their neighbours or allies.  
This competition is more evident in the passing of restrictive rules such as the SCO and STC 
rules. Though the main purpose of our inquiry, the SCO rule, was initiated by the Western 
European States and eventually, since 2012, Canada incoporated this preventive rule in its 
national legislation, however, there can be found some similarities and differences between these 
two legal system in applying the SCO rule. Based on what has been explained in this research, at 
first glance, the criteria established by both EU and Canada legislation to determine a third 
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country’s safety are too general and do not comply with reality and the complicated patterns of 
human rights violations happening every day on the domestic scale. The criteria for determining 
the general safety of a third country are legislated ambiguously so that many decisive issues, 
such as the third country’s real practices, the accessibility of State protection to all its nationals 
and the applicability of judicial redress, remained unknown to the internal law-making bodies of 
Western governments. 
On the other hand, with regard to the differences, Canada’s approach to developing the SCO rule 
in its asylum legislation has been more radical, with more intense results than those achieved by 
the common asylum policy and laws implemented in the EU. As demonstarated in this 
comparative study, first of all, the quantitative measures laid down in the IRPA suffer from 
additional shortcomings compared to the standards passed by EU legislators in the APD and the 
RAPD. According to Costello, the quantitative criteria are so dubious that “they include 
abandoned and withdrawn claims within their calculations; and it is problematic that they are 
based on past refugee determinations and not on present or anticipated country conditions.”707  
Second of all, although, as Costello indicated, both the qualitative criteria laid down in the IRPA 
and the standards established in the APD and the RAPD “are general and do not focus enough on 
whether a country is likely to produce refugees”708, however, all these problems, in addition to a 
DCO designation procedure left entirely to the Minister’s discretion, have made the impact of the 
DCO rules on refugee claimants in Canada definitely more severe, since DCO refugee applicants 
were deprived of the right to appeal to the RAD,709 compared to SCO provisions enacted in the 
APD and later in the RAPD, which did not deprive SCO applicants of the right to appeal. 
Fortunately, in its brilliant decision in the case of Y.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), the Federal Court has granted the fundamental right to appeal to DCO refugee 
claimants.  
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However, one of the most concerning aspect of determination of SCO or DCO, common between 
the two legal systems of the EU and Canada, is that the constitutionality and accuracy of criteria 
for designating SCOs and DCOs has not been decided or established by any case law, either in 
the EU or Canada. Hence, while the EJC and ECtHR, as the judicial bodies protecting human 
rights at the EU level, and the Federal Court in Canada, have established the inherent flaws of 
the SCO and DCO rules in some cases, including the potential violation of the fundamental 
principle of non-refoulement and infringement of international refugee and human rights law or 
constitution law, in particular when the determination procedure is expedited and the basic 
human rights of SCO and DCO asylum seekers are ceded or denied, Western countries have not 
stopped applying this restrictive rule, especially at the EU level.  
With regard to the asylum crisis the EU is struggling with today and the massive flow of asylum 
seekers escaping from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and northern African countries to the eastern and 
the southern borders of the EU, the most affected Member States have resorted to more 
restrictive asylum measures such as closing their borders, making the resettlement process harder 
for recognized refugees, preventing family reunification and accelerating the deportation of 
unfounded or undeserving asylum seekers to their countries by adding new countries to their 
national SCO list. For instance, as a quick response to the security concerns and increasing 
criticism caused by the massive arrival and acceptance of Syrian and African asylum seekers in 
Germany since last year, the German government has suggested recognizing Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia as SCOs. 
Ultimately, the most disturbing aspect of the SCO rule is that it reflects and meets, more than any 
other restrictive measure, the political, economic and social interests of the Western countries 
instead of ensuring effective international protection for persons who truly need it. Exempting a 
third country’s nationals from the prerequisite of having a visa is a decisive factor in the 
intergovernmental relationship between the destination State and the country of origin. Though 
recognizing a country of origin as an SCO may best serve the receiving State’s purposes by 
deterring and discouraging potential SCO refugee claimants from seeking international 
protection in the host country, the forgotten element is the life, freedom, and physical integrity of 
citizens that are violated in the country of origin deemed safe.  
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The life-threatening and dangerous ways asylum seekers manage to reach EU territory and the 
growing number of refugee claimants arriving at the EU’s external borders reveal that the 
immediate, irresponsible and discriminatory responses of certain EU Member States to all these 
disasters may not resolve the asylum crisis in the long term and do not diminish the security, 
economic and social concerns raised by the presence of refugee applicants. Even restrictive 
measures such as the SCO and STC rules are not effective enough to reduce the heavy burden of 
refugee requests on such a large scale.  
It is time for Western countries to wake up and accept their responsibility in strengthening the 
refugee protection system, as it is more vulnerable now than it has been at any other time. 
Countries that are far from refugee-producing zones, such as Canada and the United States, 
should support countries that border the crisis zones by accepting displaced persons and 
establishing a collaborative, workable program for allocating a specified number of asylum 
seekers to each receiving country in accordance with political, financial and population 
conditions, the cultural proximity between the asylum seekers and the refugee country in 
question and the ability of the third country nationals’ community to support and integrate the 
new asylum seekers, while also attempting to identify and cure the issues that produce refugees 
in the country of origin.  
Fortunately, the Canadian government, since 2015, has pursued a more liberal and hospitable 
refugee policy regarding the current refugee crisis, in particular, the refugee applications of 
Syrian asylum seekers. With the main purposes of giving effective response to the refugee crisis 
and continuing its commitment to resettle more Syrian refugees, the Canadian government has 
put in place certain programs such as “ the Private Sponsorship of Syrian Refugees Program”710, 
“the Government-Assisted Refugees Program”711, and “the Blended Visa Office-Referred 
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Program”712 which ultimately has resulted the arrival of 32,437 Syrian refugees since November 
4, 2015.713  
One the other hand, it is expected from the EU Member States to put forward the emergency 
responses and accept their responsibilities to manage the rising number of asylum seekers 
movement, in particular, the Syrian asylum seekers, and to resolve the refugee crisis burdened, in 
particular, on the Eastern and the Southern EU Member States. In this regard, certain steps can 
be very helpful to reduce the financial and social costs of the overcrowded refugee sites in some 
EU Member States such as Greece or Italy. As suggested by UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Filippo Grandi, it is time for all EU Member States to step up, observe their regional 
and international human rights commitments, and accelerate the execution of legal options such 
as family reunification and relocation through the EU’s official relocation programme714. This 
program is proposed by the European Commission and the Council with the main purposes of 
transfering, through safer pathways, the persons in need of international protection from the 
Eastern and the Southern EU frontiers to the Northern and the Western EU Member States, 
protecting them from being exploited by the human smugglers, and reinforcing the solidarity 
between the EU Member States in controlling the mass movement of asylum seekers in EU.715 
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The Western countries can no longer ignore the disturbing fact that human rights disasters are a 
permanent feature of a global society. Remaining passive before all these human rights crises, 
closing borders or applying deterrent asylum rules are not acceptable responses either to a 
specific situation or as a long-term solution. Many rejected or deported asylum seekers continue 
trying to reach a country they consider safe for themselves by risking their lives on a more 
dangerous journey, if they are not killed or imprisoned upon being returned to their “safe” 
country of origin.  
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